Michele Aleandri
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Michele Aleandri has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Stefano Moretti
LAMSADE, CNRS, Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL
9 shared publications - Takahiro Suzuki
The University of Tokyo
4 shared publications - Ida Germana Minelli
Università dell’Aquila, DISIM, 67100 Coppito, L’Aquila, Italy
3 shared publications - Marco Dall'Aglio
LUISS University Viale Romania 32 00197 Rome Italy
3 shared publications - Vito Fragnelli
University of Eastern Piedmont
3 shared publications - Davide Gabrielli
DISIM, Università dell’Aquila, L’Aquila, Italy
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 13 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 550-564
Independence Axioms in Social Ranking
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Mathematical Statistics in Electronic Communications in Probability
- Vol. 31 (none) , 1-13
Reinforced dynamics for interacting agents in competitive or cooperative environments
We study systems of interacting reinforced stochastic processes, where agents’ decisions evolve under reinforcement, network-mediated interactions, and environmental influences. In competitive environments with irreducible networks, we prove almost sure convergence of agents’ states, with bipartite graphs leading to non-deterministic limits and non-bipartite graphs to deterministic ones. These results are extended to reducible networks with cooperative or competitive substructures, using a hierarchical graph representation in which higher-level agents perceive lower-level agents as forcing inputs. A general framework for interacting agents under external forcing is also provided, offering a rigorous characterization of long-term behavior and synchronization phenomena in such systems.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Mathematical Statistics in Electronic Communications in Probability
- Vol. 31 (none) , 1-13
Open AccessReinforced dynamics for interacting agents in competitive or cooperative environments
We study systems of interacting reinforced stochastic processes, where agents’ decisions evolve under reinforcement, network-mediated interactions, and environmental influences. In competitive environments with irreducible networks, we prove almost sure convergence of agents’ states, with bipartite graphs leading to non-deterministic limits and non-bipartite graphs to deterministic ones. These results are extended to reducible networks with cooperative or competitive substructures, using a hierarchical graph representation in which higher-level agents perceive lower-level agents as forcing inputs. A general framework for interacting agents under external forcing is also provided, offering a rigorous characterization of long-term behavior and synchronization phenomena in such systems.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Mathematical Statistics in Electronic Journal of Probability
- Vol. 31 (none) , 1-23
Freidlin-Wentzell solutions of discrete Hamilton-Jacobi equations
We consider a sequence of finite irreducible Markov chains with exponentially small transition rates: the transition graph is a fixed, finite, strongly connected directed graph; the transition rates decay exponentially on a parameter N with a given rate that varies from edge to edge. The stationary equation uniquely identifies the invariant measure for each N, but at exponential scale in the limit as N goes to infinity reduces to a discrete equation for the large deviation rate functional of the invariant measure, that in general has not an unique solution. In analogy with the continuous case of diffusions, we call such equation a discrete Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Likewise in the continuous case we introduce a notion of viscosity supersolutions and viscosity subsolutions and give a detailed geometric characterization of the solutions in terms of special faces of the polyhedron of one-Lipschitz functions on the transition graph. This parallels the weak KAM theory in a purely discrete setting. We identify also a special vanishing viscosity solution obtained in the limit from the combinatorial representation of the invariant measure given by the matrix tree theorem. The result gives a selection principle on the set of solutions to the discrete Hamilton-Jacobi equation obtained by the Freidlin and Wentzell minimal arborescences construction; this enlightens and parallels what happens in the continuous setting.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Mathematical Statistics in Electronic Journal of Probability
- Vol. 31 (none) , 1-23
Freidlin-Wentzell solutions of discrete Hamilton-Jacobi equations
We consider a sequence of finite irreducible Markov chains with exponentially small transition rates: the transition graph is a fixed, finite, strongly connected directed graph; the transition rates decay exponentially on a parameter N with a given rate that varies from edge to edge. The stationary equation uniquely identifies the invariant measure for each N, but at exponential scale in the limit as N goes to infinity reduces to a discrete equation for the large deviation rate functional of the invariant measure, that in general has not an unique solution. In analogy with the continuous case of diffusions, we call such equation a discrete Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Likewise in the continuous case we introduce a notion of viscosity supersolutions and viscosity subsolutions and give a detailed geometric characterization of the solutions in terms of special faces of the polyhedron of one-Lipschitz functions on the transition graph. This parallels the weak KAM theory in a purely discrete setting. We identify also a special vanishing viscosity solution obtained in the limit from the combinatorial representation of the invariant measure given by the matrix tree theorem. The result gives a selection principle on the set of solutions to the discrete Hamilton-Jacobi equation obtained by the Freidlin and Wentzell minimal arborescences construction; this enlightens and parallels what happens in the continuous setting.
