Mosharraf Hossain
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Mosharraf Hossain has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mahmoud Agha
Department of Finance, Zayed University – Abu Dhabi Campus
2 shared publications - Richard Arthur Heaney
University of Western Australia
2 shared publications - Shahadat Hossain
Department of Finance, University of Chittagong, Chittagong 4331, Bangladesh
2 shared publications - Vincent K. Chong
The University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia
2 shared publications - Gregory P. White
School of Accounting, Curtin Business School, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Australia
1 shared publication - Jing Yu
University of Sydney Business School, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 September 2026
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Managerial Finance
- Vol. 22 (5) , 1101-1122
Green financing policy and bank performance and risk: evidence from a developing economy
Purpose: This paper examines whether green financing creates value for banks and alters their risk profiles, and how government incentives and corporate governance shape these outcomes. Focusing on Bangladeshi banks, the study compares bank performance, costs and risk before and after the 2015 green financing policy that introduced financial incentives for compliant banks. It aims to determine whether green lending without incentives enhances performance, whether policy support changes its effectiveness and whether green lending increases bank risk. The paper further investigates the role of CEO power, institutional ownership and board size in moderating the performance effects of green financing. Design/methodology/approach: Using bank-level data and a difference-in-difference frameowrk, this paper examines the impact of green financing on the performance and risk of Bangladeshi banks before and after the introduction of a government green financing policy in 2015 that included financial incentives for compliant banks. The paper also examines whether CEO power and governance structure moderate this impact. Findings: The study finds that green lending is positively associated with bank performance for the full sample. However, before the 2015 green financing policy, banks engaging in green lending exhibited higher operating costs and lower performance than non-green banks. After the introduction of the policy and its associated financial incentives, compliant banks significantly outperformed non-compliant banks, indicating that green policies without incentives may not create value. Post-policy green lending is also linked to improved bank credit ratings, suggesting no increase in bank risk. These findings imply that CEOs' aversion to green lending found in prior studies is not driven by risk–return considerations. Additionally, CEO power weakens the positive performance effects of green lending, while institutional ownership and larger boards mitigate this adverse impact. Originality/value: This study offers novel evidence on the value and risk implications of green financing by exploiting the introduction of a government's policy with financial incentives. Unlike prior research that treats green lending as inherently value-enhancing, the paper distinguishes between pre- and post-policy periods, showing that green lending creates value only when supported by incentives. It further contributes by demonstrating that green lending does not increase bank risk, as reflected in improved credit ratings, thereby challenging risk-based explanations for CEOs' aversion to green finance. Finally, the study uniquely highlights how CEO power and corporate governance mechanisms jointly shape green financing outcomes.
- 8 September 2026
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Managerial Finance
- Vol. 22 (5) , 1101-1122
Green financing policy and bank performance and risk: evidence from a developing economy
Purpose: This paper examines whether green financing creates value for banks and alters their risk profiles, and how government incentives and corporate governance shape these outcomes. Focusing on Bangladeshi banks, the study compares bank performance, costs and risk before and after the 2015 green financing policy that introduced financial incentives for compliant banks. It aims to determine whether green lending without incentives enhances performance, whether policy support changes its effectiveness and whether green lending increases bank risk. The paper further investigates the role of CEO power, institutional ownership and board size in moderating the performance effects of green financing. Design/methodology/approach: Using bank-level data and a difference-in-difference frameowrk, this paper examines the impact of green financing on the performance and risk of Bangladeshi banks before and after the introduction of a government green financing policy in 2015 that included financial incentives for compliant banks. The paper also examines whether CEO power and governance structure moderate this impact. Findings: The study finds that green lending is positively associated with bank performance for the full sample. However, before the 2015 green financing policy, banks engaging in green lending exhibited higher operating costs and lower performance than non-green banks. After the introduction of the policy and its associated financial incentives, compliant banks significantly outperformed non-compliant banks, indicating that green policies without incentives may not create value. Post-policy green lending is also linked to improved bank credit ratings, suggesting no increase in bank risk. These findings imply that CEOs' aversion to green lending found in prior studies is not driven by risk–return considerations. Additionally, CEO power weakens the positive performance effects of green lending, while institutional ownership and larger boards mitigate this adverse impact. Originality/value: This study offers novel evidence on the value and risk implications of green financing by exploiting the introduction of a government's policy with financial incentives. Unlike prior research that treats green lending as inherently value-enhancing, the paper distinguishes between pre- and post-policy periods, showing that green lending creates value only when supported by incentives. It further contributes by demonstrating that green lending does not increase bank risk, as reflected in improved credit ratings, thereby challenging risk-based explanations for CEOs' aversion to green finance. Finally, the study uniquely highlights how CEO power and corporate governance mechanisms jointly shape green financing outcomes.
