Ann-Christin Posten
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Ann-Christin Posten has a total of 57 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Elinor Amit
Harvard University
2 shared publications - Jennifer E. Miller
Yale School of Medicine
2 shared publications - Pınar Uğurlar
Department of Psychology, Ozyegin University
2 shared publications Thomas Mussweiler
London Business Sch, London, England
2 shared publications- Tobias Wingen
Faculty of Psychology, FernUniversität in Hagen, Hagen, Germany
2 shared publications Aileen Oeberst
FernUniversität in Hagen
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
No evidence for causal effects of trust in science on intentions for health-related behavior
Many researchers and policymakers assume that interventions targeting trust in science will be key for promoting health-related behaviors, including in the context of curbing the spread of disease. One central finding from the past pandemic is that trust in science predicted health-related protection intentions and behaviors, such as social distancing and vaccination. Yet, it is unclear whether the observed correlation between trust in science and protection intentions does indeed imply causation. Across our studies (total N = 5311), we successfully replicated this correlation. However, when experimentally manipulating self-reported trust in science, we found no evidence for causal effects on protection intentions. This absence of meaningful effects was confirmed by equivalence tests, an internal meta-analysis (N = 3761), and a machine learning algorithm. These results question the causal importance of short-term changes in trust in science for protection intentions. Drawing the right lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic will be essential for effective future policy responses.
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessNo evidence for causal effects of trust in science on intentions for health-related behavior
Many researchers and policymakers assume that interventions targeting trust in science will be key for promoting health-related behaviors, including in the context of curbing the spread of disease. One central finding from the past pandemic is that trust in science predicted health-related protection intentions and behaviors, such as social distancing and vaccination. Yet, it is unclear whether the observed correlation between trust in science and protection intentions does indeed imply causation. Across our studies (total N = 5311), we successfully replicated this correlation. However, when experimentally manipulating self-reported trust in science, we found no evidence for causal effects on protection intentions. This absence of meaningful effects was confirmed by equivalence tests, an internal meta-analysis (N = 3761), and a machine learning algorithm. These results question the causal importance of short-term changes in trust in science for protection intentions. Drawing the right lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic will be essential for effective future policy responses.
- Open Access
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Forensische Psychiatrie, Psychologie, Kriminologie
- Vol. 20 (1) , 73-84
Zur Testfairness der aussagepsychologischen Begutachtungsmethodik: eine Bayes-statistische Analyse anhand von 2000 Gutachten
Zusammenfassung: In aussagepsychologischen Begutachtungen wird geprüft, ob einer Aussage ein Erlebnisbezug unterstellt werden kann. Eine Beauftragung erfolgt meist, wenn die aussagende Person Merkmale aufweist, deren Einordnung psychologische Expertise verlangt. Darunter fallen ein junges Alter, eine Intelligenzminderung oder psychische Störungen. Bislang ist jedoch wenig darüber bekannt, ob und wie sich diese Merkmale auf das Begutachtungsergebnis auswirken. Zudem gibt es Kritik, dass die Begutachtungsmethodik bei diesen Personengruppen zu Benachteiligungen führt oder nicht anwendbar sein könnte. Um diese Kritik der mangelnden Testfairness zu untersuchen, wurde in der vorliegenden Studie ein Datensatz von 2005 Gutachten mittels Bayesstatistischer Regressionsanalysen ausgewertet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass weder demografisch-persönliche noch klinisch-psychologische Merkmale der aussagenden Person einen klaren Zusammenhang mit einem bestimmten Begutachtungsergebnis aufweisen. Die 8 berechneten Regressionsmodelle weisen vielmehr unsichere Effektschätzungen auf, was nahelegt, dass andere Merkmale für das Begutachtungsergebnis bedeutsamer sein müssen. Eine ergänzende korrelative Nachanalyse zwischen kritikrelevanten Merkmalen der aussagenden Person und den Verhinderungsgründen für eine Erlebnisannahme ergab ebenfalls keine Hinweise auf eine (systematische) Benachteiligung bestimmter Personengruppen. Insgesamt sprechen die Befunde für eine ausreichende Testfairness der aussagepsychologischen Begutachtungsmethodik. Eine eingeschränkte Anwendbarkeit der Methodik bei Personen jungen Alters, mit einer Intelligenzminderung oder Symptomen einer psychischen Störung lässt sich nach aktueller Befundlage nicht annehmen.
