Murray Smith
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Murray Smith has a total of 78 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jens Kjeldgaard-Christiansen
Department of English, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
3 shared publications - Mathias Clasen
Recreational Fear Lab, Aarhus University
3 shared publications - Amine Sijilmassi
Département d’études cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, EHESS, PSL University, CNRS , 75005 Paris
2 shared publications - Bence Nanay
Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
2 shared publications - Constant Bonard
University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Coralie Chevallier
Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’études cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 October 2026
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychological Review
Carving stories at their natural joints.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychological Review
Carving stories at their natural joints.
- Open Access
- 15 September 2026
- Published by Helsinki University Press in Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. LXIII/XIX (2) , 192-217
Exploring the Geography of Taste
In The Geography of Taste (2024), Dominic McIver Lopes, Samantha Matherne, Mohan Matthen, and Bence Nanay pursue an ambitious project of reconfiguring theoretical aesthetics in light of a shared commitment to the cultural diversity of aesthetic value. Developed from an ‘Authors Meet Critics’ discussion held at the 82nd Annual Meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics, this symposium comprises critical commentaries by Murray Smith, James Harold, and Paloma Atencia-Linares, together with responses by the authors.
- 15 September 2026
- Published by Helsinki University Press in Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. LXIII/XIX (2) , 192-217
Open AccessExploring the Geography of Taste
In The Geography of Taste (2024), Dominic McIver Lopes, Samantha Matherne, Mohan Matthen, and Bence Nanay pursue an ambitious project of reconfiguring theoretical aesthetics in light of a shared commitment to the cultural diversity of aesthetic value. Developed from an ‘Authors Meet Critics’ discussion held at the 82nd Annual Meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics, this symposium comprises critical commentaries by Murray Smith, James Harold, and Paloma Atencia-Linares, together with responses by the authors.
- Open Access
- 24 July 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Carving Stories at their Natural Joints
Over the past three decades, psychology has documented the recurrence of specific themes in stories across cultures (e.g., love, alliances, monsters, imaginary worlds) and linked them to identifiable motivational mechanisms (e.g., mate choice, cooperation, threat detection, exploration). Yet this body of work has remained fragmented, organized around individual themes rather than integrated into a unified account of what makes narrative content psychologically engaging. Here, we propose the Motivational-Ingredient Framework. We identify a set of motivational ingredients: core narrative features, each defined by the specific motivational mechanism it activates. Drawing on evolutionary psychology, affective neuroscience, and the study of human motivation, we compile a comprehensive table of ingredients grounded in the current understanding of human motivational architecture. This framework offers a theory-driven, cross-culturally applicable foundation for the empirical study of narrative content, with implications for fields ranging from media psychology and computational humanities to education and public policy.
- 24 July 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessCarving Stories at their Natural Joints
Over the past three decades, psychology has documented the recurrence of specific themes in stories across cultures (e.g., love, alliances, monsters, imaginary worlds) and linked them to identifiable motivational mechanisms (e.g., mate choice, cooperation, threat detection, exploration). Yet this body of work has remained fragmented, organized around individual themes rather than integrated into a unified account of what makes narrative content psychologically engaging. Here, we propose the Motivational-Ingredient Framework. We identify a set of motivational ingredients: core narrative features, each defined by the specific motivational mechanism it activates. Drawing on evolutionary psychology, affective neuroscience, and the study of human motivation, we compile a comprehensive table of ingredients grounded in the current understanding of human motivational architecture. This framework offers a theory-driven, cross-culturally applicable foundation for the empirical study of narrative content, with implications for fields ranging from media psychology and computational humanities to education and public policy.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Berghahn Books in Projections
- Vol. 19 (3) , 3-31
Theory of Mind Negatively Predicts Reflection and Positively Predicts Moral Understanding
A key determinant of viewers’ ability to derive moral understanding from movies may be their ability to understand and reflect upon the beliefs that underlie behavior. We therefore tested whether a measure of theory of mind would predict reflection on a movie and viewers’ moral understanding of the film. We asked participants to write expressively about a lesson they derived from a film they had previously seen or were shown. Two studies demonstrated that theory of mind negatively predicted reflection but positively predicted moral understanding. This suggests that theory of mind aids in the online processing of films but may render further reflection superfluous. Furthermore, exploratory analyses indicating that a film's deviation from one's moral foundations spurs retrospective imaginative involvement.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Berghahn Books in Projections
- Vol. 19 (3) , 3-31
Theory of Mind Negatively Predicts Reflection and Positively Predicts Moral Understanding
A key determinant of viewers’ ability to derive moral understanding from movies may be their ability to understand and reflect upon the beliefs that underlie behavior. We therefore tested whether a measure of theory of mind would predict reflection on a movie and viewers’ moral understanding of the film. We asked participants to write expressively about a lesson they derived from a film they had previously seen or were shown. Two studies demonstrated that theory of mind negatively predicted reflection but positively predicted moral understanding. This suggests that theory of mind aids in the online processing of films but may render further reflection superfluous. Furthermore, exploratory analyses indicating that a film's deviation from one's moral foundations spurs retrospective imaginative involvement.
