Joakim Kulin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Joakim Kulin has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ingemar Johansson Sevä
Umeå University
8 shared publications Ingemar Johansson Sevä
Affiliation Department of Sociology, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden
2 shared publications- Malcolm Fairbrother
Department of Sociology, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
2 shared publications - Ekaterina Rhodes
University of Victoria
1 shared publication - Filip Fors Connolly
Department of sociology, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden
1 shared publication - Maureen A. Eger
Umeå University, Sweden
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Politics
- p. 1-33
Beyond denial: climate delay discourses and public opinion on government climate action in the United States
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Politics
- p. 1-33
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessBeyond denial: climate delay discourses and public opinion on government climate action in the United States
- Open Access
- 25 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 45 (4) , 686-710
How do Europeans want to fight climate change? Comparing and explaining public support for a wide variety of policies
Most people are concerned about climate change and want policymakers to address it. But how? To investigate which policy options are more versus less popular, with whom, and why, we collected data in four European countries on attitudes toward 16 policies: taxes, bans, regulations, and subsidies/spending. We argue that support for different policies should reflect perceptions of policies’ net costs, and that such perceptions are likely influenced by people’s political trust. We tested this expectation by randomly assigning survey respondents to read different versions of given policies and confirmed that individuals with low political trust, who are less supportive overall of most policies, are most sensitive to variation in implied costs. We argue this interaction effect is a previously untested implication of the influential theory that political trust operates as a heuristic, and it helps explain policies’ varying popularity, including the puzzle of why carbon taxes are highly unpopular.
- 25 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 45 (4) , 686-710
Open AccessHow do Europeans want to fight climate change? Comparing and explaining public support for a wide variety of policies
Most people are concerned about climate change and want policymakers to address it. But how? To investigate which policy options are more versus less popular, with whom, and why, we collected data in four European countries on attitudes toward 16 policies: taxes, bans, regulations, and subsidies/spending. We argue that support for different policies should reflect perceptions of policies’ net costs, and that such perceptions are likely influenced by people’s political trust. We tested this expectation by randomly assigning survey respondents to read different versions of given policies and confirmed that individuals with low political trust, who are less supportive overall of most policies, are most sensitive to variation in implied costs. We argue this interaction effect is a previously untested implication of the influential theory that political trust operates as a heuristic, and it helps explain policies’ varying popularity, including the puzzle of why carbon taxes are highly unpopular.
- Open Access
- 21 November 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Politics
- Vol. 34 (6) , 979-999
Climate whataboutism and rightwing populism: how emissions blame-shifting translates nationalist attitudes into climate policy opposition
- 21 November 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Politics
- Vol. 34 (6) , 979-999
Open AccessClimate whataboutism and rightwing populism: how emissions blame-shifting translates nationalist attitudes into climate policy opposition
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 4 October 2024
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Climate
- Vol. 3 (10) , e0000443
Rightwing populist attitudes and public support for climate policies in Western Europe: Widening the scope using the European Social Survey
In Western Europe, rightwing populist parties and their supporters frequently deny the realities of climate change and oppose climate policies. Meanwhile, public opinion research has tied ideological orientations associated with rightwing populism to climate change denial/skepticism and climate policy opposition. Yet, comprehensive studies assessing the relative importance of various rightwing populist orientations across national contexts are lacking. Using European Social Survey data (Round 8) from 15 Western European countries, we systematically investigate the relationships between a large set of orientations related to rightwing populism and public views about climate change. The results show that nationalism and nativism, that is, orientations associated with the thick ideology of rightwing populism, appear to be comparably strong and consistent predictors, especially regarding opposition to climate change mitigation policies. However, the relative importance of different orientations varies across Western European countries, and depend on whether the focus is on policy attitudes or climate change beliefs. Researchers studying single countries and/or specific attitudinal outcomes should therefore be cautious when generalizing about these relationships cross-nationally.