- Open Access
- 26 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Does Green Credit Reduce Solvency Risk of Commercial Banks?
This study examines the effect of green credit on the solvency risks faced by commercial banks. Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions were applied to a unique, hand-collected dataset comprising 30 regulated commercial banks in Bangladesh from 2012 to 2019. The findings demonstrate that green credit reduces solvency risk for commercial banks. This relationship holds across multiple measures of solvency risk and green credit, including analyses that incorporate a one-year lag in green credit usage. The results remain robust to potential endogeneity, as evidenced by System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Propensity Score Matching estimates. Further analysis reveals that green credit mitigates solvency risks by lowering credit risk and return volatility, while enhancing risk-adjusted earnings for commercial banks. These findings contribute to the existing literature, offer practical implications for policymakers and regulators, and highlight the necessity of prudential interventions to promote and incentivize green lending.
- 26 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDoes Green Credit Reduce Solvency Risk of Commercial Banks?
This study examines the effect of green credit on the solvency risks faced by commercial banks. Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions were applied to a unique, hand-collected dataset comprising 30 regulated commercial banks in Bangladesh from 2012 to 2019. The findings demonstrate that green credit reduces solvency risk for commercial banks. This relationship holds across multiple measures of solvency risk and green credit, including analyses that incorporate a one-year lag in green credit usage. The results remain robust to potential endogeneity, as evidenced by System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Propensity Score Matching estimates. Further analysis reveals that green credit mitigates solvency risks by lowering credit risk and return volatility, while enhancing risk-adjusted earnings for commercial banks. These findings contribute to the existing literature, offer practical implications for policymakers and regulators, and highlight the necessity of prudential interventions to promote and incentivize green lending.
- Open Access
- 17 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Solvency Risk of Microfinance Institutions: Does National Culture Matter?
This study investigates whether national cultural values of uncertainty avoidance and individualism matter for the solvency risk of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). We use a sample of 1,423 MFIs (7,651 MFI-year observations) from 65 countries for the period 2004-2018 and find evidence that MFIs operating in countries with high uncertainty avoidance tend to show better solvency, while MFIs operating in countries with high individualism tend to exhibit poor solvency position. These relationships are robust after accounting for endogeneity and robustness tests. However, the role of uncertainty avoidance and individualism gradually diminishes during and after the global financial crisis. Detailed analysis shows that the MFIs in high uncertainty avoidance cultures prefer more risk-adjusted return on assets and risk-adjusted equity, and in high individualism cultures tend to prefer less risk-adjusted return on assets and risk-adjusted equity. We also find that the effect differs among MFIs due to the regulatory and ownership status of MFIs, as well as country-level governance variables (such as creditors' rights index and the rule of law). These findings offer important implications for regulators and practitioners of hybrid financial institutions like MFIs.
- 17 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSolvency Risk of Microfinance Institutions: Does National Culture Matter?
This study investigates whether national cultural values of uncertainty avoidance and individualism matter for the solvency risk of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). We use a sample of 1,423 MFIs (7,651 MFI-year observations) from 65 countries for the period 2004-2018 and find evidence that MFIs operating in countries with high uncertainty avoidance tend to show better solvency, while MFIs operating in countries with high individualism tend to exhibit poor solvency position. These relationships are robust after accounting for endogeneity and robustness tests. However, the role of uncertainty avoidance and individualism gradually diminishes during and after the global financial crisis. Detailed analysis shows that the MFIs in high uncertainty avoidance cultures prefer more risk-adjusted return on assets and risk-adjusted equity, and in high individualism cultures tend to prefer less risk-adjusted return on assets and risk-adjusted equity. We also find that the effect differs among MFIs due to the regulatory and ownership status of MFIs, as well as country-level governance variables (such as creditors' rights index and the rule of law). These findings offer important implications for regulators and practitioners of hybrid financial institutions like MFIs.
