Angela K. Gore
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Angela K. Gore has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
William R. Baber
4 shared publicationsJean X. Zhang
3 shared publicationsCharles Trzcinka
2 shared publicationsEric Yeung
Terry college of business
2 shared publicationsKevin T. Rich
2 shared publicationsSteven R. Matsunaga
University of Oregon
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2022 (1)
Windfall Federal Grants and Local Government Corruption
While federal grants comprise a significant and increasing revenue source for many local governments, regulators have expressed concerns about the effectiveness of the federal government’s grant ma...
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2022 (1)
Windfall Federal Grants and Local Government Corruption
While federal grants comprise a significant and increasing revenue source for many local governments, regulators have expressed concerns about the effectiveness of the federal government’s grant ma...
- 11 November 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 22 (1) , 109-140
Compensation design and political risk: the case of city managers
- 11 November 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 22 (1) , 109-140
Compensation design and political risk: the case of city managers
- 1 November 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 56 (2-3) , 212-227
Accounting restatements, governance and municipal debt financing
- 1 November 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 56 (2-3) , 212-227
Accounting restatements, governance and municipal debt financing
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Does Board Financial Monitoring Matter in the Government Sector? Evidence from Municipal Financial Reporting Quality and Fiscal Policies
We investigate whether the presence of council financial oversight (i.e. audit and finance) committees is associated with financial reporting quality and fiscal policies in the municipal setting. The evidence shows that municipalities with financial oversight committees have higher quality financial reporting and fiscal policies in line with voter preferences. Specifically, we find that both audit and finance committees are associated with fewer internal control problems. Moreover, municipalities with audit committees have higher quality external disclosure, are less likely to experience fiscal deficits, and more likely to finance municipal operations with locally raised revenues rather than by issuing new debt. The latter findings are consistent with municipal audit committees serving a more expansive role than that of monitoring the financial reporting function. Overall, our findings suggest that audit and finance committees function as substitute mechanisms with respect to internal control quality, and as independent mechanisms in terms of external disclosure and fiscal policies.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDoes Board Financial Monitoring Matter in the Government Sector? Evidence from Municipal Financial Reporting Quality and Fiscal Policies
We investigate whether the presence of council financial oversight (i.e. audit and finance) committees is associated with financial reporting quality and fiscal policies in the municipal setting. The evidence shows that municipalities with financial oversight committees have higher quality financial reporting and fiscal policies in line with voter preferences. Specifically, we find that both audit and finance committees are associated with fewer internal control problems. Moreover, municipalities with audit committees have higher quality external disclosure, are less likely to experience fiscal deficits, and more likely to finance municipal operations with locally raised revenues rather than by issuing new debt. The latter findings are consistent with municipal audit committees serving a more expansive role than that of monitoring the financial reporting function. Overall, our findings suggest that audit and finance committees function as substitute mechanisms with respect to internal control quality, and as independent mechanisms in terms of external disclosure and fiscal policies.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Do Governments Hide Resources from Unions? The Influence of Public Sector Unions on Financial Reporting Choices
This study explores whether unionized municipalities use aspects of governmental (or “fund”) accounting to obscure the amount of resources available through the
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDo Governments Hide Resources from Unions? The Influence of Public Sector Unions on Financial Reporting Choices
This study explores whether unionized municipalities use aspects of governmental (or “fund”) accounting to obscure the amount of resources available through the
- Open Access
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Accounting Restatements, Governance and Municipal Debt Financing
We find that mean municipal debt costs are greater following financial restatement disclosures. Comparisons of the relative use of municipal debt, and of the use of unsecured versus secured debt, corroborate that financial restatements increase the cost of municipal debt financing. Additional analyses indicate that adverse consequences of restatements are mitigated by strong audit oversight and by provisions that encourage direct voter participation in the governance process. The evidence supports the use of restatements as a summary measure of financial reporting quality in the municipal context and informs thinking about auditor and voter oversight in the municipal financial reporting process.
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAccounting Restatements, Governance and Municipal Debt Financing
We find that mean municipal debt costs are greater following financial restatement disclosures. Comparisons of the relative use of municipal debt, and of the use of unsecured versus secured debt, corroborate that financial restatements increase the cost of municipal debt financing. Additional analyses indicate that adverse consequences of restatements are mitigated by strong audit oversight and by provisions that encourage direct voter participation in the governance process. The evidence supports the use of restatements as a summary measure of financial reporting quality in the municipal context and informs thinking about auditor and voter oversight in the municipal financial reporting process.
