Sandip Mitra
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Sandip Mitra has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dilip Mookherjee
4 shared publications- Sujata Visaria
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
3 shared publications Antonio Nicolò
2 shared publicationsKunal Sen
2 shared publicationsPrasenjit Banerjee
2 shared publications- Pushkar Maitra
Department of Economics, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 31 May 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 158
Evaluating the distributive effects of a micro-credit intervention
- 31 May 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 158
Evaluating the distributive effects of a micro-credit intervention
- 1 March 2020
- Published by United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research in WIDER Working Paper
Moral reputation and political selection in a decentralized democracy: Theory and evidence from India
What motivates individuals to become politicians? This is an important question in decentralized democracies, where local politicians play a key role in public goods provision. However, and in emerging economies, bureaucratic hurdles and administrative failures introduce uncertainty about the returns to a politician’s effort towards public goods provision. This paper presents a theoretical enquiry of political selection in the presence of such uncertainty. When individuals differ in their concern for reputation, our model predicts that politicians’ effort is increasing in their reputation concern. With uncertainty about the public goods production (and thus reputational) returns to politician effort, our model also predicts that reputation-concerned individuals are more reluctant to join politics than those who worry less about their perceived moral stature. Using data from lab-in-the-field experiments in rural India with local politicians and non-politician participants, we find support for the main predictions of our model.
- 1 March 2020
- Published by United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research in WIDER Working Paper
Moral reputation and political selection in a decentralized democracy: Theory and evidence from India
What motivates individuals to become politicians? This is an important question in decentralized democracies, where local politicians play a key role in public goods provision. However, and in emerging economies, bureaucratic hurdles and administrative failures introduce uncertainty about the returns to a politician’s effort towards public goods provision. This paper presents a theoretical enquiry of political selection in the presence of such uncertainty. When individuals differ in their concern for reputation, our model predicts that politicians’ effort is increasing in their reputation concern. With uncertainty about the public goods production (and thus reputational) returns to politician effort, our model also predicts that reputation-concerned individuals are more reluctant to join politics than those who worry less about their perceived moral stature. Using data from lab-in-the-field experiments in rural India with local politicians and non-politician participants, we find support for the main predictions of our model.
- 1 August 2019
- Published by United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research in WIDER Working Paper
Politicians and their promises in an uncertain world: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India
In emerging economies, pro-social policy outcomes may be prevented by bureaucratic inefficiency, capture by elected or non-elected office holders, or by other hurdles. For local citizens, uncertainty about the true cause of such failures often prevails. We study the pro-sociality of politicians’ decision-making in a modified dictator game with real politician participants in rural India. In our game, a recipient citizen does not know whether dictator politician capture or bad luck is to blame when receiving zero. Using a 2 × 2 design, we investigate how the combination of two non-monetary instruments affect politician behaviour in this hard to govern environment. The first instrument, a (non-binding) promise, is a commitment device; the second introduces a minimal relational lever between the politician and the recipient. We find that politician-dictator giving becomes dramatically more pro-social, from zero to 50:50-giving, when these two instruments are combined. Our results provide new insights about the scope for norm-based, lowcost mechanisms to tackle governance-related asymmetric information challenges in developing country settings.
- 1 August 2019
- Published by United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research in WIDER Working Paper
Politicians and their promises in an uncertain world: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India
In emerging economies, pro-social policy outcomes may be prevented by bureaucratic inefficiency, capture by elected or non-elected office holders, or by other hurdles. For local citizens, uncertainty about the true cause of such failures often prevails. We study the pro-sociality of politicians’ decision-making in a modified dictator game with real politician participants in rural India. In our game, a recipient citizen does not know whether dictator politician capture or bad luck is to blame when receiving zero. Using a 2 × 2 design, we investigate how the combination of two non-monetary instruments affect politician behaviour in this hard to govern environment. The first instrument, a (non-binding) promise, is a commitment device; the second introduces a minimal relational lever between the politician and the recipient. We find that politician-dictator giving becomes dramatically more pro-social, from zero to 50:50-giving, when these two instruments are combined. Our results provide new insights about the scope for norm-based, lowcost mechanisms to tackle governance-related asymmetric information challenges in developing country settings.
