Yaolei Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Yaolei Wang has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jingui Xie
School of Management, Technical University of Munich, 74076 Heilbronn, Germany; and Munich Data Science Institute, Technical University of Munich, 85748 Garching, Germany
3 shared publications - Ping Cao
School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China
3 shared publications Ping Cao
2 shared publicationsDongyuan Zhan
1 shared publication- Dongyuan Zhan
School of Management, Faculty of Business for Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
1 shared publication Huan Liu
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 28 July 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Advance Selling and Upgrading in Priority Queues
Problem definition: We study advance selling and upgrading in a priority queue setting that emerges in the amusement park industry. Customers choose to buy fast-track or regular tickets depending on their heterogeneous waiting costs. At the park entrance, customers can choose tickets based on the observed congestion levels. Customers who purchase tickets in advance suffer from congestion uncertainty. Upgrading options allow customers to purchase regular tickets in advance and upgrade on-site if the congestion turns out to be high. The seller’s objective is to find the optimal pricing scheme to maximize revenue. Methodology/results: We analyze a two-stage model in a queueing game framework. Under full coverage and fixed regular ticket prices, the seller sets the priority ticket prices to maximize the revenue. We investigate two pricing schemes, both with and without upgrading options, under different scenarios depending on the proportion of customers who have access to advance ticket purchasing. When all customers have access to advance ticket purchasing, our findings indicate that the advance-and-spot selling scheme yields the same maximum revenue as the scheme that includes the upgrading option if the spot regular ticket price is not too large; thus, the upgrading option becomes unnecessary. Otherwise, allowing upgrading generates more revenue (and social welfare). Interestingly, although upgrading options offer consumers greater flexibility, they reduce consumer surplus in scenarios where upgrading increases revenue. When some customers only purchase tickets on the spot, our numerical analysis shows that allowing upgrading results in higher revenue when the probability of high system congestion is large and highlights cases when the revenue gap is significant. Finally, we extend our analysis to account for customers’ balking behavior and the additional waiting time incurred when purchasing tickets on the spot, providing a robust check on scheme comparison. Managerial implications: Our paper is one of the first to investigate—in the context of queueing economics—the advance selling strategy together with upgrading option, taking into account arrival rate uncertainty. Our results offer guidance on selling scheme design for ticket sellers and provide one economic explanation for the various pricing policies seen in the amusement park industry. Funding: Financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72101248, 72471215, 72122019, 72471005, and 72031006] is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0410 .
- 28 July 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Advance Selling and Upgrading in Priority Queues
Problem definition: We study advance selling and upgrading in a priority queue setting that emerges in the amusement park industry. Customers choose to buy fast-track or regular tickets depending on their heterogeneous waiting costs. At the park entrance, customers can choose tickets based on the observed congestion levels. Customers who purchase tickets in advance suffer from congestion uncertainty. Upgrading options allow customers to purchase regular tickets in advance and upgrade on-site if the congestion turns out to be high. The seller’s objective is to find the optimal pricing scheme to maximize revenue. Methodology/results: We analyze a two-stage model in a queueing game framework. Under full coverage and fixed regular ticket prices, the seller sets the priority ticket prices to maximize the revenue. We investigate two pricing schemes, both with and without upgrading options, under different scenarios depending on the proportion of customers who have access to advance ticket purchasing. When all customers have access to advance ticket purchasing, our findings indicate that the advance-and-spot selling scheme yields the same maximum revenue as the scheme that includes the upgrading option if the spot regular ticket price is not too large; thus, the upgrading option becomes unnecessary. Otherwise, allowing upgrading generates more revenue (and social welfare). Interestingly, although upgrading options offer consumers greater flexibility, they reduce consumer surplus in scenarios where upgrading increases revenue. When some customers only purchase tickets on the spot, our numerical analysis shows that allowing upgrading results in higher revenue when the probability of high system congestion is large and highlights cases when the revenue gap is significant. Finally, we extend our analysis to account for customers’ balking behavior and the additional waiting time incurred when purchasing tickets on the spot, providing a robust check on scheme comparison. Managerial implications: Our paper is one of the first to investigate—in the context of queueing economics—the advance selling strategy together with upgrading option, taking into account arrival rate uncertainty. Our results offer guidance on selling scheme design for ticket sellers and provide one economic explanation for the various pricing policies seen in the amusement park industry. Funding: Financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72101248, 72471215, 72122019, 72471005, and 72031006] is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0410 .
