Paulo Barelli
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Paulo Barelli has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- John Duggan
University of Rochester
5 shared publications - Samuel de Abreu Pessoa
Fundação Getulio Vargas
2 shared publications - Srihari Govindan
Department of Economics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA
2 shared publications Alexander Pfaff
1 shared publicationIan King
1 shared publication- Idione Meneghel
Australian National University, Australia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 19 (2) , 565-582
Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions
- 1 January 2024
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 19 (2) , 565-582
Open AccessExistence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions
- Open Access
- 1 January 2021
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 16 (4) , 1221-1248
Subgame‐perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: Dispensing with public randomization
An Open Access Economic Theory journal, publishing leading research in economic theory
- 1 January 2021
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 16 (4) , 1221-1248
Open AccessSubgame‐perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: Dispensing with public randomization
An Open Access Economic Theory journal, publishing leading research in economic theory
- 25 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 48 (1) , 1-4
Introduction to the special issue in honor of William Thomson
- 25 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 48 (1) , 1-4
Introduction to the special issue in honor of William Thomson
- 1 November 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 94, 1-14
Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs
- 1 November 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 94, 1-14
Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 155, 95-130
Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, & endogenous institutions
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 155, 95-130
Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, & endogenous institutions
- 1 October 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 54, 74-83
On the optimality of exclusion in multi-dimensional screening
- 1 October 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 54, 74-83
On the optimality of exclusion in multi-dimensional screening
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 151, 596-604
A note on semi-Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 151, 596-604
A note on semi-Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games
- 1 January 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 82 (1) , 271-314
Competition for a Majority
We define the class of two‐player zero‐sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities, which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved. For such games, we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game, maximin and minimax strategies for the players, and a Nash equilibrium. If all discontinuities favor one player, then a value exists and that player has a maximin strategy. A property called payoff approachability implies existence of an equilibrium, and that the resulting value is invariant: games with the same payoffs at points of continuity have the same value and ɛ‐equilibria. For voting games in which two candidates propose policies and a candidate wins election if a weighted majority of voters prefer his proposed policy, we provide tie‐breaking rules and assumptions about voters' preferences sufficient to imply payoff approachability. These assumptions are satisfied by generic preferences if the dimension of the space of policies exceeds the number of voters; or with no dimensional restriction, if the electorate is sufficiently large. Each Colonel Blotto game is a special case in which each candidate allocates a resource among several constituencies and a candidate gets votes from those allocated more than his opponent offers; in this case, for simple‐majority rule we prove existence of an equilibrium with zero probability of ties.
- 1 January 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 82 (1) , 271-314
Competition for a Majority
We define the class of two‐player zero‐sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities, which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved. For such games, we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game, maximin and minimax strategies for the players, and a Nash equilibrium. If all discontinuities favor one player, then a value exists and that player has a maximin strategy. A property called payoff approachability implies existence of an equilibrium, and that the resulting value is invariant: games with the same payoffs at points of continuity have the same value and ɛ‐equilibria. For voting games in which two candidates propose policies and a candidate wins election if a weighted majority of voters prefer his proposed policy, we provide tie‐breaking rules and assumptions about voters' preferences sufficient to imply payoff approachability. These assumptions are satisfied by generic preferences if the dimension of the space of policies exceeds the number of voters; or with no dimensional restriction, if the electorate is sufficiently large. Each Colonel Blotto game is a special case in which each candidate allocates a resource among several constituencies and a candidate gets votes from those allocated more than his opponent offers; in this case, for simple‐majority rule we prove existence of an equilibrium with zero probability of ties.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 77 (1) , 21-40
Admissibility and event-rationality
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 77 (1) , 21-40
Admissibility and event-rationality
- 1 January 2013
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 81 (2) , 813-824
A Note on the Equilibrium Existence Problem in Discontinuous Games
In this note, we prove an equilibrium existence theorem for games with discontinuous payoffs and convex and compact strategy spaces. It generalizes the classical result of Reny (1999), as well as the recent paper of McLennan, Monteiro, and Tourky (2011). Our conditions are simple and easy to verify. Importantly, examples of spatial location models show that our conditions allow for economically meaningful payoff discontinuities, that are not covered by other conditions in the literature.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 81 (2) , 813-824
A Note on the Equilibrium Existence Problem in Discontinuous Games
In this note, we prove an equilibrium existence theorem for games with discontinuous payoffs and convex and compact strategy spaces. It generalizes the classical result of Reny (1999), as well as the recent paper of McLennan, Monteiro, and Tourky (2011). Our conditions are simple and easy to verify. Importantly, examples of spatial location models show that our conditions allow for economically meaningful payoff discontinuities, that are not covered by other conditions in the literature.