HYHung-Chao Yu

Hung-Chao Yu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Hung-Chao Yu has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Effort Allocation in Integrated Audits and Implications for Financial Reporting Quality

    by Xinming Liu, Hung-Chao Yu

    SUMMARY: This study investigates the implications of effort allocation in integrated audits on financial reporting quality. We examine whether increased-reliance on internal controls, defined as auditors allocating greater effort to the audit of internal controls and less effort to the financial statement audit, relative to expected levels of effort, negatively impacts financial reporting quality. Based on a sample of 9,094 firm-year observations from companies listed on China’s stock exchanges during 2012–2019, we find evidence that increased-reliance on internal controls is associated with lower financial reporting quality. However, client importance mitigates this negative effect. Our main findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity, excluding observations whose abnormal audit fees are close to zero, and using a sample with stable total audit fees over time. Overall, our findings suggest that disclosure of fees related to internal control audits and financial statement audits provides information relevant to assessing financial reporting quality. Data Availability: The data used in this paper are available from China Stock Market & Accounting Research, Taiwan Economic Journal, and public filings. JEL Classifications: D81; G38; M42; M48.

  • Is Audit Committee Equity Compensation Related to Audit Fees?*

    by Xinming Liu, Gerald J. Lobo, Hung‐Chao Yu

    Section 301 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) implicitly assumes that audit committees can independently determine audit fees. Critics of section 301 have questioned this assumption in particular, and the efficacy of section 301 more generally. In response, the SEC issued a concept release in 2015 calling for public disclosure of the process that audit committees follow for determining auditor compensation. Motivated by these calls and the widespread use of stocks and options to compensate firms' independent directors, we examine the relation between equity compensation granted to audit committee members and audit fees. Using a sample of 3,685 firm‐year observations during 2007–2015, we find a negative relation between audit committee equity compensation and audit fees, consistent with larger equity pay inducing audit committee members to compromise independence by paying lower audit fees. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity, firm size, alternative measures of equity compensation, alternative samples, and an alternative treatment of extreme values. We further show that larger equity compensation is associated with lower earnings quality. We also find that the negative effect of equity compensation on audit fees is stronger when city‐level audit market competition is high. However, this negative relation disappears when (i) firms face high litigation risk, (ii) auditors have stronger bargaining power, (iii) the audit committee includes a high proportion of accounting experts, and (iv) auditors are industry experts. Our results are relevant for regulators and investors.


  • How do companies react to restatements? – Evidence from audit committee compensation,

    by Xinming Liu, Hung-Chao Yu

    This study examines whether firms react to restatements by adjusting equity-based compensation paid to their audit committees and whether such adjustment is effective in improving the quality of firms’ financial reporting. Three major findings are documented. First, larger equity-based compensation aligns the interests between audit committees and shareholders in S&P 1500 firms, leading to lower restatement likelihood. In contrast, larger equity-based compensation induces audit committees to compromise independence in non-S&P 1500 firms, leading to higher restatement likelihood. Second, S&P 1500 firms increase equity-based compensation to both AC chairs and other AC members following restatements to enhance the alignment effect. Differently, non-S&P 1500 firms reduce equity-based compensation paid to audit committee chairs rather than other members following restatements to mitigate the entrenchment effect. Importantly, restating firms adjust equity compensation only to audit committee members but not to CEOs or other board committee members. Finally, reducing (increasing) audit committees’ equity-based compensation is effective in improving non-S&P 1500’s (S&P 1500’s) quality of financial statements after restatements. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity, including corporate governance variables, dropping firms who discharge auditors and CEOs, and considering nonlinearity. Our empirical results bear important implications for regulators and investors.


  • The Nature of Corporate Income Tax Under a Full Imputation Tax Regime: A Test of Functional Fixation

    by Hung‐Chao Yu, Wu‐Chun Chi, Chun‐Yuan Hsu

    This paper tests two competing hypotheses describing investors’ behavior: the efficient market hypothesis and the functional fixation hypothesis. In particular, this study examines how Taiwan's stock market interprets the nature of corporate income tax after the 1998 Tax Reform, which switches from the classical tax system to the integrated tax system. This Tax Reform changes the nature of corporate income tax from a pure operating expense to an individual shareholder's tax credit, but current GAAP still treats it as an operating expense in the income statement. The empirical results show that Taiwan's stock market perceives the change in nature of corporate income tax and responds accordingly.