CXChunlin Xiong

Chunlin Xiong

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Chunlin Xiong has a total of 41 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • SParse: Semantic Tracking and Path Analysis for Attack Investigation in Real-Time

    by Jie Ying, Tiantian Zhu, Wenrui Cheng, Qixuan Yuan, Mingjun Ma, Chunlin Xiong, Tieming Chen, Mingqi Lv, Yan Chen

    As Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) become more complex and destructive, attack investigation has gained importance. Analysts use provenance graphs for causality analysis on Point-Of-Interest (POI) events to capture critical events. However, existing methods suffer from problems of high false positives, high overhead, and high latency due to the vast size of the provenance graph and the rarity of critical events. We propose SPARSE for constructing critical component graphs (i.e., consisting of critical events) from streaming logs in real time. Our approach is based on two key observations: 1) Critical events exist in suspicious semantic graphs (SSGs) composed of interaction flows between suspicious entities, and 2) Information flows accomplishing the attacker's goal exist as paths. SPARSE uses a two-stage framework that first constructs the SSG using a state-based mode with semantic transfer rules and storage strategies. Then, it identifies suspicious flow paths (SFPs) related to the POI event and quantifies each path's influence to filter irrelevant events. Evaluation on a large-scale attack dataset shows our system generates a critical component graph ($\sim$ 113 edges) in 1.6 seconds, which is 2014 × smaller than the backtracking graph ($\sim$ 227,589 edges). It is also 25 × more effective in filtering irrelevant edges compared to other state-of-the-art techniques.


  • CRUcialG: Reconstruct Integrated Attack Scenario Graphs by Cyber Threat Intelligence Reports

    by Wenrui Cheng, Tiantian Zhu, Tieming Chen, Qixuan Yuan, Jie Ying, Hongmei Li, Chunlin Xiong, Mingda Li, Mingqi Lv, Yan Chen

    Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports are factual records compiled by security analysts through their observations of threat events or their own practical experience with attacks. In order to utilize CTI reports for attack detection, existing methods have attempted to map the content of reports onto system-level attack provenance graphs to clearly depict attack procedures. However, existing studies on constructing graphs from CTI reports suffer from problems such as weak Natural Language Processing (NLP) capabilities, discrete and fragmented graphs, and insufficient attack semantic representation. Therefore, we propose a system called CRUcialG for the automated reconstruction of Attack Scenario Graphs (ASGs) by CTI reports. First, we use NLP models to extract systematic attack knowledge from CTI reports to form preliminary ASGs. Then, we propose a four-phase attack rationality validation framework from the tactical phase with attack procedure to evaluate the reasonability of ASGs. Finally, we implement the relation repair and phase supplement of ASGs by adopting a serialized graph generation model. We collect a total of 10,607 CTI reports and generate 5,761 complete ASGs. Experimental results on CTI reports from 30 security vendors and DARPA show that the similarity of ASG reconstruction by CRUcialG can reach 84.54%. Compared with SOTA (EXTRACTOR and AttackG), the recall of CRUcialG (extraction of real attack events) can reach 88.13% and 94.46% respectively, which is 40% higher than SOTA on average. The F1-score of attack phase validation is able to reach 90.04%.


  • TAGAPT: Toward Automatic Generation of APT Samples With Provenance-Level Granularity

    by Wenrui Cheng, Qixuan Yuan, Tiantian Zhu, Tieming Chen, Jie Ying, Aohan Zheng, Mingjun Ma, Chunlin Xiong, Mingqi Lv, Yan Chen

    Detecting advanced persistent threats (APTs) at a host via data provenance has emerged as a valuable yet challenging task. Compared with attack rule matching, machine learning approaches offer new perspectives for efficiently detecting attacks by leveraging their inherent ability to autonomously learn from data and adapt to dynamic environments. However, the scarcity of APT samples poses a significant limitation, rendering supervised learning methods that have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in other domains (e.g., malware detection) impractical. Therefore, we propose a system called TAGAPT, which is able to automatically generate numerous APT samples with provenance-level granularity. First, we introduce a deep graph generation model to generalize various graph structures that represent new attack patterns. Second, we propose an attack stage division algorithm to divide each generated graph structure into stage subgraphs. Finally, we design a genetic algorithm to find the optimal attack technique explanation for each subgraph and obtain fully instantiated APT samples. Experimental results demonstrate that TAGAPT can learn from existing attack patterns and generalize to novel attack patterns. Furthermore, the generated APT samples 1) exhibit the ability to help with efficient threat hunting and 2) provide additional assistance to the state-of-the-art (SOTA) attack detection system (Kairos) by filtering out 73% of the observed false positives. We have open-sourced the code and the generated samples to support the development of the security community.


