Satish Thosar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Satish Thosar has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sanjiv Jaggia
Orfalea College of Business, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, USA
6 shared publications - Bradley Schwandt
School of Business, University of Redlands, Redlands, CA 92373, USA
1 shared publication Sanjiv Jaggia
California Polytechnic State University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 15 August 2024
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Managerial Finance
- Vol. 50 (11) , 1920-1933
Internal versus external CEO hires: key differences
Purpose: Historically, most CEOs were promoted from within the organization. The internal candidates offer continuity, are well known to the Board, and have deep institutional knowledge. However, if the Board is seeking changes to the firm’s strategy, operations, or culture, they turn to outside candidates with proven track records. Shareholders react positively to the announcement of an external successor but the longer-term evidence on the performance front is mixed. Most empirical studies have tended to focus on a narrow aspect of the hiring choice, whereas we undertake a more holistic examination involving various elements.Design/methodology/approach: We consider the salience of the CEO hiring choice from several perspectives: educational background, gender, compensation, and firm performance. We use a propensity score matching approach to ensure comparability between internally promoted and externally hired CEOs. The observed covariates for the matching algorithm include firm size, CEO tenure, and industry sector.Findings: We find that external CEOs are significantly more likely to have received their undergraduate degree from an elite institution, majored in a STEM discipline, and earned an MBA credential. They earn higher total compensation (with a higher proportion of equity-linked performance pay) but do not outperform in terms of the ROA or Tobin’s Q metrics. Gender does not appear to play a distinguishing role in the internal versus external hiring choice. We also do not detect significant differences in firm performance outcomes associated with educational pedigree, a STEM education, or an MBA credential, whether the CEO is internally promoted or hired externally.Originality/value: Our paper contributes by providing novel evidence on the impact of educational background on external CEO hiring decisions. Our findings carry implications for testing hypotheses stemming from signaling theory and exploring the significant role of social networks associated with elite educational institutions. Also, the finding that externally appointed CEOs do not outperform their internally promoted counterparts may be noteworthy for corporate boards' hiring committees, especially when reviewing candidates who are edge cases.
- 15 August 2024
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Managerial Finance
- Vol. 50 (11) , 1920-1933
Internal versus external CEO hires: key differences
Purpose: Historically, most CEOs were promoted from within the organization. The internal candidates offer continuity, are well known to the Board, and have deep institutional knowledge. However, if the Board is seeking changes to the firm’s strategy, operations, or culture, they turn to outside candidates with proven track records. Shareholders react positively to the announcement of an external successor but the longer-term evidence on the performance front is mixed. Most empirical studies have tended to focus on a narrow aspect of the hiring choice, whereas we undertake a more holistic examination involving various elements.Design/methodology/approach: We consider the salience of the CEO hiring choice from several perspectives: educational background, gender, compensation, and firm performance. We use a propensity score matching approach to ensure comparability between internally promoted and externally hired CEOs. The observed covariates for the matching algorithm include firm size, CEO tenure, and industry sector.Findings: We find that external CEOs are significantly more likely to have received their undergraduate degree from an elite institution, majored in a STEM discipline, and earned an MBA credential. They earn higher total compensation (with a higher proportion of equity-linked performance pay) but do not outperform in terms of the ROA or Tobin’s Q metrics. Gender does not appear to play a distinguishing role in the internal versus external hiring choice. We also do not detect significant differences in firm performance outcomes associated with educational pedigree, a STEM education, or an MBA credential, whether the CEO is internally promoted or hired externally.Originality/value: Our paper contributes by providing novel evidence on the impact of educational background on external CEO hiring decisions. Our findings carry implications for testing hypotheses stemming from signaling theory and exploring the significant role of social networks associated with elite educational institutions. Also, the finding that externally appointed CEOs do not outperform their internally promoted counterparts may be noteworthy for corporate boards' hiring committees, especially when reviewing candidates who are edge cases.
- 25 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Advances in Economic Research
- Vol. 30 (3) , 347-349
A Firm-Level Evaluation of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
- 25 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Advances in Economic Research
- Vol. 30 (3) , 347-349
A Firm-Level Evaluation of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
- 12 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Advances in Economic Research
- Vol. 30 (1) , 111-113
A Speculative Explanation for Demand Persistence in the Post-Pandemic Period
- 12 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Advances in Economic Research
- Vol. 30 (1) , 111-113
A Speculative Explanation for Demand Persistence in the Post-Pandemic Period
- 14 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 54 (26) , 3016-3030
Education and risk-taking incentives: an analysis of CEO compensation contracts
We explore whether CEO educational background attributes and other demographic variables such as gender and age play a role in influencing the incentive features―pay-for-performance (delta) and pay-for-risk (vega)―embedded in their compensation contracts. We interpret these incentive features as robust proxies for idiosyncratic risk tolerance, which is an important element in diverse streams of research including but not limited to the upper echelons theory and the concomitant investigations into the drivers of strategic management choices and organizational outcomes. Using a unique and hand collected dataset, we uncover a number of interesting relationships. For instance, we find that CEOs graduating from elite schools and those with undergraduate majors in subjects like business/economics or the humanities display higher exposure to incentive pay compared to more specialized fields like engineering/science. Our study links observable demographic characteristics to the risk-taking propensities of CEOs which in our view would be of interest to hiring and compensation committees on corporate boards as they select (or renew the contracts of) senior executives.