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Advance Selling and Upgrading in Priority Queues
We study advance selling and upgrading in a priority queue setting that emerges in the amusement park industry. Customers choose to buy fast-track or regular tickets depending on their heterogeneous waiting costs. At the park entrance, customers can choose tickets based on the observed congestion levels. Customers who purchase tickets in advance suffer from congestion uncertainty. Upgrading options allow customers to purchase regular tickets in advance and upgrade on-site if the congestion turns out to be high. The seller's objective is to find the optimal pricing scheme to maximize revenue. We analyze a two-stage model in a queueing game framework. Under full coverage and fixed regular ticket prices, the seller sets the priority ticket prices to maximize the revenue. We investigate two pricing schemes, both with and without upgrading options, under different scenarios depending on the proportion of customers who have access to advance ticket purchasing. When all customers have access to advance ticket purchasing, our findings indicate that advance-and-spot selling scheme yields the same maximum revenue as the scheme that includes the upgrading option if the spot regular ticket price is not too large; thus the upgrading option becomes unnecessary. Otherwise, allowing upgrading generates more revenue (and social welfare). Interestingly, while upgrading options offer consumers greater flexibility, they reduce consumer surplus in scenarios where upgrading increases revenue. When some customers only purchase tickets on the spot, our numerical analysis shows that allowing upgrading results in higher revenue when the probability of high system congestion is large, and highlights cases when the revenue gap is significant. Finally, we extend our analysis to account for customers' balking behavior and the additional waiting time incurred when purchasing tickets on the spot, providing a robust check on scheme comparison. Our paper is one of the first to investigate---in the context of queueing economics---the advance selling strategy together with upgrading option, taking into account arrival rate uncertainty. Our results offer guidance on selling scheme design for ticket sellers, and provide one economic explanation for the various pricing policies seen in the amusement park industry.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAdvance Selling and Upgrading in Priority Queues
We study advance selling and upgrading in a priority queue setting that emerges in the amusement park industry. Customers choose to buy fast-track or regular tickets depending on their heterogeneous waiting costs. At the park entrance, customers can choose tickets based on the observed congestion levels. Customers who purchase tickets in advance suffer from congestion uncertainty. Upgrading options allow customers to purchase regular tickets in advance and upgrade on-site if the congestion turns out to be high. The seller's objective is to find the optimal pricing scheme to maximize revenue. We analyze a two-stage model in a queueing game framework. Under full coverage and fixed regular ticket prices, the seller sets the priority ticket prices to maximize the revenue. We investigate two pricing schemes, both with and without upgrading options, under different scenarios depending on the proportion of customers who have access to advance ticket purchasing. When all customers have access to advance ticket purchasing, our findings indicate that advance-and-spot selling scheme yields the same maximum revenue as the scheme that includes the upgrading option if the spot regular ticket price is not too large; thus the upgrading option becomes unnecessary. Otherwise, allowing upgrading generates more revenue (and social welfare). Interestingly, while upgrading options offer consumers greater flexibility, they reduce consumer surplus in scenarios where upgrading increases revenue. When some customers only purchase tickets on the spot, our numerical analysis shows that allowing upgrading results in higher revenue when the probability of high system congestion is large, and highlights cases when the revenue gap is significant. Finally, we extend our analysis to account for customers' balking behavior and the additional waiting time incurred when purchasing tickets on the spot, providing a robust check on scheme comparison. Our paper is one of the first to investigate---in the context of queueing economics---the advance selling strategy together with upgrading option, taking into account arrival rate uncertainty. Our results offer guidance on selling scheme design for ticket sellers, and provide one economic explanation for the various pricing policies seen in the amusement park industry.