- 5 March 2024
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Managerial Finance
- Vol. 20 (5) , 1200-1217
Green finance when stakeholders’ interests collide with each other: the case of Bangladesh
Purpose: This study examines the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) power, institutional investors and their interaction on green financing provided by Bangladeshi financial institutions and the moderating effect of government policy and CEO political connections on these relations.Design/methodology/approach: We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and interaction terms among variables of interest for the empirical analysis.Findings: Green financing decreases with CEO power, implying that CEOs of this country’s financial institutions are averse to green loans, whereas institutional investors increase green financing extended by these institutions. The government policy, which includes financial incentives for complying financial institutions, strengthens institutional investors' positive impact on green financing, but it does not change CEOs' aversion to green loans. Institutional investors have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between green finance (GF) and CEO power, but this positive moderating effect is negated in banks where the government owns a stake, possibly because CEOs of state-owned financial institutions are politically connected, which reduces institutional investors’ influence over them.Originality/value: This study is unique in that it is the first to examine how the interaction among different stakeholders affects green financing in a unique setting. As the literature is almost silent on this topic, the findings of this paper are expected to raise policymakers’ awareness of the obstacles that hamper the efforts of developing countries to go green.
- 5 March 2024
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Managerial Finance
- Vol. 20 (5) , 1200-1217
Green finance when stakeholders’ interests collide with each other: the case of Bangladesh
Purpose: This study examines the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) power, institutional investors and their interaction on green financing provided by Bangladeshi financial institutions and the moderating effect of government policy and CEO political connections on these relations.Design/methodology/approach: We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and interaction terms among variables of interest for the empirical analysis.Findings: Green financing decreases with CEO power, implying that CEOs of this country’s financial institutions are averse to green loans, whereas institutional investors increase green financing extended by these institutions. The government policy, which includes financial incentives for complying financial institutions, strengthens institutional investors' positive impact on green financing, but it does not change CEOs' aversion to green loans. Institutional investors have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between green finance (GF) and CEO power, but this positive moderating effect is negated in banks where the government owns a stake, possibly because CEOs of state-owned financial institutions are politically connected, which reduces institutional investors’ influence over them.Originality/value: This study is unique in that it is the first to examine how the interaction among different stakeholders affects green financing in a unique setting. As the literature is almost silent on this topic, the findings of this paper are expected to raise policymakers’ awareness of the obstacles that hamper the efforts of developing countries to go green.
- 1 May 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Global Finance Journal
- Vol. 44, 100448
The information content of director trading: Evidence from acquisition announcements in Australia
- 1 May 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Global Finance Journal
- Vol. 44, 100448
The information content of director trading: Evidence from acquisition announcements in Australia
- 26 June 2018
- Published by Wiley in Australian Accounting Review
- Vol. 29 (4) , 615-630
Components of CEO Remuneration and Non‐GAAP Disclosure
This paper provides evidence of the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration on decisions to disclose voluntary non‐generally accepted accounting principles (non‐GAAP) financial measures. We investigate profit announcements that focus on the most emphasised part, which includes mandatorily identified information (results for the announcement to the market) and the least emphasised part, which incorporates other sections. By reading the profit announcements and manually collecting non‐GAAP financial measures (NGFM) data, there is no reliance on keyword search strings and as such we uncover the pervasiveness of the use of NGFM. Results show that the base component of CEOs’ remuneration plays a significant role in reporting NGFM in the most emphasised part of the profit announcement. Conversely, all three (base, short‐term and long‐term incentives) components of the remuneration package have a significant relationship with the reporting decisions in the least emphasised part of the statement. We find that, depending on the regulatory imposition and the emphasis assigned to the section of the profit announcement, the motive for voluntary disclosure of NGFM can be explained as altruistic (informative) or opportunistic (misleading). We contribute evidence on ‘pay–action’ rather than ‘pay–performance’ by incorporating all three components simultaneously into the framework to maintain the assumption of correspondence and internal consistency among those components.