  • Nip in the Bud: Forecasting and Interpreting Post- Exploitation Attacks in Real-Time Through Cyber Threat Intelligence Reports

    by Tiantian Zhu, Jie Ying, Tieming Chen, Chunlin Xiong, Wenrui Cheng, Qixuan Yuan, Aohan Zheng, Mingqi Lv, Yan Chen

    Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks have caused significant damage worldwide. Various Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) systems are deployed by enterprises to fight against potential threats. However, EDR suffers from high false positives. In order not to affect normal operations, analysts need to investigate and filter detection results before taking countermeasures, in which heavy manual labor and alarm fatigue cause analysts miss optimal response time, thereby leading to information leakage and destruction. Therefore, we propose Endpoint Forecasting and Interpreting (EFI), a real-time attack forecast and interpretation system, which can automatically predict next move during post-exploitation and explain it in technique-level, then dispatch strategies to EDR for advance reinforcement. First, we use Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports to extract the attack scene graph (ASG) that can be mapped to low-level system logs to strengthen attack samples. Second, we build a serialized graph forecast model, which is combined with the attack provenance graph (APG) provided by EDR to generate an attack forecast graph (AFG) to predict the next move. Finally, we utilize the attack template graph (ATG) and graph alignment plus algorithm for technique-level interpretation to automatically dispatch strategies for EDR to reinforce system in advance. EFI can avoid the impact of existing EDR false positives, and can reduce the attack surface of system without affecting the normal operations. We collect a total of 3,484 CTI reports, generate 1,429 ASGs, label 8,000 sentences, tag 10,451 entities, and construct 256 ATGs. Experimental results on both DARPA Engagement and large scale CTI dataset show that the alignment score between the AFG predicted by EFI and the real attack graph is able to exceed 0.8, the forecast and interpretation precision of EFI can reach 91.8%


  • System-level data management for endpoint advanced persistent threat detection: Issues, challenges and trends

    by Tieming Chen, Chenbin Zheng, Tiantian Zhu, Chunlin Xiong, Jie Ying, Qixuan Yuan, Wenrui Cheng, Mingqi Lv


  • TrapCog: An Anti-Noise, Transferable, and Privacy-Preserving Real-Time Mobile User Authentication System With High Accuracy

    by Jie Ying, Tiantian Zhu, Qiang Liu, Chunlin Xiong, Zhengqiu Weng, Tieming Chen, Lei Fu, Mingqi Lv, Han Wu, Ting Wang, et al.

    The authentication technology of mobile device users has been studied for decades. To balance security, privacy, and usability, motion sensors-based user authentication methods are widely investigated in recent years. However, existing studies meet the problems such as scarcity of training samples, underutilization of data, poor de-noising ability, insufficient transferability, privacy leakage, and low accuracy. To overcome these difficulties, we propose a system, called TrapCog , with the following capabilities: 1) In the phase of data collection, TrapCog can eliminate man-made noise (mislabeling) through differential training based on down-sampling. 2) In the model training stage, the siamese neural network with Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) as the sub-network is used to achieve sufficient coverage of sample patterns and the transferability of the model. 3) In the phase of real-world authentication, the privacy of the user is tremendously protected through end-side model deployment and local authentication. Experimental results on a dataset composed of 1,513 users with real-world noise show that TrapCog has high accuracy and strong transferability, which is much better than state-of-the-art studies.


  • APTSHIELD: A Stable, Efficient and Real-Time APT Detection System for Linux Hosts

    by Tiantian Zhu, Jinkai Yu, Chunlin Xiong, Wenrui Cheng, Qixuan Yuan, Jie Ying, Tieming Chen, Jiabo Zhang, Mingqi Lv, Yan Chen, et al.

    Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack usually refers to the form of long-term, covert and sustained attack on specific targets, with an adversary using advanced attack techniques to destroy the key facilities of an organization. APT attacks have caused serious security threats and massive financial loss worldwide. Academics and industry thereby have proposed a series of solutions to detect APT attacks, such as dynamic/static code analysis, traffic detection, sandbox technology, endpoint detection and response (EDR), etc. However, existing defenses are failed to accurately and effectively defend against the current APT attacks that exhibit strong persistent, stealthy, diverse and dynamic characteristics due to the weak data source integrity, large data processing overhead and poor real-time performance in the process of real-world scenarios. To overcome these difficulties, in this paper we propose APTSHIELD, a stable, efficient and real-time APT detection system for Linux hosts. In the aspect of data collection, audit is selected to stably collect kernel data of the operating system so as to carry out a complete portrait of the attack based on comprehensive analysis and comparison of existing logging tools; In the aspect of data processing, redundant semantics skipping and non-viable node pruning are adopted to reduce the amount of data, so as to reduce the overhead of the detection system; In the aspect of attack detection, an APT attack detection framework based on ATT&CK model is designed to carry out real-time attack response and alarm through the transfer and aggregation of labels. Experimental results on both laboratory and Darpa Engagement show that our system can effectively detect web vulnerability attacks, file-less attacks and remote access trojan attacks, and has a low false positive rate, which adds far more value than the existing frontier work.


  • Generic, efficient, and effective deobfuscation and semantic-aware attack detection for PowerShell scripts

    by Chunlin Xiong, Zhenyuan Li, Yan Chen, Tiantian Zhu, Jian Wang, Hai Yang, Wei Ruan

    In recent years, PowerShell has increasingly been reported as appearing in a variety of cyber attacks. However, because the PowerShell language is dynamic


  • General, Efficient, and Real-Time Data Compaction Strategy for APT Forensic Analysis

    by Tiantian Zhu, Jiayu Wang, Linqi Ruan, Chunlin Xiong, Jinkai Yu, Yaosheng Li, Yan Chen, Mingqi Lv, Tieming Chen

    The damage caused by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks to governments and large enterprises is gradually escalating. Once an attack event is detected, forensic analysis will use the dependencies between system audit logs to rapidly locate intrusion points and determine the impact of the attacks. Due to the high persistence of APT attacks, huge amounts of data will be stored to meet the needs of forensic analysis, which not only brings great storage overhead, but also sharply increases the computing costs. To compact data without affecting forensic analysis, several methods have been proposed. However, in real-world scenarios, we meet the problems of weak cross-platform capability, large data processing overhead, and poor real-time performance, rendering existing data compaction methods difficult to meet the usability and universality requirements jointly. To overcome these difficulties, this paper proposes a general, efficient, and real-time data compaction method at the system log level; it does not involve internal analysis of the program or depend on the specific operating system type, and it includes two strategies: 1) data compaction of maintaining global semantics (GS), which determines and deletes redundant events that do not affect global dependencies, and 2) data compaction based on suspicious semantics (SS). Given that the purpose of forensic analysis is to restore the attack chain, SS performs context analysis on the remaining events from GS and further deletes the parts that are not related to the attack. The results of the real-world experiments show that the compaction ratios of our method to system events are as high as $4.36\times $ to $13.18\times $ and $7.86\times $ to $26.99\times $ on GS and SS, respectively, which is better than state-of-the-art studies.


  • RATScope: Recording and Reconstructing Missing RAT Semantic Behaviors for Forensic Analysis on Windows

    by Runqing Yang, Xutong Chen, Haitao Xu, Yueqiang Cheng, Chunlin Xiong, Linqi Ruan, Mohammad Kavousi, Zhenyuan Li, Liheng Xu, Yan Chen

    Remote Access Trojan (RAT) attacks have become an extensively prevailing and serious threat to enterprise security. A forensic system targeting RAT attacks is needed to record and reconstruct fine-grained semantic behaviors of RATs. However, existing forensic systems suffer from various issues such as intrusive instrumentation, nontrivial recording overhead, and RAT behavior blindness. In this paper, we first conduct a large-scale study of a representative set of real-world RAT families active from 1999 to 2016. This is the first study to understand the landscape of RATs in the literature. Based on the study, we then propose RATScope, an instrumentation-free RAT forensic system targeting Windows platform. Specifically, RATScope offers an audit logging module to efficiently record system logs by leveraging Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), and provides a novel program behavior modeling technique to accurately reconstruct semantic behaviors of RATs. We implemented a prototype of RATScope and evaluated the recording overhead and the behavior identification accuracy. The results show that the audit logging module only incurred 3.7% runtime overhead on average. Our system can achieve around 90% true positive rate in the cross-family experiment, around 80% true positive rate in the two-year spanning temporal experiment, and near zero false positive rate.