MRMostafizur Rahman

Mostafizur Rahman

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Mostafizur Rahman has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Cellular Network Without Borders: Exploring Settlement-Free Peering

    by Anindo Mahmood, Shahzeb Mustafa, Murat Yuksel, Sayanta Seth, Mostafizur Rahman

    In recent times, the wireless network market has received an influx of innovative technologies to cope up with the ever-growing data traffic demand and make efficient deployment and utilization of network resources. Despite that, cellular service and coverage in non-urban areas still remains largely unreliable. Providers predominantly set up roaming agreements to offer service to their customers in such regions where they have no coverage. These roaming services come with their own set of technical and operational constraints and limitations. As an alternative, we introduce Wireless Peering for cellular providers, a concept inspired by ISP peering in wireline networks. By facilitating settlement-free spectrum sharing, Wireless Peering allows providers to seamlessly extend their coverage to off-network regions, without any hardware modifications. Due to its software-defined nature, the model offers high scalability, cost-effectiveness and ease of deployment. In this paper, we detail the core ideas and operational framework of a Wireless Peering model with a particular emphasis on improving customer satisfaction and provider revenue gains. Simulation results using OpencellID data on real-life providers and customers across contiguous United States (US) exhibits significant improvements over roaming for both customers and providers.


  • On the Performance of Uplink NOMA Short-Packet Communication System

    by Jianchao Zheng, Honglu Jiang, Liwen Yu, Samer Y. Khamaiseh, Mostafizur Rahman

    In this paper, we investigate a two-user uplink nonorthogonal multiple access (NOMA) short-packet communication system in flat Rayleigh fading channels, which includes a base station, a central user and a cell-edge user. To derive the average block error rate of the system model, unlike the works in the literature where the product term ( $\mathbb {E}[\epsilon _{c}\epsilon _{ee}]$ ) is omitted or set a lower bound, we propose a novel method based on probability density function that works well in the uplink NOMA system. We theoretically derive the asymptotic expression of the product term in uplink NOMA system by using double Riemann integral approximation. It is validated that simulation results are consistent with our theoretical analysis, which demonstrate that our closed-form of average block error rate can accurately measure the performance of short-packet communications in wireless systems.


  • A Game-Theoretic Framework to Regulate Freeriding in Inter-Provider Spectrum Sharing

    by Mostafizur Rahman, Murat Yuksel, Thomas Quint

    Primary-secondary spectrum sharing is limited in terms of design space, and may not be sufficient to meet the ever-increasing demand of connectivity and high signal quality. The next step to increase spectrum sharing efficiency is to design markets where sharing takes place among primary providers rather than leaving it to the limited case where the primary licensee is idle. Attaining contractual spectrum sharing among primary providers, a.k.a. co-primary or inter-provider sharing, involves additional costs for the users, e.g., roaming fee. Co-primary spectrum sharing without additional charge to the users poses two major challenges: a) regulatory approaches must be introduced to incentivize providers to share spectrum resources, and b) small providers in co-primary spectrum sharing markets may freeride on large providers' networks as the customers of the small providers may be using the spectrum and infrastructure resources of large providers. Such freeriding opportunities must be minimized to realize the benefits of primary-level sharing. We consider a subsidy-based spectrum sharing (SBSS) market to facilitate co-primary spectrum sharing where providers are explicitly incentivized to share spectrum resources. We focus on minimizing freeriding in SBSS markets and introduce a game-theoretic model to regulate the freeriding. We use the model to explore operational regimes with minimal freeriding.


  • Regulations and Strategies in Subsidy-based Spectrum Sharing Markets

    by Mostafizur Rahman, Murat Yuksel, Walid Saad

    Static spectrum allocation and secondary spectrum sharing are unlikely to sufficiently meet the growing need for the radio spectrum due to continuous increase in the number of wireless devices. Hence, new approaches for spectrum sharing at primary level are needed to improve spectrum utilization. In particular, to provide higher spectrum utilization, a government can motivate providers to participate in primary level sharing by introducing subsidy-based spectrum sharing (SBSS) markets. However, this market may give rise to the adverse effect of freeriding. In this paper, the goal is to minimize freeriding in a dynamic spectrum sharing environment using a novel heuristic algorithm that allows a set of providers to effectively participate in an SBSS market. In particular, the provider strategies and regulation on fees set by the government that minimize freeriding are analyzed. Simulation results verify the sustainability of the SBSS market by providing suitable strategies to the providers. A comparison between a game equilibrium to the strategies obtained from proposed algorithm shows the optimality gap. Moreover, a comparative analysis of conventional non-sharing spectrum market to the regulated SBSS market is provided to demonstrate the improvement of a provider’s earning when its charging fee lies between a fair market fee and a regulated minimum fee.