- 14 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 54 (26) , 3016-3030
Education and risk-taking incentives: an analysis of CEO compensation contracts
We explore whether CEO educational background attributes and other demographic variables such as gender and age play a role in influencing the incentive features―pay-for-performance (delta) and pay-for-risk (vega)―embedded in their compensation contracts. We interpret these incentive features as robust proxies for idiosyncratic risk tolerance, which is an important element in diverse streams of research including but not limited to the upper echelons theory and the concomitant investigations into the drivers of strategic management choices and organizational outcomes. Using a unique and hand collected dataset, we uncover a number of interesting relationships. For instance, we find that CEOs graduating from elite schools and those with undergraduate majors in subjects like business/economics or the humanities display higher exposure to incentive pay compared to more specialized fields like engineering/science. Our study links observable demographic characteristics to the risk-taking propensities of CEOs which in our view would be of interest to hiring and compensation committees on corporate boards as they select (or renew the contracts of) senior executives.
- 30 April 2021
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Managerial Finance
- Vol. 47 (10) , 1465-1485
CEO management style: does educational background play a role?
Purpose: The corporate finance literature has largely treated individual managers as uniform entities, leaving unexplained the large heterogeneity in corporate practices. The authors explore whether educational background attributes, such as a bachelor's degree from an elite institution and the field of study, influence CEO management style manifested in objectively measurable outcomes at the firm level.Design/methodology/approach: The authors construct a unique data set from various sources. The management-style variables encompass investment, financial, organizational strategy policy choices, and performance outcomes. They standardize the style variables by industry sector and express deviations from industry means into three categories (low, medium, high). The ordered logit models suggest that educational background attributes influence management style across several dimensions.Findings: The authors document numerous statistically and economically significant results. For instance, an elite education translates to superior market performance as measured by Tobin's Q. A background in science/technology manifests in more (less) spending on R&D (advertising) and less exposure to financial risk for the firm. The authors also find that gender plays almost no role, while CEO age has a nonlinear influence role in affecting management style.Research limitations/implications: The study posits that educational background plays an important role along several dimensions such as skill and character development, signaling and network building. While these effects are difficult to disentangle, they all arguably influence an individual's ability to perform complex tasks such as running a company.Originality/value: The paper contributes to the growing literature on the drivers of CEO style and performance. Previous studies have examined the role of a CEO's elite educational background on firm performance outcomes and have reported either no or limited association. In contrast, the authors document that an elite education is strongly linked to superior market performance but not to accounting-based performance measures. They also find that CEOs who major in science/technology exhibit markedly different management styles compared to their counterparts with backgrounds in business/economics or the humanities.
- 30 April 2021
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Managerial Finance
- Vol. 47 (10) , 1465-1485
CEO management style: does educational background play a role?
Purpose: The corporate finance literature has largely treated individual managers as uniform entities, leaving unexplained the large heterogeneity in corporate practices. The authors explore whether educational background attributes, such as a bachelor's degree from an elite institution and the field of study, influence CEO management style manifested in objectively measurable outcomes at the firm level.Design/methodology/approach: The authors construct a unique data set from various sources. The management-style variables encompass investment, financial, organizational strategy policy choices, and performance outcomes. They standardize the style variables by industry sector and express deviations from industry means into three categories (low, medium, high). The ordered logit models suggest that educational background attributes influence management style across several dimensions.Findings: The authors document numerous statistically and economically significant results. For instance, an elite education translates to superior market performance as measured by Tobin's Q. A background in science/technology manifests in more (less) spending on R&D (advertising) and less exposure to financial risk for the firm. The authors also find that gender plays almost no role, while CEO age has a nonlinear influence role in affecting management style.Research limitations/implications: The study posits that educational background plays an important role along several dimensions such as skill and character development, signaling and network building. While these effects are difficult to disentangle, they all arguably influence an individual's ability to perform complex tasks such as running a company.Originality/value: The paper contributes to the growing literature on the drivers of CEO style and performance. Previous studies have examined the role of a CEO's elite educational background on firm performance outcomes and have reported either no or limited association. In contrast, the authors document that an elite education is strongly linked to superior market performance but not to accounting-based performance measures. They also find that CEOs who major in science/technology exhibit markedly different management styles compared to their counterparts with backgrounds in business/economics or the humanities.