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Forensische Psychiatrie, Psychologie, Kriminologie
- Vol. 20 (1) , 73-84
Open AccessZur Testfairness der aussagepsychologischen Begutachtungsmethodik: eine Bayes-statistische Analyse anhand von 2000 Gutachten
Zusammenfassung: In aussagepsychologischen Begutachtungen wird geprüft, ob einer Aussage ein Erlebnisbezug unterstellt werden kann. Eine Beauftragung erfolgt meist, wenn die aussagende Person Merkmale aufweist, deren Einordnung psychologische Expertise verlangt. Darunter fallen ein junges Alter, eine Intelligenzminderung oder psychische Störungen. Bislang ist jedoch wenig darüber bekannt, ob und wie sich diese Merkmale auf das Begutachtungsergebnis auswirken. Zudem gibt es Kritik, dass die Begutachtungsmethodik bei diesen Personengruppen zu Benachteiligungen führt oder nicht anwendbar sein könnte. Um diese Kritik der mangelnden Testfairness zu untersuchen, wurde in der vorliegenden Studie ein Datensatz von 2005 Gutachten mittels Bayesstatistischer Regressionsanalysen ausgewertet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass weder demografisch-persönliche noch klinisch-psychologische Merkmale der aussagenden Person einen klaren Zusammenhang mit einem bestimmten Begutachtungsergebnis aufweisen. Die 8 berechneten Regressionsmodelle weisen vielmehr unsichere Effektschätzungen auf, was nahelegt, dass andere Merkmale für das Begutachtungsergebnis bedeutsamer sein müssen. Eine ergänzende korrelative Nachanalyse zwischen kritikrelevanten Merkmalen der aussagenden Person und den Verhinderungsgründen für eine Erlebnisannahme ergab ebenfalls keine Hinweise auf eine (systematische) Benachteiligung bestimmter Personengruppen. Insgesamt sprechen die Befunde für eine ausreichende Testfairness der aussagepsychologischen Begutachtungsmethodik. Eine eingeschränkte Anwendbarkeit der Methodik bei Personen jungen Alters, mit einer Intelligenzminderung oder Symptomen einer psychischen Störung lässt sich nach aktueller Befundlage nicht annehmen.
- Open Access
- 2 January 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Vol. 52 (12) , 4210-4226
You Are Not Alone – Third-Party Punishment by Individuals and Groups Empowers Victims
Third-party punishment communicates with offenders to resocialize them. However, little is known about what it communicates to victims. Considering group contexts, the current research focuses on the effects on victims of either one individual or the entire group punishing offenders. Five preregistered experiments ( N = 1,231; student and online adult samples from Germany and the United Kingdom) demonstrate that various forms of third-party punishment empower victims (Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5) and that this effect is amplified when the entire group supports the punishment (Studies 1–4). Sequential mediation analyses and experimental designs show that punishment restores value consensus, which in turn revalidates victims’ group membership status, thereby empowering victims. Regardless of explicit messages, stand-alone punishment empowers victims (Studies 4 and 5). These findings emphasize the communicative effects of third-party punishment on victims, contributing to our understanding of how punishment can support them in coping.
- 2 January 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Vol. 52 (12) , 4210-4226
Open AccessYou Are Not Alone – Third-Party Punishment by Individuals and Groups Empowers Victims
Third-party punishment communicates with offenders to resocialize them. However, little is known about what it communicates to victims. Considering group contexts, the current research focuses on the effects on victims of either one individual or the entire group punishing offenders. Five preregistered experiments ( N = 1,231; student and online adult samples from Germany and the United Kingdom) demonstrate that various forms of third-party punishment empower victims (Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5) and that this effect is amplified when the entire group supports the punishment (Studies 1–4). Sequential mediation analyses and experimental designs show that punishment restores value consensus, which in turn revalidates victims’ group membership status, thereby empowering victims. Regardless of explicit messages, stand-alone punishment empowers victims (Studies 4 and 5). These findings emphasize the communicative effects of third-party punishment on victims, contributing to our understanding of how punishment can support them in coping.