- Open Access
- 18 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (5) , 1-27
Reflective equilibrium, aesthetic appreciation, and aesthetic judgement
I explore the relevance of reflective equilibrium to aesthetic experience, judgement, and appreciation, framing this project in both descriptive and normative terms. I begin with an exposition of reflective equilibrium, construed as a theory of epistemic justification, and of aesthetic appreciation, characterised as an activity with an epistemic goal—namely, achieving an optimal understanding of an artwork or aesthetic object. I stress the broad purview of reflective equilibrium, as well as Rawls’ arguments on the importance of aesthetic activity in human experience, and thus its place in a theory of justice. These preliminary considerations set up a more detailed exploration of reflective equilibrium in action in the aesthetic domain. I develop the argument with reference to a range of cases, from mainstream filmmaking to twelve-tone composition, considering the place of reflective equilibrium in aesthetic appreciation in both its individual and collective guises, as well as its “wide” and “narrow” forms. I demonstrate how the application of reflective equilibrium in the context of the critical appreciation of art relates to a range of significant issues in aesthetics, via the examination of arguments from Sontag, Sibley, Walton, Carroll, and Gaut (among others). Finally I assess various objections to, and extensions of, the main argument, including the objection that aesthetic appreciation does not aim at understanding, and the proposal that the embodied, emotional dimension of aesthetic experience, which must be accommodated by reflective equilibrium in the context of aesthetics, may shed light on its nature and operation in other domains.
- 18 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (5) , 1-27
Open AccessReflective equilibrium, aesthetic appreciation, and aesthetic judgement
I explore the relevance of reflective equilibrium to aesthetic experience, judgement, and appreciation, framing this project in both descriptive and normative terms. I begin with an exposition of reflective equilibrium, construed as a theory of epistemic justification, and of aesthetic appreciation, characterised as an activity with an epistemic goal—namely, achieving an optimal understanding of an artwork or aesthetic object. I stress the broad purview of reflective equilibrium, as well as Rawls’ arguments on the importance of aesthetic activity in human experience, and thus its place in a theory of justice. These preliminary considerations set up a more detailed exploration of reflective equilibrium in action in the aesthetic domain. I develop the argument with reference to a range of cases, from mainstream filmmaking to twelve-tone composition, considering the place of reflective equilibrium in aesthetic appreciation in both its individual and collective guises, as well as its “wide” and “narrow” forms. I demonstrate how the application of reflective equilibrium in the context of the critical appreciation of art relates to a range of significant issues in aesthetics, via the examination of arguments from Sontag, Sibley, Walton, Carroll, and Gaut (among others). Finally I assess various objections to, and extensions of, the main argument, including the objection that aesthetic appreciation does not aim at understanding, and the proposal that the embodied, emotional dimension of aesthetic experience, which must be accommodated by reflective equilibrium in the context of aesthetics, may shed light on its nature and operation in other domains.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2024
- Published by Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences University of Rijeka in European journal of analytic philosophy
- Vol. 20 (2) , 259-282
Artistic Freedom Realised
The fewer the constraints we encounter in an artistic endeavour, the greater our artistic freedom; as technology advances and presents us with more numerous options and ever-greater creative flexibility, so our artistic freedom burgeons. Such is the folk wisdom on the phenomenon. Is the wisdom wise? Many artists and art theorists think not; for Stravinsky, “[t]he more constraints one imposes, the more one frees one’s self of the chains that shackle the spirit”. I consider the orthodox view and this alternative view through an exploration of the constraints arising from physical, psychological, and technological factors, as well as the heterogeneous array of routine practices we label “conventions”. To deepen the analysis, I turn to the “problem-solving” perspective on artistic creativity, examining the interplay between invention and convention in art, drawing on a variety of examples from film and rock music. On the theory advanced by Jon Elster, the problems with which artists engage arise from a mix of chosen, imposed, and invented constraints; on the theory of David Bordwell, those problems can be solved through the replication, revision, synthesis, or rejection of existing solutions. I conclude that neither the folk theory, nor the alternative theory, are correct; rather, there is a “sweet zone” of artistic creativity poised between a disabling surfeit of options, and a stifling sparsity of them. I argue that Stravinsky’s counter-theory of artistic creativity, though not literally true, acts as a “felicitous falsehood”—an epistemically valuable overcorrection.