- 4 October 2024
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Climate
- Vol. 3 (10) , e0000443
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessRightwing populist attitudes and public support for climate policies in Western Europe: Widening the scope using the European Social Survey
In Western Europe, rightwing populist parties and their supporters frequently deny the realities of climate change and oppose climate policies. Meanwhile, public opinion research has tied ideological orientations associated with rightwing populism to climate change denial/skepticism and climate policy opposition. Yet, comprehensive studies assessing the relative importance of various rightwing populist orientations across national contexts are lacking. Using European Social Survey data (Round 8) from 15 Western European countries, we systematically investigate the relationships between a large set of orientations related to rightwing populism and public views about climate change. The results show that nationalism and nativism, that is, orientations associated with the thick ideology of rightwing populism, appear to be comparably strong and consistent predictors, especially regarding opposition to climate change mitigation policies. However, the relative importance of different orientations varies across Western European countries, and depend on whether the focus is on policy attitudes or climate change beliefs. Researchers studying single countries and/or specific attitudinal outcomes should therefore be cautious when generalizing about these relationships cross-nationally.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2024
- Published by IOP Publishing in Environmental Research Communications
- Vol. 6 (9) , 095013
Political trust and public support for climate policy in Europe: the role of perceptions about politicians’ competence and integrity
While previous studies on the relationship between political trust and support for climate policy have focused on the evaluative component of trust, namely whether politicians and the political system can be trusted or not, less is known about the role of different dimensions of trustworthiness that underlie such evaluations. In this study, we examine how perceptions about politicians’ competence and integrity, two central dimensions of trustworthiness, are related to public support for climate policies. Using survey data from four European countries (Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Poland), we find that people who think that politicians are competent are generally more likely to support climate policy. In contrast, we do not find such a relationship between integrity perceptions (e.g., corruption) and policy attitudes. These findings are consistent across national contexts and hold even when alternating the measures capturing competence and integrity perceptions. To bolster public support for climate policies, climate communication should prioritize addressing public concerns regarding politicians’ competence in designing sound climate policies, rather than alleviating concerns about their integrity, such as fears of corruption.
- 1 September 2024
- Published by IOP Publishing in Environmental Research Communications
- Vol. 6 (9) , 095013
Open AccessPolitical trust and public support for climate policy in Europe: the role of perceptions about politicians’ competence and integrity
While previous studies on the relationship between political trust and support for climate policy have focused on the evaluative component of trust, namely whether politicians and the political system can be trusted or not, less is known about the role of different dimensions of trustworthiness that underlie such evaluations. In this study, we examine how perceptions about politicians’ competence and integrity, two central dimensions of trustworthiness, are related to public support for climate policies. Using survey data from four European countries (Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Poland), we find that people who think that politicians are competent are generally more likely to support climate policy. In contrast, we do not find such a relationship between integrity perceptions (e.g., corruption) and policy attitudes. These findings are consistent across national contexts and hold even when alternating the measures capturing competence and integrity perceptions. To bolster public support for climate policies, climate communication should prioritize addressing public concerns regarding politicians’ competence in designing sound climate policies, rather than alleviating concerns about their integrity, such as fears of corruption.
- Open Access
- 21 June 2024
- Published by Wiley in Scandinavian Political Studies
- Vol. 47 (4) , 575-600
Rightwing populism and public opinion on the Covid‐19 pandemic in Sweden: The role of strategic party positioning and political cues
During the early stages of the Covid‐19 pandemic, the Swedish government did not implement the hard lockdowns and coercive measures found in many countries and instead relied on voluntary social distancing measures and work‐from‐home initiatives. Unlike its international counterparts in most countries, the rightwing populist party in Sweden early on took a critical approach toward the government's handling of the Covid‐19 pandemic, calling for stricter government measures to curb virus transmission. Based on theories about strategic party positioning, and theories about political elite cues and framing effects, we use Swedish survey data from the early stages of the pandemic to show that the views of rightwing populist party supporters aligned with the rhetoric of the Swedish rightwing populist party in demanding more (rather than less) government intervention to curb the spread of SARS‐COV‐2. Our results suggest that they did so by drawing on core rightwing populist themes of anti‐elitism and nationalism. Hence, our results speak to the role of elite cues and framing in public opinion formation during times of crisis, particularly among rightwing populists, who generally opposed stricter government measures to fight the Covid‐19 pandemic.