- Open Access
- 11 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Communications Psychology
- Vol. 4 (1)
No evidence for causal effects of trust in science on intentions for health-related behavior
Many researchers and policymakers assume that interventions targeting trust in science will be key for promoting health-related behaviors, including in the context of curbing the spread of disease. One central finding from the past pandemic is that trust in science predicted health-related protection intentions and behaviors, such as social distancing and vaccination. Yet, it is unclear whether the observed correlation between trust in science and protection intentions does indeed imply causation. Across our studies (total N = 5311), we successfully replicated this correlation. However, when experimentally manipulating self-reported trust in science, we found no evidence for causal effects on protection intentions. This absence of meaningful effects was confirmed by equivalence tests, an internal meta-analysis ( N = 3761), and a machine learning algorithm. These results question the causal importance of short-term changes in trust in science for protection intentions. Drawing the right lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic will be essential for effective future policy responses.
- 11 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Communications Psychology
- Vol. 4 (1)
Open AccessNo evidence for causal effects of trust in science on intentions for health-related behavior
Many researchers and policymakers assume that interventions targeting trust in science will be key for promoting health-related behaviors, including in the context of curbing the spread of disease. One central finding from the past pandemic is that trust in science predicted health-related protection intentions and behaviors, such as social distancing and vaccination. Yet, it is unclear whether the observed correlation between trust in science and protection intentions does indeed imply causation. Across our studies (total N = 5311), we successfully replicated this correlation. However, when experimentally manipulating self-reported trust in science, we found no evidence for causal effects on protection intentions. This absence of meaningful effects was confirmed by equivalence tests, an internal meta-analysis ( N = 3761), and a machine learning algorithm. These results question the causal importance of short-term changes in trust in science for protection intentions. Drawing the right lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic will be essential for effective future policy responses.
- Open Access
- 17 March 2025
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 122 (12)
Maintaining cooperation through vertical communication of trust when removing sanctions
An effective way to foster cooperation is to monitor behavior and sanction freeriding. Yet, previous studies have shown that cooperation quickly declines when sanctioning mechanisms are removed. We test whether explicitly expressing trust in players’ capability to maintain cooperation after the removal of sanctions, i.e., vertical communication of trust, has the potential to alleviate this drop in compliance. Four incentivized public-goods experiments ( N = 2,823) find that the vertical communication of trust maintains cooperation upon the removal of centralized (Study 1), third-party (Study 2a, 2b), and peer punishment (Study 3), and this effect extends beyond single interactions (Study 4). In all studies, vertical trust communication increases mutual trust among players, providing support to the idea that vertically communicating trust can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Extrapolating our findings to natural environments, they suggest that authorities should carefully consider how they communicate the lifting of rules and sanctions.
- 17 March 2025
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 122 (12)
Open AccessMaintaining cooperation through vertical communication of trust when removing sanctions
An effective way to foster cooperation is to monitor behavior and sanction freeriding. Yet, previous studies have shown that cooperation quickly declines when sanctioning mechanisms are removed. We test whether explicitly expressing trust in players’ capability to maintain cooperation after the removal of sanctions, i.e., vertical communication of trust, has the potential to alleviate this drop in compliance. Four incentivized public-goods experiments ( N = 2,823) find that the vertical communication of trust maintains cooperation upon the removal of centralized (Study 1), third-party (Study 2a, 2b), and peer punishment (Study 3), and this effect extends beyond single interactions (Study 4). In all studies, vertical trust communication increases mutual trust among players, providing support to the idea that vertically communicating trust can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Extrapolating our findings to natural environments, they suggest that authorities should carefully consider how they communicate the lifting of rules and sanctions.
- 1 July 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 125 (1) , 57-81
Are there dominant response tendencies for social reactions? Trust trumps mistrust—evidence from a Dominant Behavior Measure (DBM).