- Open Access
- 5 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 35 (1) , 3
Ranking Alternatives from Opinions on Criteria
A primary challenge in collective decision-making is that achieving unanimous agreement is difficult, even at the level of criteria. The history of social choice theory illustrates this: numerous normative criteria on voting rules have been proposed; however, disagreements persist regarding which criteria should take precedence. This study addresses the problem of ranking alternatives based on the aggregation of opinions over criteria that the alternatives might fulfill. Using the opinion aggregation model, we propose a new rule—termed the Intersection Initial Segment (IIS) rule—and characterize it using five axioms: neutrality, independence of the worst set, independence of the best set, weak intersection very important player, and independence of non-unanimous improvement. We illustrate our approach using a running example in which the objective is to rank voting rules—showing that our opinion aggregation model is particularly well-suited to this context—and that the IIS rule is a counterpart to the method discussed as reported by Nurmi (The choice of voting rules based on preferences over criteria. In: Bogumił Kamiński, Gregory E. Kersten, and Tomasz Szapiro, editors, Outlooks and Insights on Group Decision and Negotiation. GDN 2015. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing 218:241–252, 2015).
- 5 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 35 (1) , 3
Open AccessRanking Alternatives from Opinions on Criteria
A primary challenge in collective decision-making is that achieving unanimous agreement is difficult, even at the level of criteria. The history of social choice theory illustrates this: numerous normative criteria on voting rules have been proposed; however, disagreements persist regarding which criteria should take precedence. This study addresses the problem of ranking alternatives based on the aggregation of opinions over criteria that the alternatives might fulfill. Using the opinion aggregation model, we propose a new rule—termed the Intersection Initial Segment (IIS) rule—and characterize it using five axioms: neutrality, independence of the worst set, independence of the best set, weak intersection very important player, and independence of non-unanimous improvement. We illustrate our approach using a running example in which the objective is to rank voting rules—showing that our opinion aggregation model is particularly well-suited to this context—and that the IIS rule is a counterpart to the method discussed as reported by Nurmi (The choice of voting rules based on preferences over criteria. In: Bogumił Kamiński, Gregory E. Kersten, and Tomasz Szapiro, editors, Outlooks and Insights on Group Decision and Negotiation. GDN 2015. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing 218:241–252, 2015).
- Open Access
- 5 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Stochastic Processes and their Applications
- Vol. 192
Long time fluctuations at critical parameter of Hopf’s bifurcation
- 5 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Stochastic Processes and their Applications
- Vol. 192
Open AccessLong time fluctuations at critical parameter of Hopf’s bifurcation
- Open Access
Reinforced dynamics for interacting agents in competitive or cooperative environments
We study systems of interacting reinforced stochastic processes, where agents' decisions evolve under reinforcement, network-mediated interactions, and environmental influences. In competitive environments with irreducible networks, we prove almost sure convergence of agents' states, with bipartite graphs leading to non-deterministic limits and non-bipartite graphs to deterministic ones. These results are extended to reducible networks with cooperative or competitive substructures, using a hierarchical graph representation in which higher-level agents perceive lower-level agents as forcing inputs. A general framework for interacting agents under external forcing is also provided, offering a rigorous characterization of long-term behavior and synchronization phenomena in such systems.
Open AccessReinforced dynamics for interacting agents in competitive or cooperative environments
We study systems of interacting reinforced stochastic processes, where agents' decisions evolve under reinforcement, network-mediated interactions, and environmental influences. In competitive environments with irreducible networks, we prove almost sure convergence of agents' states, with bipartite graphs leading to non-deterministic limits and non-bipartite graphs to deterministic ones. These results are extended to reducible networks with cooperative or competitive substructures, using a hierarchical graph representation in which higher-level agents perceive lower-level agents as forcing inputs. A general framework for interacting agents under external forcing is also provided, offering a rigorous characterization of long-term behavior and synchronization phenomena in such systems.
