Anna Korppoo

Green economy (GE) is a fairly new concept in the domestic discussion in Russia, which has lagged behind other developed economies in terms of environmental governance. This article examines how GE is conceptualized in the Russian academic discussion and how this debate reflects international conceptualizations of the concept. Drawing on a coding frame inspired by the international literature on GE, we find that the Russian academic discussion tends to operate with what we call a strong interpretation of GE that is not yet sufficiently developed to underpin actual policy-making. Russian academics view GE as a solution to the environmental, social and as economic problems that stem largely from the country’s resource-exporting and industrial economy, and highlight problems with the quality of environmental administration. Finally, the benefits/threats thinking characteristic of the Russian environmental debate directs GE discussions toward environmentally weaker interpretations.

Most municipal solid waste (MSW) in Russia is disposed of in landfills, and only a relatively small fraction is recycled. The landfilling of waste leads to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and air and groundwater pollution. However, recently, there have been some initiatives to improve waste management in the country. We assessed the economic and environmental benefits of waste recycling in the Murmansk region, in which a new waste recycling plant has been operating since 2019. We found that MSW recycling in the Murmansk region has induced a small, positive, job creation effect and could potentially lead to a non-negligible reduction in GHG emissions. Extrapolating the results from this case study to the country level, we found that recycling landfilled MSW in Russia could save approximately 154 million tons of GHG emissions in carbon dioxide equivalents annually, which is comparable to the total CO₂ emissions from Algeria. The positive environmental and health-related impacts from the extensive implementation of MSW recycling in the country could be substantial. From this case study, we also learned that one of the biggest challenges for the waste recycling company in the Murmansk region is finding profitable markets for recycled materials. Moreover, due to the high investment and operational costs, recycling MSW led to a substantial increase in communal fees. However, there is potential to make waste recycling more cost effective. Most MSW in the Murmansk region is still separated at the recycling plant, while separating waste at the source could substantially reduce operational costs. Other challenges in the large-scale implementation of MSW recycling in Russia, such as a lack of investments and the population’s willingness to recycle waste, are also discussed.

In this concluding chapter the main comparative findings are set forth as hypotheses to be tested by future research. We have found that informal institutions are deeply embedded as key elements in policy implementation in both China and Russia, with informal institutions tending more often to work in favour of formal policy goals in the former than in the latter. Still, informal institutions can both support as well as water down formal policy goals, in both polities. The state seems actively involved in launching and utilizing informal institutions in policy implementation in both countries – which may help to explain the generally low availability of accurate data availability. Given Beijing’s political will and effort to curb emissions, more may be expected from China than from Russia on global climate diplomacy. Still, if sufficiently influential stakeholders are involved, informal institutions can do work aimed at reducing emissions also in Russia.

How are climate change and Russia’s role in international climate diplomacy understood in Russia? This article enhances our understanding of the cultural drivers of Russia’s international climate position by using extensive interview data with Russian (non-climate) professionals to explore domestic assumptions, perceptions, and beliefs beyond official positions expressed in international diplomatic discourses. Underlying cultural framings are understood as societal beliefs widely shared in Russian society. A framing analysis of the interview data indicates that Russian participation in climate diplomacy is underpinned by assumptions concerning Russian self-interest – such as benefit-seeking, foreign-policy goals and suspicion of the motives of other countries – that are often unrelated to environmental concerns. Societal beliefs in Russia’s great-power status together with a focus on national economic and political interests, societal cynicism/zero-sum game beliefs, conspiracy theories and a dualistic approach to science are reflected in these assumptions, and provide persuasive cultural explanations for understanding official climate change statements. The influence of the political leadership on societal beliefs on climate change helps to explain the prevalence of these beliefs; wider societal beliefs are a further significant explanatory factor. Key policy insights

This article provides an overview of the recent modelling results on Russia's GHG emission trends, and reviews the success of mitigation policies in order to establish whether Russia's domestic target seems feasible. Various Russian GHG emission scenarios indicate that Russia's domestic target – emissions 25% below the 1990 level by 2020 – is not far from the business-as-usual emissions trajectory. In particular, two factors could deliver the required emissions reductions: the currently declining gross domestic product (GDP) growth and ongoing domestic mitigation policies. The former is more likely to secure the target level of emissions, because GDP growth has been contracting significantly in comparison to earlier forecasts of 3–5% annual growth, and this trend is expected to continue. The latter option – success with domestic mitigation measures – seems less likely, given the various meta-barriers to policy implementation, and the marginality of mitigation policies, problems with law-making processes, bureaucratic tradition, and informality of legislative and implementation systems. Policy relevance This article provides an assessment of the stringency of Russia's domestically set emissions limitation target by 2020 and the chances of Russia, the fourth largest GHG emitter in the world, achieving it. We base our assessment on a number of recent key sources that analyse Russia's GHG emission paths by applying socio-economic models, which have only been available in the Russian language prior to this publication. This knowledge is applicable for use by other negotiation parties to compare Russia's efforts to mitigate climate change to their own, and thus makes a contribution to facilitating a more equal burden-sharing of climate commitments under the future climate change agreement.