- 15 November 2024
- Published by Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences University of Rijeka in European journal of analytic philosophy
- Vol. 20 (2) , 259-282
Open AccessArtistic Freedom Realised
The fewer the constraints we encounter in an artistic endeavour, the greater our artistic freedom; as technology advances and presents us with more numerous options and ever-greater creative flexibility, so our artistic freedom burgeons. Such is the folk wisdom on the phenomenon. Is the wisdom wise? Many artists and art theorists think not; for Stravinsky, “[t]he more constraints one imposes, the more one frees one’s self of the chains that shackle the spirit”. I consider the orthodox view and this alternative view through an exploration of the constraints arising from physical, psychological, and technological factors, as well as the heterogeneous array of routine practices we label “conventions”. To deepen the analysis, I turn to the “problem-solving” perspective on artistic creativity, examining the interplay between invention and convention in art, drawing on a variety of examples from film and rock music. On the theory advanced by Jon Elster, the problems with which artists engage arise from a mix of chosen, imposed, and invented constraints; on the theory of David Bordwell, those problems can be solved through the replication, revision, synthesis, or rejection of existing solutions. I conclude that neither the folk theory, nor the alternative theory, are correct; rather, there is a “sweet zone” of artistic creativity poised between a disabling surfeit of options, and a stifling sparsity of them. I argue that Stravinsky’s counter-theory of artistic creativity, though not literally true, acts as a “felicitous falsehood”—an epistemically valuable overcorrection.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Journal of Media Psychology
- Vol. 36 (4) , 220-230
Moral Understanding and Media
According to a widespread view in the arts and humanities, artworks are not only cognitively but also morally valuable. However, arguments for this claim often proceed with little attention to empirical evidence. At the same time, artists, filmmakers, and media creators deliberately deploy various devices to effect cognitive change; but whether these devices have the desired effects, and on whom, also remains largely untested. If we want to understand the ways that film and media can have moral impacts, we must step out of our disciplinary siloes. It is not enough for film experts, philosophers, and experimentalists to merely take note of each other’s work; collaborative interdisciplinary research is required, both to improve methods and to examine questions that have not yet been empirically explored. In this article we propose a framework for this kind of research, focusing on how media can influence moral understanding. We first outline the challenges that must be met for such research to be successful, including clarifying and operationalizing concepts, measuring moral understanding, and applying empirical methods to media and the arts. We then describe the advantages of interdisciplinary collaboration for meeting these challenges, in the context of some recent examples of interdisciplinary projects on related themes.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Journal of Media Psychology
- Vol. 36 (4) , 220-230
Moral Understanding and Media
According to a widespread view in the arts and humanities, artworks are not only cognitively but also morally valuable. However, arguments for this claim often proceed with little attention to empirical evidence. At the same time, artists, filmmakers, and media creators deliberately deploy various devices to effect cognitive change; but whether these devices have the desired effects, and on whom, also remains largely untested. If we want to understand the ways that film and media can have moral impacts, we must step out of our disciplinary siloes. It is not enough for film experts, philosophers, and experimentalists to merely take note of each other’s work; collaborative interdisciplinary research is required, both to improve methods and to examine questions that have not yet been empirically explored. In this article we propose a framework for this kind of research, focusing on how media can influence moral understanding. We first outline the challenges that must be met for such research to be successful, including clarifying and operationalizing concepts, measuring moral understanding, and applying empirical methods to media and the arts. We then describe the advantages of interdisciplinary collaboration for meeting these challenges, in the context of some recent examples of interdisciplinary projects on related themes.
- 9 November 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 228-246
The Reflective Afterlife and the Ends of Imagining
In the “mood-stance” approach to fiction and nonfiction, it is held that nonfiction invites viewers to take the states of affairs represented as asserted, while fiction invites viewers to take the represented states of affairs as presented for our imaginative consideration. The relevant distinction then is belief versus imagination. This chapter demonstrates that this distinction harbors important ambiguities in that both fiction and nonfiction elicit imagination and belief. The idea of fiction as a prompt to imagination also does not sufficiently account for the importance of fictions in human life. Imagination to what end? One of the primary functions of fiction, this chapter argues, is to scaffold our exploration of the space of possibilities, such that we are able to discover and formulate new hypotheses about moral understanding.
- 9 November 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 228-246
The Reflective Afterlife and the Ends of Imagining
In the “mood-stance” approach to fiction and nonfiction, it is held that nonfiction invites viewers to take the states of affairs represented as asserted, while fiction invites viewers to take the represented states of affairs as presented for our imaginative consideration. The relevant distinction then is belief versus imagination. This chapter demonstrates that this distinction harbors important ambiguities in that both fiction and nonfiction elicit imagination and belief. The idea of fiction as a prompt to imagination also does not sufficiently account for the importance of fictions in human life. Imagination to what end? One of the primary functions of fiction, this chapter argues, is to scaffold our exploration of the space of possibilities, such that we are able to discover and formulate new hypotheses about moral understanding.
- Open Access
- 26 April 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
- Vol. 16 (3) , 333-396
Book Symposium. Steffen Borge, The Philosophy of Football
This is a book symposium on Steffen Borge’s The Philosophy of Football. It has contributions from William Morgan, Murray Smith and Brian Weatherson with replies from Borge.
- 26 April 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
- Vol. 16 (3) , 333-396
Open AccessBook Symposium. Steffen Borge, The Philosophy of Football
This is a book symposium on Steffen Borge’s The Philosophy of Football. It has contributions from William Morgan, Murray Smith and Brian Weatherson with replies from Borge.