- 18 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 356 (1) , 135-163
A coopetition index for coalitions in simple games
- 18 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 356 (1) , 135-163
A coopetition index for coalitions in simple games
- Open Access
Independence Axioms in Social Ranking
Independence from non-essential changes in input information is a widely recognized axiom in social choice theory. This independence reduces the cost of specifying and/or analyzing non-essential data. This study makes a comprehensive analysis of independence axioms in the context of social ranking solutions (SRSs). We consider seven independence axioms (two of which are new) and provide a novel characterization of the lexicographic excellence solution and plurality by substituting these independence axioms in the existing characterization of the intersection initial segment rule. The characterizations highlight the differences among the three SRSs in terms of independence.
Open AccessIndependence Axioms in Social Ranking
Independence from non-essential changes in input information is a widely recognized axiom in social choice theory. This independence reduces the cost of specifying and/or analyzing non-essential data. This study makes a comprehensive analysis of independence axioms in the context of social ranking solutions (SRSs). We consider seven independence axioms (two of which are new) and provide a novel characterization of the lexicographic excellence solution and plurality by substituting these independence axioms in the existing characterization of the intersection initial segment rule. The characterizations highlight the differences among the three SRSs in terms of independence.
- Open Access
Mill's canons meet social ranking: A characterization of plurality
In his book entitled ''A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive'' (1843), John Stuart Mill proposed principles of inductive reasoning in the form of five canons. To date, these canons are classic methods for causal reasoning: they are intended to single out the circumstances that are connected to the phenomenon under focus. The present paper reinterprets Mill's canons in the modern theory of social ranking solutions, which aims to estimate the power of individuals based on teams' performances. We first apply Mill's canons to determine the key success factors in cooperative performances and then characterize plurality using a strong version of Mill's first canon. Plurality is also compatible with most other canons. Thus, our results demonstrated a hidden link between classical causal reasoning and the theory of social ranking solutions.
Open AccessMill's canons meet social ranking: A characterization of plurality
In his book entitled ''A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive'' (1843), John Stuart Mill proposed principles of inductive reasoning in the form of five canons. To date, these canons are classic methods for causal reasoning: they are intended to single out the circumstances that are connected to the phenomenon under focus. The present paper reinterprets Mill's canons in the modern theory of social ranking solutions, which aims to estimate the power of individuals based on teams' performances. We first apply Mill's canons to determine the key success factors in cooperative performances and then characterize plurality using a strong version of Mill's first canon. Plurality is also compatible with most other canons. Thus, our results demonstrated a hidden link between classical causal reasoning and the theory of social ranking solutions.
- Open Access
Ranking alternatives from opinions on criteria
A primary challenge in collective decision-making is that achieving unanimous agreement is difficult, even at the level of criteria. The history of social choice theory illustrates this: numerous normative criteria on voting rules have been proposed; however, disagreements persist regarding which criteria should take precedence. This study addresses the problem of ranking alternatives based on the aggregation of opinions over criteria that the alternatives might fulfill. Using the opinion aggregation model, we propose a new rule, termed the Intersection Initial Segment (IIS) rule, and characterize it using five axioms: neutrality, independence of the worst set, independence of the best set, weak intersection very important player, and independence of non-unanimous improvement. We illustrate our approach on a running example where the objective is to rank voting rules, showing that our opinion aggregation model is particularly well-suited to this context, and that the IIS rule is a counterpart to the method discussed in Nurmi's paper (2015).
Open AccessRanking alternatives from opinions on criteria
A primary challenge in collective decision-making is that achieving unanimous agreement is difficult, even at the level of criteria. The history of social choice theory illustrates this: numerous normative criteria on voting rules have been proposed; however, disagreements persist regarding which criteria should take precedence. This study addresses the problem of ranking alternatives based on the aggregation of opinions over criteria that the alternatives might fulfill. Using the opinion aggregation model, we propose a new rule, termed the Intersection Initial Segment (IIS) rule, and characterize it using five axioms: neutrality, independence of the worst set, independence of the best set, weak intersection very important player, and independence of non-unanimous improvement. We illustrate our approach on a running example where the objective is to rank voting rules, showing that our opinion aggregation model is particularly well-suited to this context, and that the IIS rule is a counterpart to the method discussed in Nurmi's paper (2015).