- 21 June 2024
- Published by Wiley in Scandinavian Political Studies
- Vol. 47 (4) , 575-600
Open AccessRightwing populism and public opinion on the Covid‐19 pandemic in Sweden: The role of strategic party positioning and political cues
During the early stages of the Covid‐19 pandemic, the Swedish government did not implement the hard lockdowns and coercive measures found in many countries and instead relied on voluntary social distancing measures and work‐from‐home initiatives. Unlike its international counterparts in most countries, the rightwing populist party in Sweden early on took a critical approach toward the government's handling of the Covid‐19 pandemic, calling for stricter government measures to curb virus transmission. Based on theories about strategic party positioning, and theories about political elite cues and framing effects, we use Swedish survey data from the early stages of the pandemic to show that the views of rightwing populist party supporters aligned with the rhetoric of the Swedish rightwing populist party in demanding more (rather than less) government intervention to curb the spread of SARS‐COV‐2. Our results suggest that they did so by drawing on core rightwing populist themes of anti‐elitism and nationalism. Hence, our results speak to the role of elite cues and framing in public opinion formation during times of crisis, particularly among rightwing populists, who generally opposed stricter government measures to fight the Covid‐19 pandemic.
- Open Access
- 4 June 2021
- Published by Sociologisk Forskning, Swedish Sociological Association in Sociologisk Forskning
- Vol. 58 (1–2) , 77-102
Oro över coronapandemin i det svenska samhället
Syftet med denna studie är att öka kunskapen om människors oro över coronapandemin i Sverige. Vi använder enkätdata (n=3 040) för att studera 1) hur utbredd oron är, 2) vad den mer konkret består i, 3) hur den varierar mellan olika demografiska och socioekonomiska grupper, 4) huruvida oron kan förklaras av faktorer som personlighet, livsåskådning, tillit och riskuppfattningar, samt 5) vilka konsekvenser oron får för människors sociala kontakter, livskvalitet, beteenden och åsikter om samhällets åtgärder för att minska smittspridningen. Resultaten visar att det finns en utbredd oro över coronapandemin i Sverige och att denna främst bottnar i en oro för den egna eller familjemedlemmars hälsa. Dessutom varierar oron mellan grupper: framför allt äldre personer men även kvinnor och låginkomsttagare uppvisar jämförelsevis en högre grad av oro. Det finns ett flertal faktorer som förklarar den upplevda oron, men särskilt riskuppfattningar förklarar en stor andel av variationen mellan individer samt skillnader mellan olika grupper. De som oroar sig mer uppger också att de i större utsträckning följer myndigheternas rekommendationer och har minskat sina sociala aktiviteter samt upplever en försämrad livskvalitet under coronapandemin.