- 10 November 2010
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 32 (7) , 771-786
The role of technical expertise in firm governance structure: evidence from chief financial officer contractual incentives
We provide evidence that the presence of technical expertise in firm governance structure reduces reliance on contractual incentives to control the potential agency problem for executives whose responsibilities require specialized knowledge. Specifically, we find that firms with financial expertise in the form of a board finance committee, or a chief executive officer with a financial background, tend to use lower levels of incentive‐based compensation for their chief financial officers. Our findings suggest financial experts provide stronger oversight and/or direction with regard to firm financial policies and strategies, thereby allowing firms to reduce reliance on incentive compensation. Our study provides insight into the role of technical expertise and board committees in firm governance, and into the benefits of common functional expertise within top management teams. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 10 November 2010
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 32 (7) , 771-786
The role of technical expertise in firm governance structure: evidence from chief financial officer contractual incentives
We provide evidence that the presence of technical expertise in firm governance structure reduces reliance on contractual incentives to control the potential agency problem for executives whose responsibilities require specialized knowledge. Specifically, we find that firms with financial expertise in the form of a board finance committee, or a chief executive officer with a financial background, tend to use lower levels of incentive‐based compensation for their chief financial officers. Our findings suggest financial experts provide stronger oversight and/or direction with regard to firm financial policies and strategies, thereby allowing firms to reduce reliance on incentive compensation. Our study provides insight into the role of technical expertise and board committees in firm governance, and into the benefits of common functional expertise within top management teams. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 1 January 2009
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 84 (1) , 183-207
Why Do Cities Hoard Cash? Determinants and Implications of Municipal Cash Holdings
This study examines the determinants of municipal cash holdings and the implications of holding high levels of cash. The first part of the analysis investigates municipal manager incentives to accumulate cash as part of normal operations. Results indicate that municipalities with a higher variation in revenues, fewer sources of revenues, and higher growth accumulate more cash. Larger governments and those receiving relatively more state revenue accumulate less cash. Further analysis considers whether high levels of cash indicate agency problems, and finds municipalities with high cash holdings spend more on administrative expenses, city manager salaries, and bonuses. I find no evidence that municipalities with excess cash reduce taxes. The presence of staggered councils and councils that are not independent tend to exacerbate excessive cash holdings. These results are consistent with the proposition that municipalities with high cash levels have agency problems relative to those with lower cash holdings.
- 1 January 2009
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 84 (1) , 183-207
Why Do Cities Hoard Cash? Determinants and Implications of Municipal Cash Holdings
This study examines the determinants of municipal cash holdings and the implications of holding high levels of cash. The first part of the analysis investigates municipal manager incentives to accumulate cash as part of normal operations. Results indicate that municipalities with a higher variation in revenues, fewer sources of revenues, and higher growth accumulate more cash. Larger governments and those receiving relatively more state revenue accumulate less cash. Further analysis considers whether high levels of cash indicate agency problems, and finds municipalities with high cash holdings spend more on administrative expenses, city manager salaries, and bonuses. I find no evidence that municipalities with excess cash reduce taxes. The presence of staggered councils and councils that are not independent tend to exacerbate excessive cash holdings. These results are consistent with the proposition that municipalities with high cash levels have agency problems relative to those with lower cash holdings.
- 1 May 2008
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 83 (3) , 565-592
Consequences of GAAP Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from Municipal Debt Issues
We compare characteristics of municipal debt issues in states that mandate GAAP for municipalities with issues in states that impose no annual financial disclosure requirements. Cross-sectional comparisons indicate that the use of public (versus private) debt is greater, and municipal debt costs are 14 to 25 basis points lower, in states where GAAP is mandated. Moreover, municipalities in states that impose the GAAP requirement realize lower debt costs following the effective date of the regulation. These results suggest that GAAP requirements reduce municipal borrowing costs. More generally, the evidence indicates that financial reporting regulation reduces contracting costs between borrowers and lenders.
- 1 May 2008
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 83 (3) , 565-592
Consequences of GAAP Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from Municipal Debt Issues
We compare characteristics of municipal debt issues in states that mandate GAAP for municipalities with issues in states that impose no annual financial disclosure requirements. Cross-sectional comparisons indicate that the use of public (versus private) debt is greater, and municipal debt costs are 14 to 25 basis points lower, in states where GAAP is mandated. Moreover, municipalities in states that impose the GAAP requirement realize lower debt costs following the effective date of the regulation. These results suggest that GAAP requirements reduce municipal borrowing costs. More generally, the evidence indicates that financial reporting regulation reduces contracting costs between borrowers and lenders.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2008
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Why do Cities Hoard Cash? Determinants and Implications of Municipal Cash Holdings
This paper examines the determinants of municipal cash holdings and the implications of holding high levels of cash. The first part of the analysis investigates
- 1 January 2008
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhy do Cities Hoard Cash? Determinants and Implications of Municipal Cash Holdings
This paper examines the determinants of municipal cash holdings and the implications of holding high levels of cash. The first part of the analysis investigates