Lawrence A. Hirschfeld
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Lawrence A. Hirschfeld has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Aram Yengoyan
1 shared publicationDan Sperber
1 shared publication- Dan Sperber
EHESS-ENS-CNRS
1 shared publication Elizabeth Bartmess
University of Michigan, Department of Psychology, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1043, USA
1 shared publication- Hammad Sheikh
New School for Social Research
1 shared publication - Sarah Joanne White
University College London, UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 13 August 2018
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Cognition and Culture
- Vol. 18 (3-4) , 231-261
The Rutherford Atom of Culture
Increasingly, psychologists have shown a healthy interest in cultural variation and a skepticism about assuming that research with North American and Northern European undergraduates provides reliable insight into universal psychological processes. Unfortunately, this reappraisal has not been extended to questioning the notion of culture central to this project. Rather, there is wide acceptance that culture refers to a kind of social form that is entity-like, territorialized, marked by a high degree of shared beliefs and coalescing into patterns of key values that animate a broad range of cultural performances and representations. Ironically, anthropologists and other scholars in cultural studies have overwhelmingly come to reject this view of culture. Arguably, then, the move in psychology to attend to cultural environments has paradoxically further distanced it from the fields most concerned with cultural forms. This essay reviews this state of affairs and offers a proposal how a more nuanced appreciation of cultural life can be articulated with theories and methods familiar and available to psychologists.
- 13 August 2018
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Cognition and Culture
- Vol. 18 (3-4) , 231-261
The Rutherford Atom of Culture
Increasingly, psychologists have shown a healthy interest in cultural variation and a skepticism about assuming that research with North American and Northern European undergraduates provides reliable insight into universal psychological processes. Unfortunately, this reappraisal has not been extended to questioning the notion of culture central to this project. Rather, there is wide acceptance that culture refers to a kind of social form that is entity-like, territorialized, marked by a high degree of shared beliefs and coalescing into patterns of key values that animate a broad range of cultural performances and representations. Ironically, anthropologists and other scholars in cultural studies have overwhelmingly come to reject this view of culture. Arguably, then, the move in psychology to attend to cultural environments has paradoxically further distanced it from the fields most concerned with cultural forms. This essay reviews this state of affairs and offers a proposal how a more nuanced appreciation of cultural life can be articulated with theories and methods familiar and available to psychologists.
- 7 June 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race
- Vol. 9 (1) , 17-39
SEVEN MYTHS OF RACE AND THE YOUNG CHILD
Racism reproduces through children. Racial bias is acquired early, and like many early-acquired predilections it is tenaciously resistant to counterevidence. Much of the institutional struggle against racism focuses on children, working to change their attitudes and judgments by addressing what children supposedly have come to know and believe about race. Yet much of what lay folk and educators alike imagine about children's knowledge of race and how they have come to acquire it is inaccurate. This essay is concerned to identify these inaccuracies, present evidence that challenges them, and briefly consider why they—like racialist thinking itself—are so tenaciously held and resistant to counterevidence.
- 7 June 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race
- Vol. 9 (1) , 17-39
SEVEN MYTHS OF RACE AND THE YOUNG CHILD
Racism reproduces through children. Racial bias is acquired early, and like many early-acquired predilections it is tenaciously resistant to counterevidence. Much of the institutional struggle against racism focuses on children, working to change their attitudes and judgments by addressing what children supposedly have come to know and believe about race. Yet much of what lay folk and educators alike imagine about children's knowledge of race and how they have come to acquire it is inaccurate. This essay is concerned to identify these inaccuracies, present evidence that challenges them, and briefly consider why they—like racialist thinking itself—are so tenaciously held and resistant to counterevidence.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2008
- Published by SAGE Publications in Evolutionary Psychology
- Vol. 6 (1)
The Bilingual Brain Revisited: A Comment on Hagen (2008)
L.K. Hagen (2008; Evolutionary Psychology, 6, 43–63) proposes that effortless first acquisition compared to more difficult second language acquisition provides evidence that the monolinguistic nature of our ancestral social environments implies a near-constant state of intergroup conflict. I argue to the contrary that the capacity to acquire multiple languages simultaneously in childhood without decrement to first language acquisition suggests that there was selection pressure for multilingualism. I further argue that this cognitive capacity is evidence for an ancestral environment in which distinct groups commingled (e.g., through long-term trading and marriage relationships) in relative security.
- 1 January 2008
- Published by SAGE Publications in Evolutionary Psychology
- Vol. 6 (1)
Open AccessThe Bilingual Brain Revisited: A Comment on Hagen (2008)
L.K. Hagen (2008; Evolutionary Psychology, 6, 43–63) proposes that effortless first acquisition compared to more difficult second language acquisition provides evidence that the monolinguistic nature of our ancestral social environments implies a near-constant state of intergroup conflict. I argue to the contrary that the capacity to acquire multiple languages simultaneously in childhood without decrement to first language acquisition suggests that there was selection pressure for multilingualism. I further argue that this cognitive capacity is evidence for an ancestral environment in which distinct groups commingled (e.g., through long-term trading and marriage relationships) in relative security.
- 1 June 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Current Biology
- Vol. 17 (12) , R451-R452
Can autistic children predict behavior by social stereotypes?
- 1 June 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Current Biology
- Vol. 17 (12) , R451-R452
Can autistic children predict behavior by social stereotypes?
- 11 January 2007
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 149-164
Culture and Modularity This chapter integrates and expands elements from Sperber () and Sperber & Hirschfeld ().
