Michail Moraitis
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Michail Moraitis has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Elena Dubrova
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
4 shared publications - Martin Brisfors
Royal Institute of Technology (KTH)
2 shared publications - Gabriel Klasson Landin
Royal Institute of Technology (KTH)
1 shared publication Håkan Englund
Ericsson ResearchPlatform Security Ericsson AB, Lund, Sweden
1 shared publication- Martin Brisfors
Department of Electrical Engineering, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication Niklas Lindskog
Ericsson ResearchPlatform Security Ericsson AB, Lund, Sweden
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 25 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 372-387
Attacking and Securing the Clock Randomization and Duplication Side-Channel Attack Countermeasure
- 25 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 372-387
Attacking and Securing the Clock Randomization and Duplication Side-Channel Attack Countermeasure
- Open Access
- 8 November 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 11, 127931-127955
FPGA Bitstream Modification: Attacks and Countermeasures
Advances in FPGA technology in recent years have resulted in an expansion of its usage in a very wide spectrum of applications. Apart from serving the traditional prototyping purposes, FPGAs are currently regarded as an integral part of embedded systems used in many industries, including communication, medical, aerospace, automotive, and military. Moreover, the emerging trend of AI has found FPGAs to be at the technological forefront with their use as deep learning acceleration platforms. The demand for FPGAs has grown to the point that major companies (e.g. Amazon) are offering cloud-based access to FPGAs, known as FPGA-as-a-Service. In many applications, FPGAs handle sensitive data and/or host cryptographic algorithm implementations. These FPGAs are not always located in a tamper-resistant environment, which makes their security a major concern, especially in light of the ever-growing number of publications demonstrating effective attacks specifically tailored to exploit the physical traits of FPGA implementations. In this survey, we cover the subset of those attacks that involve tampering with the FPGA configuration bitstream. We start by discussing how the FPGA vendors attempt to protect their products and how malicious parties try to overcome this protection. We then proceed to present the different bitstream modification attacks that can be found in the literature organized according to their targets. Finally, we present various countermeasures that can be deployed, drawing on bibliographic references from works specifically focused on FPGA bitstream protection, as well as those initially proposed for different purposes or devices that can be adapted for bitstream protection.
- 8 November 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 11, 127931-127955
Open AccessFPGA Bitstream Modification: Attacks and Countermeasures
Advances in FPGA technology in recent years have resulted in an expansion of its usage in a very wide spectrum of applications. Apart from serving the traditional prototyping purposes, FPGAs are currently regarded as an integral part of embedded systems used in many industries, including communication, medical, aerospace, automotive, and military. Moreover, the emerging trend of AI has found FPGAs to be at the technological forefront with their use as deep learning acceleration platforms. The demand for FPGAs has grown to the point that major companies (e.g. Amazon) are offering cloud-based access to FPGAs, known as FPGA-as-a-Service. In many applications, FPGAs handle sensitive data and/or host cryptographic algorithm implementations. These FPGAs are not always located in a tamper-resistant environment, which makes their security a major concern, especially in light of the ever-growing number of publications demonstrating effective attacks specifically tailored to exploit the physical traits of FPGA implementations. In this survey, we cover the subset of those attacks that involve tampering with the FPGA configuration bitstream. We start by discussing how the FPGA vendors attempt to protect their products and how malicious parties try to overcome this protection. We then proceed to present the different bitstream modification attacks that can be found in the literature organized according to their targets. Finally, we present various countermeasures that can be deployed, drawing on bibliographic references from works specifically focused on FPGA bitstream protection, as well as those initially proposed for different purposes or devices that can be adapted for bitstream protection.
- 25 July 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Design & Test
- Vol. 41 (5) , 7-16
Securing CRYSTALS-Kyber in FPGA Using Duplication and Clock Randomization
Editor’s notes: Postquantum cryptographic circuits bring in new implementation for which new side-channel attacks (SCAs) have been discovered including machine-learning-guided SCAs. This article presents a lightweight countermeasure to simultaneously prevent both side-channel and fault attacks. —Swarup Bhunia, University of Florida, USA
- 25 July 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Design & Test
- Vol. 41 (5) , 7-16
Securing CRYSTALS-Kyber in FPGA Using Duplication and Clock Randomization
Editor’s notes: Postquantum cryptographic circuits bring in new implementation for which new side-channel attacks (SCAs) have been discovered including machine-learning-guided SCAs. This article presents a lightweight countermeasure to simultaneously prevent both side-channel and fault attacks. —Swarup Bhunia, University of Florida, USA
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 38-53
Do Not Rely on Clock Randomization: A Side-Channel Attack on a Protected Hardware Implementation of AES
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 38-53
Do Not Rely on Clock Randomization: A Side-Channel Attack on a Protected Hardware Implementation of AES
- Open Access
- 16 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
- Vol. 7 (1) , 11-24
FPGA Design Deobfuscation by Iterative LUT Modification at Bitstream Level
Hardware obfuscation is a well-known countermeasure against reverse engineering. For FPGA designs, obfuscation can be implemented with a small overhead by using underutilised logic cells; however, its effectiveness depends on the stealthiness of the added redundancy. In this paper, we show that it is possible to deobfuscate an SRAM FPGA design by ensuring the full controllability of each instantiated look-up table input via iterative bitstream modification. The presented algorithm works directly on bitstream and does not require the possession of a flattened netlist. The feasibility of our approach is verified on the example of an obfuscated SNOW 3G design implemented on a Xilinx 7-series FPGA.
- 16 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
- Vol. 7 (1) , 11-24
Open AccessFPGA Design Deobfuscation by Iterative LUT Modification at Bitstream Level
Hardware obfuscation is a well-known countermeasure against reverse engineering. For FPGA designs, obfuscation can be implemented with a small overhead by using underutilised logic cells; however, its effectiveness depends on the stealthiness of the added redundancy. In this paper, we show that it is possible to deobfuscate an SRAM FPGA design by ensuring the full controllability of each instantiated look-up table input via iterative bitstream modification. The presented algorithm works directly on bitstream and does not require the possession of a flattened netlist. The feasibility of our approach is verified on the example of an obfuscated SNOW 3G design implemented on a Xilinx 7-series FPGA.
- 17 March 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs
- Vol. 68 (5) , 1710-1714
Can Deep Learning Break a True Random Number Generator?
True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) create a hardware-based, non-deterministic noise that is used for generating keys, initialization vectors, and nonces in a variety of applications requiring cryptographic protection. A compromised TRNG may lead to a system-wide loss of security. In this brief, we show that an attack combining power analysis with bitstream modification is capable of classifying the output bits of a TRNG implemented in FPGAs from a single power measurement. We demonstrate the attack on the example of an open source AIS-20/31 compliant ring oscillator-based TRNG implemented in Xilinx Artix-7 28nm FPGAs. The combined attack opens a new attack vector which makes possible what is not achievable with pure bitstream modification or side-channel analysis.
- 17 March 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs
- Vol. 68 (5) , 1710-1714
Can Deep Learning Break a True Random Number Generator?
True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) create a hardware-based, non-deterministic noise that is used for generating keys, initialization vectors, and nonces in a variety of applications requiring cryptographic protection. A compromised TRNG may lead to a system-wide loss of security. In this brief, we show that an attack combining power analysis with bitstream modification is capable of classifying the output bits of a TRNG implemented in FPGAs from a single power measurement. We demonstrate the attack on the example of an open source AIS-20/31 compliant ring oscillator-based TRNG implemented in Xilinx Artix-7 28nm FPGAs. The combined attack opens a new attack vector which makes possible what is not achievable with pure bitstream modification or side-channel analysis.