David G. Winter
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
David G. Winter has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Abigail J. Stewart
3 shared publications- Abigail J. Stewart
University of Michigan
2 shared publications David C. McClelland
2 shared publications- Elena Semenova
Free University of Berlin
2 shared publications - Amy K. Richardson
Univ Michigan, Dept Psychol, 530 Church St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
1 shared publication - Benjamin T. Blankenship
Department of Psychology James Madison University Virginia USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 November 2021
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 42 (6) , 1091-1098
Discontents, Doctrines, and Disruptions
- 8 November 2021
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 42 (6) , 1091-1098
Discontents, Doctrines, and Disruptions
- 1 November 2021
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology
- Vol. 27 (4) , 524-533
U.S. Senators’ power motivation and their votes for war versus peace.
- 1 November 2021
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology
- Vol. 27 (4) , 524-533
U.S. Senators’ power motivation and their votes for war versus peace.
- 24 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy
- Vol. 21 (1) , 64-98
Trust and tribulation: Racial identity centrality, institutional trust, and support for candidates in the 2020 US presidential election
We examined how racial‐ethnic identity centrality, or the importance of race/ethnicity in people's self‐perceptions, affected peoples’ support for the Democratic and Republican candidates in the 2020 US election. We explored this association by examining the mediating role of trust in important social institutions. In Study 1, we examined these effects by comparing the pattern of relationships among people of color (POC) and white people, using a sample of 177 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participants. In Study 2, we expanded our focus on different racial‐ethnic groups, by comparing effects for Black, Latinx, Asian American/Pacific Islander (AAPI), and white participants, using a sample of 530 MTurk workers. Although there were a few findings that ran contrary to our expectations, the two studies generally found that trust in institutions that challenge the status quo, such as the media, explained the relationship between identity centrality and support for candidates among POC, especially Black and Latinx participants. We also found that trust in institutions that uphold the status quo, such as police and courts, explained the relationship between racial‐ethnic identity centrality and support for candidates among white people.
- 24 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy
- Vol. 21 (1) , 64-98
Trust and tribulation: Racial identity centrality, institutional trust, and support for candidates in the 2020 US presidential election
We examined how racial‐ethnic identity centrality, or the importance of race/ethnicity in people's self‐perceptions, affected peoples’ support for the Democratic and Republican candidates in the 2020 US election. We explored this association by examining the mediating role of trust in important social institutions. In Study 1, we examined these effects by comparing the pattern of relationships among people of color (POC) and white people, using a sample of 177 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participants. In Study 2, we expanded our focus on different racial‐ethnic groups, by comparing effects for Black, Latinx, Asian American/Pacific Islander (AAPI), and white participants, using a sample of 530 MTurk workers. Although there were a few findings that ran contrary to our expectations, the two studies generally found that trust in institutions that challenge the status quo, such as the media, explained the relationship between identity centrality and support for candidates among POC, especially Black and Latinx participants. We also found that trust in institutions that uphold the status quo, such as police and courts, explained the relationship between racial‐ethnic identity centrality and support for candidates among white people.
- 3 February 2020
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 41 (4) , 813-834
A Motivational Analysis of Russian Presidents, 1994–2018
This article analyzes the motivations of the three presidents of Russia since the end of the Soviet Union: Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev. Imagery for the achievement, affiliation, and power motives was scored from the texts of annual presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly from 1994 through 2018. Although there were fluctuations from president to president, and from year to year within each term, the Russian presidents overall tended to be higher in achievement than power. This contrasts with many political leaders from other countries and suggests modification in previous conclusions about the problems of high achievement motivation in politics. The scores of each president are related to the events and policies of that president's term of office. The third term of Vladimir Putin is particularly interesting, because his achievement scores were lower, and power and affiliation scores higher, than in his previous terms. These changes seem to fit with his changes in foreign and domestic policies from his earlier terms.
- 3 February 2020
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 41 (4) , 813-834
A Motivational Analysis of Russian Presidents, 1994–2018
This article analyzes the motivations of the three presidents of Russia since the end of the Soviet Union: Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev. Imagery for the achievement, affiliation, and power motives was scored from the texts of annual presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly from 1994 through 2018. Although there were fluctuations from president to president, and from year to year within each term, the Russian presidents overall tended to be higher in achievement than power. This contrasts with many political leaders from other countries and suggests modification in previous conclusions about the problems of high achievement motivation in politics. The scores of each president are related to the events and policies of that president's term of office. The third term of Vladimir Putin is particularly interesting, because his achievement scores were lower, and power and affiliation scores higher, than in his previous terms. These changes seem to fit with his changes in foreign and domestic policies from his earlier terms.