- Open Access
- 1 March 2018
- Published by MIT Press in Review of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 100 (1) , 1-13
Asymmetric Information and Middleman Margins: An Experiment with Indian Potato Farmers
West Bengal potato farmers cannot directly access wholesale markets and do not know wholesale prices. Local middlemen earn large margins; pass-through from wholesale to farm-gate prices is negligible. When we informed farmers in randomly chosen villages about wholesale prices, average farm-gate sales and prices were unaffected, but pass-through to farm-gate prices increased. These results can be explained by a model where farmers bargain ex post with village middlemen, with the outside option of selling to middlemen outside the village. They are inconsistent with standard oligopolistic models of pass-through, search frictions or risk-sharing contracts. (JEL Codes: O120, L140)
- 1 March 2018
- Published by MIT Press in Review of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 100 (1) , 1-13
Open AccessAsymmetric Information and Middleman Margins: An Experiment with Indian Potato Farmers
West Bengal potato farmers cannot directly access wholesale markets and do not know wholesale prices. Local middlemen earn large margins; pass-through from wholesale to farm-gate prices is negligible. When we informed farmers in randomly chosen villages about wholesale prices, average farm-gate sales and prices were unaffected, but pass-through to farm-gate prices increased. These results can be explained by a model where farmers bargain ex post with village middlemen, with the outside option of selling to middlemen outside the village. They are inconsistent with standard oligopolistic models of pass-through, search frictions or risk-sharing contracts. (JEL Codes: O120, L140)
- 1 July 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 127, 306-337
Financing smallholder agriculture: An experiment with agent-intermediated microloans in India
- 1 July 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 127, 306-337
Financing smallholder agriculture: An experiment with agent-intermediated microloans in India
- 1 April 2017
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 93, 24-46
Incentives, information and malnutrition: Evidence from an experiment in India
- 1 April 2017
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 93, 24-46
Incentives, information and malnutrition: Evidence from an experiment in India
- 1 August 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 299-328
Political Participation, Clientelism, and Targeting of Local Government Programs
This chapter provides evidence concerning political participation (turnout, awareness, attendance at meetings, campaign involvement, voting) and its relation to local governance (targeting of public services) in a developing country, based on a rural household survey in West Bengal, India. We find that reported participation rates varied remarkably little with socio-economic status, with the exception of education level and immigrant status. Within villages, benefits disbursed by local governments displayed no relation to wealth, caste, education, gender, or political affiliation. In contrast, allocation of benefits across villages by higher-level governments displayed bias against the poor; these biases were larger in villages with more unequal landownership and lower participation rates in village meetings. Political support among voters for the dominant Left party was positively correlated with receipt of recurring benefits and help provided by local governments in times of personal need, but not long-term one-time benefits or local public goods provided.
- 1 August 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 299-328
Political Participation, Clientelism, and Targeting of Local Government Programs
This chapter provides evidence concerning political participation (turnout, awareness, attendance at meetings, campaign involvement, voting) and its relation to local governance (targeting of public services) in a developing country, based on a rural household survey in West Bengal, India. We find that reported participation rates varied remarkably little with socio-economic status, with the exception of education level and immigrant status. Within villages, benefits disbursed by local governments displayed no relation to wealth, caste, education, gender, or political affiliation. In contrast, allocation of benefits across villages by higher-level governments displayed bias against the poor; these biases were larger in villages with more unequal landownership and lower participation rates in village meetings. Political support among voters for the dominant Left party was positively correlated with receipt of recurring benefits and help provided by local governments in times of personal need, but not long-term one-time benefits or local public goods provided.
- 1 February 1997
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 5 (1) , 101-106
Targeting Sectors for Foreign Capital Inflow in a Small Developing Economy
- 1 February 1997
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 5 (1) , 101-106
Targeting Sectors for Foreign Capital Inflow in a Small Developing Economy