- 26 June 2018
- Published by Wiley in Australian Accounting Review
- Vol. 29 (4) , 615-630
Components of CEO Remuneration and Non‐GAAP Disclosure
This paper provides evidence of the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration on decisions to disclose voluntary non‐generally accepted accounting principles (non‐GAAP) financial measures. We investigate profit announcements that focus on the most emphasised part, which includes mandatorily identified information (results for the announcement to the market) and the least emphasised part, which incorporates other sections. By reading the profit announcements and manually collecting non‐GAAP financial measures (NGFM) data, there is no reliance on keyword search strings and as such we uncover the pervasiveness of the use of NGFM. Results show that the base component of CEOs’ remuneration plays a significant role in reporting NGFM in the most emphasised part of the profit announcement. Conversely, all three (base, short‐term and long‐term incentives) components of the remuneration package have a significant relationship with the reporting decisions in the least emphasised part of the statement. We find that, depending on the regulatory imposition and the emphasis assigned to the section of the profit announcement, the motive for voluntary disclosure of NGFM can be explained as altruistic (informative) or opportunistic (misleading). We contribute evidence on ‘pay–action’ rather than ‘pay–performance’ by incorporating all three components simultaneously into the framework to maintain the assumption of correspondence and internal consistency among those components.
- 5 September 2016
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Accounting Research Journal
- Vol. 29 (3) , 332-347
Director trading, or lack thereof, and acquiring firm performance
Purpose: This paper aims to address the question of whether acquiring firm directors trading, prior to a merger or acquisition (M&A) announcement, predicts the share market reaction on M&A announcement. Design/methodology/approach: Event studies and cross-section regression were used in this analysis. Findings: This paper finds that acquiring firms with no director trading and firms with net director purchases in the 12 months prior to the M&A announcement earn positive abnormal returns. It is also found that share market reaction to M&A announcements is considerably larger for acquiring firms whose directors do not trade relative to those companies with directors who do trade over the prior 12 months. This director non-trading result is further born out in regression analysis. Research limitations/implications: The absence of pre-M&A announcement director trading could reflect lower agency costs for the acquiring firm and this might explain to stronger announcement day effect for this group of firms. Practical implications: The fact that directors choose not to trade in their shares prior to a M&A transaction appears to be viewed as good news by the market. Social implications: Director trading is value relevant for the acquiring firm and so it is critical that director trading is transparent. Originality/value: To the best of the authors' knowledge, this question has not been addressed in the literature before, particularly the finding for firms with no director trading in the period prior to the M&A announcement.
- 5 September 2016
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Accounting Research Journal
- Vol. 29 (3) , 332-347
Director trading, or lack thereof, and acquiring firm performance
Purpose: This paper aims to address the question of whether acquiring firm directors trading, prior to a merger or acquisition (M&A) announcement, predicts the share market reaction on M&A announcement. Design/methodology/approach: Event studies and cross-section regression were used in this analysis. Findings: This paper finds that acquiring firms with no director trading and firms with net director purchases in the 12 months prior to the M&A announcement earn positive abnormal returns. It is also found that share market reaction to M&A announcements is considerably larger for acquiring firms whose directors do not trade relative to those companies with directors who do trade over the prior 12 months. This director non-trading result is further born out in regression analysis. Research limitations/implications: The absence of pre-M&A announcement director trading could reflect lower agency costs for the acquiring firm and this might explain to stronger announcement day effect for this group of firms. Practical implications: The fact that directors choose not to trade in their shares prior to a M&A transaction appears to be viewed as good news by the market. Social implications: Director trading is value relevant for the acquiring firm and so it is critical that director trading is transparent. Originality/value: To the best of the authors' knowledge, this question has not been addressed in the literature before, particularly the finding for firms with no director trading in the period prior to the M&A announcement.