Cultural diversity demonstrates the flexibility of the human mind and might be seen as providing compelling evidence against the massively modularity thesis, which seems to imply a high degree of mental rigidity. This chapter argues that a proper understanding of the modular organization of the mind, in particular a distinction between the proper and the actual domain of modules, helps explain both the relative stability of culture and its diversity.
- 11 January 2007
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 149-164
Culture and Modularity This chapter integrates and expands elements from Sperber () and Sperber & Hirschfeld ().
Cultural diversity demonstrates the flexibility of the human mind and might be seen as providing compelling evidence against the massively modularity thesis, which seems to imply a high degree of mental rigidity. This chapter argues that a proper understanding of the modular organization of the mind, in particular a distinction between the proper and the actual domain of modules, helps explain both the relative stability of culture and its diversity.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2004
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 8 (1) , 40-46
The cognitive foundations of cultural stability and diversity
- 1 January 2004
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 8 (1) , 40-46
Top Cited PapersThe cognitive foundations of cultural stability and diversity
- Open Access
- 1 January 2003
- Published by OpenEdition in Terrain
- Vol. 40 (40) , 21-48
Pourquoi les anthropologues n’aiment-ils pas les enfants ?
Très peu de travaux majeurs en anthropologie s’intéressent prioritairement aux enfants. On peut s’en étonner étant donné que presque toute l’anthropologie contemporaine est fondée sur la présupposition selon laquelle la culture est acquise et non innée. Cet essai examine les raisons de cette regrettable lacune et propose des motifs, à la fois théoriques et empiriques, pour y remédier. Selon l’auteur, la réticence à donner la première place aux enfants dans la recherche résulte de la conjonction de deux erreurs : d’une part, une conception appauvrie de l’apprentissage culturel qui surestime le rôle joué par les adultes et sous-estime la contribution des enfants dans la reproduction culturelle ; d’autre part, un manque d’appréciation de l’étendue et de la force de la culture des enfants, particulièrement dans le façonnage de la culture des adultes. L’auteur souhaite mettre en évidence le fait que cette marginalisation des enfants et de l’enfance empêche de comprendre l’émergence et la continuité des formes culturelles. Deux études de cas, qui explorent les croyances des enfants nord-américains en matière de contamination sociale, serviront à illustrer ce propos.
- 1 January 2003
- Published by OpenEdition in Terrain
- Vol. 40 (40) , 21-48
Open AccessPourquoi les anthropologues n’aiment-ils pas les enfants ?
Très peu de travaux majeurs en anthropologie s’intéressent prioritairement aux enfants. On peut s’en étonner étant donné que presque toute l’anthropologie contemporaine est fondée sur la présupposition selon laquelle la culture est acquise et non innée. Cet essai examine les raisons de cette regrettable lacune et propose des motifs, à la fois théoriques et empiriques, pour y remédier. Selon l’auteur, la réticence à donner la première place aux enfants dans la recherche résulte de la conjonction de deux erreurs : d’une part, une conception appauvrie de l’apprentissage culturel qui surestime le rôle joué par les adultes et sous-estime la contribution des enfants dans la reproduction culturelle ; d’autre part, un manque d’appréciation de l’étendue et de la force de la culture des enfants, particulièrement dans le façonnage de la culture des adultes. L’auteur souhaite mettre en évidence le fait que cette marginalisation des enfants et de l’enfance empêche de comprendre l’émergence et la continuité des formes culturelles. Deux études de cas, qui explorent les croyances des enfants nord-américains en matière de contamination sociale, serviront à illustrer ce propos.
- 1 June 2002
- Published by Wiley in American Anthropologist
- Vol. 104 (2) , 611-627
Why Don't Anthropologists Like Children?
Few major works in anthropology focus specifically on children, a curious state of affairs given that virtually all contemporary anthropology is based on the premise that culture is learned, not inherited. Although children have a remarkable and undisputed capacity for learning generally, and learning culture in particular, in significant measure anthropology has shown little interest in them and their lives. This article examines the reasons for this lamentable lacunae and offers theoretical and empirical reasons for repudiating it. Resistance to child‐focused scholarship, it is argued, is a byproduct of (1) an impoverished view of cultural learning that overestimates the role adults play and underestimates the contribution that children make to cultural reproduction, and (2) a lack of appreciation of the scope and force of children's culture, particularly in shaping adult culture. The marginalization of children and childhood, it is proposed, has obscured our understanding of how cultural forms emerge and why they are sustained. Two case studies, exploring North American children's beliefs about social contamination, illustrate these points. [Keywords: anthropology of childhood, children's culture, acquisition of cultural knowledge, race]
- 1 June 2002
- Published by Wiley in American Anthropologist
- Vol. 104 (2) , 611-627
Why Don't Anthropologists Like Children?
Few major works in anthropology focus specifically on children, a curious state of affairs given that virtually all contemporary anthropology is based on the premise that culture is learned, not inherited. Although children have a remarkable and undisputed capacity for learning generally, and learning culture in particular, in significant measure anthropology has shown little interest in them and their lives. This article examines the reasons for this lamentable lacunae and offers theoretical and empirical reasons for repudiating it. Resistance to child‐focused scholarship, it is argued, is a byproduct of (1) an impoverished view of cultural learning that overestimates the role adults play and underestimates the contribution that children make to cultural reproduction, and (2) a lack of appreciation of the scope and force of children's culture, particularly in shaping adult culture. The marginalization of children and childhood, it is proposed, has obscured our understanding of how cultural forms emerge and why they are sustained. Two case studies, exploring North American children's beliefs about social contamination, illustrate these points. [Keywords: anthropology of childhood, children's culture, acquisition of cultural knowledge, race]