Christian Houborg
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Christian Houborg has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Benjamin Jan Andersson
Department of Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet, Retzius väg 8, 17177, Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication- Emily J. A-Izzeddin
Justus Liebig University Gießen, Germany
1 shared publication - Filipp Schmidt
Justus Liebig University Giessen, Department of Psychology, Giessen, Germany
1 shared publication H. Henrik Ehrsson
Department of Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet, Retzius väg 8, 17177, Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication- Henning Tiedemann
Department of Experimental Psychology, Justus Liebig University Giessen
1 shared publication - Konstantina Kilteni
Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
How we draw and recognize things that don’t exist
How do we make sense of something we’ve never seen before? Classifying objects into superordinate classes like ‘animal’ is a key step in interpreting novel experiences, but is challenging because radically different items (e.g., octopus, rabbit) must somehow be grouped together. In general, no single feature is shared by all members. We reasoned that to classify or imagine novel items from outside the distribution of previous experiences, observers parse objects into meaningful component features that they can mentally recombine (‘compositionality’). To test this, we asked participants to draw familiar and novel members of nine superordinate object classes. We then asked other participants to classify the drawings, and mark and label their defining ‘parts’. We find that human classification performance is well predicted by a Bayesian classifier that optimally combines the part labels, suggesting humans can create and classify out-of-distribution experiences through a compositional generative representation of object features.
Open AccessHow we draw and recognize things that don’t exist
How do we make sense of something we’ve never seen before? Classifying objects into superordinate classes like ‘animal’ is a key step in interpreting novel experiences, but is challenging because radically different items (e.g., octopus, rabbit) must somehow be grouped together. In general, no single feature is shared by all members. We reasoned that to classify or imagine novel items from outside the distribution of previous experiences, observers parse objects into meaningful component features that they can mentally recombine (‘compositionality’). To test this, we asked participants to draw familiar and novel members of nine superordinate object classes. We then asked other participants to classify the drawings, and mark and label their defining ‘parts’. We find that human classification performance is well predicted by a Bayesian classifier that optimally combines the part labels, suggesting humans can create and classify out-of-distribution experiences through a compositional generative representation of object features.
- Open Access
- 24 April 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 9 (1) , 1-9
Motor imagery involves predicting the sensory consequences of the imagined movement
Research on motor imagery has identified many similarities between imagined and executed actions at the behavioral, physiological and neural levels, thus supporting their “functional equivalence”. In contrast, little is known about their possible “computational equivalence”—specifically, whether the brain’s internal forward models predict the sensory consequences of imagined movements as they do for overt movements. Here, we address this question by assessing whether imagined self-generated touch produces an attenuation of real tactile sensations. Previous studies have shown that self-touch feels less intense compared with touch of external origin because the forward models predict the tactile feedback based on a copy of the motor command. Our results demonstrate that imagined self-touch is attenuated just as real self-touch is and that the imagery-induced attenuation follows the same spatiotemporal principles as does the attenuation elicited by overt movements. We conclude that motor imagery recruits the forward models to predict the sensory consequences of imagined movements.
- 24 April 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 9 (1) , 1-9
Open AccessMotor imagery involves predicting the sensory consequences of the imagined movement
Research on motor imagery has identified many similarities between imagined and executed actions at the behavioral, physiological and neural levels, thus supporting their “functional equivalence”. In contrast, little is known about their possible “computational equivalence”—specifically, whether the brain’s internal forward models predict the sensory consequences of imagined movements as they do for overt movements. Here, we address this question by assessing whether imagined self-generated touch produces an attenuation of real tactile sensations. Previous studies have shown that self-touch feels less intense compared with touch of external origin because the forward models predict the tactile feedback based on a copy of the motor command. Our results demonstrate that imagined self-touch is attenuated just as real self-touch is and that the imagery-induced attenuation follows the same spatiotemporal principles as does the attenuation elicited by overt movements. We conclude that motor imagery recruits the forward models to predict the sensory consequences of imagined movements.