- Open Access
- 1 February 2019
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Risk and Financial Management
- Vol. 12 (1) , 24
Has ‘Too Big To Fail’ Been Solved? A Longitudinal Analysis of Major U.S. Banks
In the wake of the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008, there has been extensive commentary and regulatory focus on the ‘Too Big to Fail’ issue. In this paper, we survey the proposed solutions and regulatory initiatives that have been undertaken. We conduct a longitudinal analysis of major U.S. banks in four discrete time periods: pre-crisis (2005–2007), crisis (2008–2010), post-crisis (2011–2013) and normalcy (2014–2016). We find that risk metrics such as leverage and volatility which spiked during the crisis have reverted to pre-crisis levels and there has been improvement in the proportion of equity capital available to cushion against asset value deterioration. However, banks have grown in size and it does not appear as if their business models have been redirected toward more traditional lending activities. We believe that it is premature to conclude that ‘Too Big to Fail” has been solved, but macro-prudential regulation is now much more effective and, consequently, banks are on a considerably sounder footing since the depths of the crisis.
- 1 February 2019
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Risk and Financial Management
- Vol. 12 (1) , 24
Open AccessHas ‘Too Big To Fail’ Been Solved? A Longitudinal Analysis of Major U.S. Banks
In the wake of the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008, there has been extensive commentary and regulatory focus on the ‘Too Big to Fail’ issue. In this paper, we survey the proposed solutions and regulatory initiatives that have been undertaken. We conduct a longitudinal analysis of major U.S. banks in four discrete time periods: pre-crisis (2005–2007), crisis (2008–2010), post-crisis (2011–2013) and normalcy (2014–2016). We find that risk metrics such as leverage and volatility which spiked during the crisis have reverted to pre-crisis levels and there has been improvement in the proportion of equity capital available to cushion against asset value deterioration. However, banks have grown in size and it does not appear as if their business models have been redirected toward more traditional lending activities. We believe that it is premature to conclude that ‘Too Big to Fail” has been solved, but macro-prudential regulation is now much more effective and, consequently, banks are on a considerably sounder footing since the depths of the crisis.
- 6 October 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics and Finance
- Vol. 43 (3) , 569-581
An evaluation of chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in a competing risks framework
- 6 October 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics and Finance
- Vol. 43 (3) , 569-581
An evaluation of chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in a competing risks framework
- 12 June 2017
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Managerial Finance
- Vol. 43 (6) , 646-662
Pay-for-performance incentives in the finance sector and the financial crisis
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate executive compensation in the finance sector during the periods surrounding the crisis with a view to determining whether compensation incentives were associated with excessive risk taking. Design/methodology/approach: The authors compare pay-for-performance sensitivity (PFPS) parameters for the finance sector before, during, and after the financial crisis. The authors also employ the technology sector as a comparison benchmark. Findings: The authors find that CEO compensation is strongly associated with the accounting-based return on assets performance measure in the finance sector particularly in the pre-crisis period; the relationship is amplified in larger firms. In contrast, the technology sector exhibits PFPS only for the market-based stockholder return measure with smaller firms displaying greater sensitivity. Originality/value: From a public policy perspective, it is desirable that PFPS for senior executives in the finance sector is muted. This is due to the risk-shifting incentives specific to the sector whereby profits flow to managers/stockholders while catastrophic losses can be socialized through taxpayer funded bailouts. The findings imply that compensation practices in the finance sector remain a potential concern for systemic stability. In addition to academics and practitioners, the paper may be of interest to financial regulators. In the authors opinion they should consider monitoring PFPS in addition to capital ratios, credit default swap spreads, and other metrics in their risk containment strategies.
- 12 June 2017
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Managerial Finance
- Vol. 43 (6) , 646-662
Pay-for-performance incentives in the finance sector and the financial crisis
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to investigate executive compensation in the finance sector during the periods surrounding the crisis with a view to determining whether compensation incentives were associated with excessive risk taking. Design/methodology/approach: The authors compare pay-for-performance sensitivity (PFPS) parameters for the finance sector before, during, and after the financial crisis. The authors also employ the technology sector as a comparison benchmark. Findings: The authors find that CEO compensation is strongly associated with the accounting-based return on assets performance measure in the finance sector particularly in the pre-crisis period; the relationship is amplified in larger firms. In contrast, the technology sector exhibits PFPS only for the market-based stockholder return measure with smaller firms displaying greater sensitivity. Originality/value: From a public policy perspective, it is desirable that PFPS for senior executives in the finance sector is muted. This is due to the risk-shifting incentives specific to the sector whereby profits flow to managers/stockholders while catastrophic losses can be socialized through taxpayer funded bailouts. The findings imply that compensation practices in the finance sector remain a potential concern for systemic stability. In addition to academics and practitioners, the paper may be of interest to financial regulators. In the authors opinion they should consider monitoring PFPS in addition to capital ratios, credit default swap spreads, and other metrics in their risk containment strategies.
- 1 December 1993
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 3 (4) , 447-457
Multiple bids as a consequence of target management resistance: A count data approach
- 1 December 1993
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 3 (4) , 447-457
Multiple bids as a consequence of target management resistance: A count data approach