Mingli Zheng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mingli Zheng has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sajid Anwar
School of Business and Creative Industries University of the Sunshine Coast Sunshine Coast Australia
5 shared publications Chaozheng Li
1 shared publicationChong Wang
1 shared publicationDominique Thon
University of Nordland
1 shared publicationRobert McMillan
1 shared publication- Ronny Aboudi
University of Miami
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 23 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science
- Vol. 2 (1) , 177-194
Subjective value judgments of distributive justice and legal decision-making
- 23 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science
- Vol. 2 (1) , 177-194
Subjective value judgments of distributive justice and legal decision-making
- 1 May 2015
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 40, 60-66
Optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity
- 1 May 2015
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 40, 60-66
Optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity
- 1 March 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 90, 81-92
Posted price selling and online auctions
- 1 March 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 90, 81-92
Posted price selling and online auctions
- 10 July 2014
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 16 (4) , 546-568
Designing a Basic Income System with a Social Welfare Function
- 10 July 2014
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 16 (4) , 546-568
Designing a Basic Income System with a Social Welfare Function
- 18 June 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 26 (1) , 79-92
Lobbying for wealth redistribution by changing the social planner’s preferences
Wealth redistribution in a society is related to the social planner’s beliefs about social justice. In this paper, the social planner’s preferences are described by a Choquet integral, which is a convex combination of a weighted utilitarian social welfare function and an egalitarian social welfare function. By spending resources on lobbying, interest groups can change the social planner’s preferences, by shifting the weights of the utilitarian part, or by shifting more or less weight to the egalitarian part. We use a model of a two-player lobbying game and obtain the conditions for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
- 18 June 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 26 (1) , 79-92
Lobbying for wealth redistribution by changing the social planner’s preferences
Wealth redistribution in a society is related to the social planner’s beliefs about social justice. In this paper, the social planner’s preferences are described by a Choquet integral, which is a convex combination of a weighted utilitarian social welfare function and an egalitarian social welfare function. By spending resources on lobbying, interest groups can change the social planner’s preferences, by shifting the weights of the utilitarian part, or by shifting more or less weight to the egalitarian part. We use a model of a two-player lobbying game and obtain the conditions for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
- Open Access
- 23 April 2013
- Published by Informa Healthcare in Expert Opinion on Therapeutic Patents
- Vol. 23 (7) , 765-771
Patent indicators: a window to pharmaceutical market success
Pharmaceutical success in the market is the best reward for pharmaceutical investors undergoing the lengthy, costly and risky process of pharmaceutical Research and Development (R&D). Drugs with high market revenues trigger fierce competition between pharmaceutical enterprises, as is demonstrated by the increasing Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) cases focusing on seizing the best-selling products. On the other hand, patents, as the best shield for innovative drugs against generic drugs, become a powerful weapon for pharmaceutical enterprises to win the substantial returns generated by market exclusivity. Patents seem to be directly responsible for the commercial success of new medicines. In this context, it is of great significance to find out the empirical associations between pharmaceutical commercial success and patents. By comprehensively analysing 127 drugs marketed in the USA and their 621 American patents, this article identifies the evidence to link various patent indicators with pharmaceutical sales...
- 23 April 2013
- Published by Informa Healthcare in Expert Opinion on Therapeutic Patents
- Vol. 23 (7) , 765-771
Open AccessPatent indicators: a window to pharmaceutical market success
Pharmaceutical success in the market is the best reward for pharmaceutical investors undergoing the lengthy, costly and risky process of pharmaceutical Research and Development (R&D). Drugs with high market revenues trigger fierce competition between pharmaceutical enterprises, as is demonstrated by the increasing Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) cases focusing on seizing the best-selling products. On the other hand, patents, as the best shield for innovative drugs against generic drugs, become a powerful weapon for pharmaceutical enterprises to win the substantial returns generated by market exclusivity. Patents seem to be directly responsible for the commercial success of new medicines. In this context, it is of great significance to find out the empirical associations between pharmaceutical commercial success and patents. By comprehensively analysing 127 drugs marketed in the USA and their 621 American patents, this article identifies the evidence to link various patent indicators with pharmaceutical sales...
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Insurance: Mathematics and Economics
- Vol. 50 (1) , 79-84
Competitive insurance market in the presence of ambiguity
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Insurance: Mathematics and Economics
- Vol. 50 (1) , 79-84
Competitive insurance market in the presence of ambiguity
- 1 February 2006
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 50 (2) , 307-322
Bidding behavior in competing auctions: Evidence from eBay
- 1 February 2006
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 50 (2) , 307-322
Bidding behavior in competing auctions: Evidence from eBay
- 1 January 2005
- Published by Mohr Siebeck in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 161 (3) , 411-427
Rational Legal Decision-Making, Value Judgment and Efficient Precaution in Tort Law
By reinterpreting Savages axioms as axioms of the social rationality over resource allocations, we derive a social welfare function encompassing individual social values and a social attitude towards distributional inequality. Wealth maximization becomes the purpose of law only if individuals have equal social values and the society does not care about distributional inequality. In tort law, when the injurer is less socially valued than the victim, the society imposes a stricter due-precaution level, and punitive damages will be awarded. Tort law also implicitly transfers wealth from the less socially valued party to the more socially valued party.
- 1 January 2005
- Published by Mohr Siebeck in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 161 (3) , 411-427
Rational Legal Decision-Making, Value Judgment and Efficient Precaution in Tort Law
By reinterpreting Savages axioms as axioms of the social rationality over resource allocations, we derive a social welfare function encompassing individual social values and a social attitude towards distributional inequality. Wealth maximization becomes the purpose of law only if individuals have equal social values and the society does not care about distributional inequality. In tort law, when the injurer is less socially valued than the victim, the society imposes a stricter due-precaution level, and punitive damages will be awarded. Tort law also implicitly transfers wealth from the less socially valued party to the more socially valued party.
- 1 December 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Asian Management
- Vol. 3 (1) , 53-65
Government spending on research and development and industrial production in Singapore
- 1 December 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Asian Management
- Vol. 3 (1) , 53-65
Government spending on research and development and industrial production in Singapore