The question of whether individuals are more prone to trust or to mistrust has increasingly interested economists and psychologists in recent years. To investigate whether people have an initial response tendency to trust versus mistrust, we developed a novel paradigm-the Dominant Behavior Measure (DBM). Capitalizing on decades of meticulous research in basic cognitive psychology (i.e., bilingual studies, Stroop paradigm), we designed a task to measure the dominance of reactions in the social realm. Participants engaged in a series of trust games that involved switching between trusting and mistrusting two trustworthy counterparts and two untrustworthy counterparts, identified by color (while ignoring a distractor name) or by name (when no color was presented). Like other dominant response tendencies (e.g., participant's first language), trust is faster, harder to switch to, and more interfering/facilitating than mistrust (Experiments 1-7). The dominance of trust holds in various social contexts-certainty of counterpart's un/trustworthiness (Experiments 4a-4c), unfamiliar counterparts (Experiments 5 and 6), counterparts from one's in-group versus out-group (Experiment 6), and negative framing of trust (Experiment 7)-showing that the dominant tendency to trust people (but not nonsocial objects, Experiment 8) is context-independent and robust. We rule out alternative explanations such as asymmetric payoff (Experiments 2 and 4b), familiarity and strength of association (Experiments 5 and 6), demand characteristics (Experiment 7), and positivity bias (Experiment 8). Introducing the DBM as a novel paradigm, we show that trust dominates mistrust and discuss the potential of this paradigm to determine dominant responses in manifold social domains. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 July 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 125 (1) , 57-81
Are there dominant response tendencies for social reactions? Trust trumps mistrust—evidence from a Dominant Behavior Measure (DBM).
The question of whether individuals are more prone to trust or to mistrust has increasingly interested economists and psychologists in recent years. To investigate whether people have an initial response tendency to trust versus mistrust, we developed a novel paradigm-the Dominant Behavior Measure (DBM). Capitalizing on decades of meticulous research in basic cognitive psychology (i.e., bilingual studies, Stroop paradigm), we designed a task to measure the dominance of reactions in the social realm. Participants engaged in a series of trust games that involved switching between trusting and mistrusting two trustworthy counterparts and two untrustworthy counterparts, identified by color (while ignoring a distractor name) or by name (when no color was presented). Like other dominant response tendencies (e.g., participant's first language), trust is faster, harder to switch to, and more interfering/facilitating than mistrust (Experiments 1-7). The dominance of trust holds in various social contexts-certainty of counterpart's un/trustworthiness (Experiments 4a-4c), unfamiliar counterparts (Experiments 5 and 6), counterparts from one's in-group versus out-group (Experiment 6), and negative framing of trust (Experiment 7)-showing that the dominant tendency to trust people (but not nonsocial objects, Experiment 8) is context-independent and robust. We rule out alternative explanations such as asymmetric payoff (Experiments 2 and 4b), familiarity and strength of association (Experiments 5 and 6), demand characteristics (Experiment 7), and positivity bias (Experiment 8). Introducing the DBM as a novel paradigm, we show that trust dominates mistrust and discuss the potential of this paradigm to determine dominant responses in manifold social domains. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 3 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 52 (3) , 584-596
Who's a yea‐sayer? Habitual trust and affirmative response behaviour
- 3 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 52 (3) , 584-596
Open AccessWho's a yea‐sayer? Habitual trust and affirmative response behaviour
- Open Access
- 21 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 51 (6) , 1007-1018
The cognitive cost of closeness: Interpersonal closeness reduces accuracy and slows down decision‐making
Interpersonal closeness increases the overlap between mental representations of the self and the other, thus rendering it more difficult to differentiate between self‐ and other‐related information. We suggest that closeness challenges computational capacity during decision‐making when the decision requires a differentiation between self‐ and other‐related information. Correlational Study 1 showed that when participants imagined engaging in a two‐person economic problem‐solving task with another person, their cognitive performance decreased with increased levels of closeness felt toward their counterpart. Three experiments showed that when participants engaged in the problem‐solving task with a close (vs. a distant) other, they tended to recall the correct solutions less (Study 2), used more time to find the solution (Study 3) and gave less accurate responses under time pressure (Study 4). These four studies are the first to jointly demonstrate that closeness influences interpersonal decision processes by being cognitively more costly.