- 8 July 2019
- Published by Inference: International Review of Science in Inference: International Review of Science
- Vol. 4 (4)
On Power Motive Imagery
Power motivation is associated with conflict escalation, according to David Winter—a thesis that Jason Quinn and Laurel Stone agree with. Nevertheless, Winter has some corrections for Quinn and Stone.
- 8 July 2019
- Published by Inference: International Review of Science in Inference: International Review of Science
- Vol. 4 (4)
On Power Motive Imagery
Power motivation is associated with conflict escalation, according to David Winter—a thesis that Jason Quinn and Laurel Stone agree with. Nevertheless, Winter has some corrections for Quinn and Stone.
- 1 July 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Politics, Groups, and Identities
- Vol. 7 (3) , 695-699
Introduction to symposium on “Themes of gender and identity in the 2016 US presidential election”
(2019). Introduction to symposium on “Themes of gender and identity in the 2016 US presidential election”. Politics, Groups, and Identities. Ahead of Print.
- 1 July 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Politics, Groups, and Identities
- Vol. 7 (3) , 695-699
Introduction to symposium on “Themes of gender and identity in the 2016 US presidential election”
(2019). Introduction to symposium on “Themes of gender and identity in the 2016 US presidential election”. Politics, Groups, and Identities. Ahead of Print.
- 1 February 2019
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology
- Vol. 25 (1) , 72-85
Soviet and German implicit perceptions of mutual threat, 1939–1941.
- 1 February 2019
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology
- Vol. 25 (1) , 72-85
Soviet and German implicit perceptions of mutual threat, 1939–1941.
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Wiley in Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy
- Vol. 18 (1) , 155-171
What Does Trump Really Want?
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Wiley in Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy
- Vol. 18 (1) , 155-171
What Does Trump Really Want?
- 1 August 2013
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology
- Vol. 19 (3) , 222-239
Khrushchev visits the Bolshoi: [More than] a footnote to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
- 1 August 2013
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology
- Vol. 19 (3) , 222-239
Khrushchev visits the Bolshoi: [More than] a footnote to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
- 1 July 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict
- Vol. 4 (2) , 144-154
Scoring motive imagery in documents from four Middle East opposition groups
Research with an enlarged dataset, containing additional documents to supplement the Smith, Suedfeld, Conway, & Winter. ( 2008 Smith, A. G. , Suedfeld, P. , Conway, L. G. and Winter, D. G. 2008. The language of violence: Distinguishing terrorist from non-terrorist groups using thematic content analysis. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 1: 142–163. [Taylor & Francis Online] [Google Scholar] ) study, confirms earlier findings that documents issued by terrorist groups express higher levels of power motive imagery and affiliation motive imagery (directed toward members of their own group or cause) than documents issued by non-terrorist groups with similar political views. However, the motive imagery scores showed few significant changes during the period before terrorist attacks carried out or inspired by the group. This suggests that motive imagery scores were of limited use in predicting terrorist attacks, at least for the groups and time period of this study.
- 1 July 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict
- Vol. 4 (2) , 144-154
Scoring motive imagery in documents from four Middle East opposition groups
Research with an enlarged dataset, containing additional documents to supplement the Smith, Suedfeld, Conway, & Winter. ( 2008 Smith, A. G. , Suedfeld, P. , Conway, L. G. and Winter, D. G. 2008. The language of violence: Distinguishing terrorist from non-terrorist groups using thematic content analysis. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 1: 142–163. [Taylor & Francis Online] [Google Scholar] ) study, confirms earlier findings that documents issued by terrorist groups express higher levels of power motive imagery and affiliation motive imagery (directed toward members of their own group or cause) than documents issued by non-terrorist groups with similar political views. However, the motive imagery scores showed few significant changes during the period before terrorist attacks carried out or inspired by the group. This suggests that motive imagery scores were of limited use in predicting terrorist attacks, at least for the groups and time period of this study.