- 29 July 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 28 (11) , 2854-2876
Priority Service Pricing with Heterogeneous Customers: Impact of Delay Cost Distribution
This paper studies the priority pricing problem for a single‐server queueing system with two priority classes in which customers have different sensitivities to delay. The system makes a fixed–delay announcement to inform arriving customers of the expected delay for each class, whereupon each customer must decide which class to join. Any customer who joins the priority class is charged a fixed priority price. Our examination of customers’ joining behavior under any given priority prices reveals that there can be multiple equilibrium delays and that the number of those delays depends on the structure of customers’ delay cost distribution. We characterize the stability of these equilibria and show that the system can reach the largest or smallest equilibrium by making a proper initial delay announcement. In addition, we consider two pricing problems to maximize the system’s long‐run average revenue and social welfare, respectively. The results derived here establish that both the revenue‐maximizing price and the social welfare–maximizing price are quite sensitive to the delay cost distribution. Finally, we investigate the influence of the number of priority classes by extending the two–priority‐class model to a multiple–priority‐class model.
- 29 July 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 28 (11) , 2854-2876
Priority Service Pricing with Heterogeneous Customers: Impact of Delay Cost Distribution
This paper studies the priority pricing problem for a single‐server queueing system with two priority classes in which customers have different sensitivities to delay. The system makes a fixed–delay announcement to inform arriving customers of the expected delay for each class, whereupon each customer must decide which class to join. Any customer who joins the priority class is charged a fixed priority price. Our examination of customers’ joining behavior under any given priority prices reveals that there can be multiple equilibrium delays and that the number of those delays depends on the structure of customers’ delay cost distribution. We characterize the stability of these equilibria and show that the system can reach the largest or smallest equilibrium by making a proper initial delay announcement. In addition, we consider two pricing problems to maximize the system’s long‐run average revenue and social welfare, respectively. The results derived here establish that both the revenue‐maximizing price and the social welfare–maximizing price are quite sensitive to the delay cost distribution. Finally, we investigate the influence of the number of priority classes by extending the two–priority‐class model to a multiple–priority‐class model.
- 14 December 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 57 (19) , 5935-5950
An approximation method for 2-chain flexible queues with preemptive priority
Chaining configurations (e.g. 2-chain) have been widely applied in service systems to improve responsiveness to customer demand. In this paper, we propose an approximation method for the analysis of symmetric parallel queueing systems with 2-chain configuration and preemptive priority. In the queueing system of interest, the arrival processes of different types of customers follow independent Poisson processes with identical arrival rate λ, and service times of different types of customers are exponentially distributed with identical service rate μ. Each server serves its primary customers with preemptive priority. When there are no primary customers in the system, the server serves secondary customers. We first derive the system stability condition. Then, we analyse the system's various performance measures. Our approach relies on the matrix-analytic method coupled with the idle probability of each server, which is proved to be . The average queue length of each queue and the rate that each server serves its secondary customers (i.e. the helping rate) can be estimated using our proposed method. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to demonstrate the accuracy of our proposed approximation method.
- 14 December 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 57 (19) , 5935-5950
An approximation method for 2-chain flexible queues with preemptive priority
Chaining configurations (e.g. 2-chain) have been widely applied in service systems to improve responsiveness to customer demand. In this paper, we propose an approximation method for the analysis of symmetric parallel queueing systems with 2-chain configuration and preemptive priority. In the queueing system of interest, the arrival processes of different types of customers follow independent Poisson processes with identical arrival rate λ, and service times of different types of customers are exponentially distributed with identical service rate μ. Each server serves its primary customers with preemptive priority. When there are no primary customers in the system, the server serves secondary customers. We first derive the system stability condition. Then, we analyse the system's various performance measures. Our approach relies on the matrix-analytic method coupled with the idle probability of each server, which is proved to be . The average queue length of each queue and the rate that each server serves its secondary customers (i.e. the helping rate) can be estimated using our proposed method. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to demonstrate the accuracy of our proposed approximation method.