- 21 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 51 (6) , 1007-1018
Open AccessThe cognitive cost of closeness: Interpersonal closeness reduces accuracy and slows down decision‐making
Interpersonal closeness increases the overlap between mental representations of the self and the other, thus rendering it more difficult to differentiate between self‐ and other‐related information. We suggest that closeness challenges computational capacity during decision‐making when the decision requires a differentiation between self‐ and other‐related information. Correlational Study 1 showed that when participants imagined engaging in a two‐person economic problem‐solving task with another person, their cognitive performance decreased with increased levels of closeness felt toward their counterpart. Three experiments showed that when participants engaged in the problem‐solving task with a close (vs. a distant) other, they tended to recall the correct solutions less (Study 2), used more time to find the solution (Study 3) and gave less accurate responses under time pressure (Study 4). These four studies are the first to jointly demonstrate that closeness influences interpersonal decision processes by being cognitively more costly.
- 1 July 2021
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 121 (1) , 43-58
How trust and distrust shape perception and memory.
Trust is a key ingredient in decision making, as it allows us to rely on the information we receive. Although trust is usually viewed as a positive element of decision making, we suggest that its effects on memory are costly rather than beneficial. Across nine studies using three different manipulations of trust and distrust and three different memory paradigms, we find that trust reduces memory performance as compared with distrust. In Study 1, trust leads to higher acceptance rates of misinformation. Studies 2a and 2b demonstrate that participants in a distrust and a control condition perform better at a memory-recognition task than participants in a trust condition. Studies 3a and 3b show that trust also reduces free recall of memory content. Examining the underlying mechanism, we find that reduced memory performance in a state of trust is caused by an increased perception of similarities between items that are to be memorized. Following a causal chain design, Study 4 shows that trust increases the sensitivity to similarities as compared with distrust and a control condition, and Study 5 shows that a processing focus on similarities reduces memory accuracy. Studies 6 and 7 create circumstances that either leave the proposed mediator free to vary or interrupt it via the induction of a similarity-focus (Study 6) or a difference-focus (Study 7). The disadvantage of trust is only present if the mediating processing focus can freely operate. Overall, these studies show that trust impairs memory performance due to an increased perception of similarities between memory content. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 July 2021
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 121 (1) , 43-58
How trust and distrust shape perception and memory.
Trust is a key ingredient in decision making, as it allows us to rely on the information we receive. Although trust is usually viewed as a positive element of decision making, we suggest that its effects on memory are costly rather than beneficial. Across nine studies using three different manipulations of trust and distrust and three different memory paradigms, we find that trust reduces memory performance as compared with distrust. In Study 1, trust leads to higher acceptance rates of misinformation. Studies 2a and 2b demonstrate that participants in a distrust and a control condition perform better at a memory-recognition task than participants in a trust condition. Studies 3a and 3b show that trust also reduces free recall of memory content. Examining the underlying mechanism, we find that reduced memory performance in a state of trust is caused by an increased perception of similarities between items that are to be memorized. Following a causal chain design, Study 4 shows that trust increases the sensitivity to similarities as compared with distrust and a control condition, and Study 5 shows that a processing focus on similarities reduces memory accuracy. Studies 6 and 7 create circumstances that either leave the proposed mediator free to vary or interrupt it via the induction of a similarity-focus (Study 6) or a difference-focus (Study 7). The disadvantage of trust is only present if the mediating processing focus can freely operate. Overall, these studies show that trust impairs memory performance due to an increased perception of similarities between memory content. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 October 2019
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Psychologische Rundschau
- Vol. 70 (4) , 259-278
Kommentare zu Okulicz-Kozaryn, M., Schmidt, A. F. & Banse, R. (2019). Worin besteht die Expertise von forensischen Sachverständigen, und ist die Approbation gemäß Psychotherapeutengesetz dafür erforderlich?
- 1 October 2019
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Psychologische Rundschau
- Vol. 70 (4) , 259-278
Kommentare zu Okulicz-Kozaryn, M., Schmidt, A. F. & Banse, R. (2019). Worin besteht die Expertise von forensischen Sachverständigen, und ist die Approbation gemäß Psychotherapeutengesetz dafür erforderlich?