- 4 June 2021
- Published by Sociologisk Forskning, Swedish Sociological Association in Sociologisk Forskning
- Vol. 58 (1–2) , 77-102
Open AccessOro över coronapandemin i det svenska samhället
Syftet med denna studie är att öka kunskapen om människors oro över coronapandemin i Sverige. Vi använder enkätdata (n=3 040) för att studera 1) hur utbredd oron är, 2) vad den mer konkret består i, 3) hur den varierar mellan olika demografiska och socioekonomiska grupper, 4) huruvida oron kan förklaras av faktorer som personlighet, livsåskådning, tillit och riskuppfattningar, samt 5) vilka konsekvenser oron får för människors sociala kontakter, livskvalitet, beteenden och åsikter om samhällets åtgärder för att minska smittspridningen. Resultaten visar att det finns en utbredd oro över coronapandemin i Sverige och att denna främst bottnar i en oro för den egna eller familjemedlemmars hälsa. Dessutom varierar oron mellan grupper: framför allt äldre personer men även kvinnor och låginkomsttagare uppvisar jämförelsevis en högre grad av oro. Det finns ett flertal faktorer som förklarar den upplevda oron, men särskilt riskuppfattningar förklarar en stor andel av variationen mellan individer samt skillnader mellan olika grupper. De som oroar sig mer uppger också att de i större utsträckning följer myndigheternas rekommendationer och har minskat sina sociala aktiviteter samt upplever en försämrad livskvalitet under coronapandemin.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 23 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Politics
- Vol. 30 (7) , 1111-1134
Nationalist ideology, rightwing populism, and public views about climate change in Europe
Rising rightwing populism (RWP) potentially constitutes an obstacle to climate change mitigation, as European RWP parties and politicians often espouse climate change skepticism and oppose climate policies. Meanwhile, their party positions and issue stances have also become increasingly characterized by nationalism. Using European Social Survey data from 2016, we show that public attitudes consistent with nationalist ideology are clearly linked to voting for RWP parties and that people who hold these attitudes are more likely to be skeptical about climate change and to oppose policies that increase taxes on fossil fuels. With regard to policy attitudes, we find that nationalist ideology is more influential than traditional left-right political ideology, environmental values and political trust. The results also reveal substantial cross-national differences, as nationalist ideology is linked more closely to public views about climate change in Western European countries, where RWP parties with a nationalist rhetoric have had recent electoral successes.
- 23 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Politics
- Vol. 30 (7) , 1111-1134
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessNationalist ideology, rightwing populism, and public views about climate change in Europe
Rising rightwing populism (RWP) potentially constitutes an obstacle to climate change mitigation, as European RWP parties and politicians often espouse climate change skepticism and oppose climate policies. Meanwhile, their party positions and issue stances have also become increasingly characterized by nationalism. Using European Social Survey data from 2016, we show that public attitudes consistent with nationalist ideology are clearly linked to voting for RWP parties and that people who hold these attitudes are more likely to be skeptical about climate change and to oppose policies that increase taxes on fossil fuels. With regard to policy attitudes, we find that nationalist ideology is more influential than traditional left-right political ideology, environmental values and political trust. The results also reveal substantial cross-national differences, as nationalist ideology is linked more closely to public views about climate change in Western European countries, where RWP parties with a nationalist rhetoric have had recent electoral successes.
- Open Access
- 28 October 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Politics
- Vol. 30 (5) , 727-752
Quality of government and the relationship between environmental concern and pro-environmental behavior: a cross-national study
Previous research consistently finds a relatively weak relationship between environmental concern and pro-environmental behavior, as environmentally concerned individuals often fail to act pro-environmentally, both in the private and public spheres. While the strength of the concern–behavior relationship varies considerably across countries, existing research has yet to provide a complete account of these cross-national differences. In this study, we add to previous cross-national research on the concern–behavior relationship by focusing on the quality of government. Using multilevel analysis and data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), we demonstrate that people who are environmentally concerned are more likely to act pro-environmentally (in the public sphere), in countries where government institutions are fair, effective and impartial. We also find that people are generally more likely to engage in pro-environmental behavior in both the private and public sphere in countries where the quality of government is high.
- 28 October 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Environmental Politics
- Vol. 30 (5) , 727-752
Open AccessQuality of government and the relationship between environmental concern and pro-environmental behavior: a cross-national study
Previous research consistently finds a relatively weak relationship between environmental concern and pro-environmental behavior, as environmentally concerned individuals often fail to act pro-environmentally, both in the private and public spheres. While the strength of the concern–behavior relationship varies considerably across countries, existing research has yet to provide a complete account of these cross-national differences. In this study, we add to previous cross-national research on the concern–behavior relationship by focusing on the quality of government. Using multilevel analysis and data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), we demonstrate that people who are environmentally concerned are more likely to act pro-environmentally (in the public sphere), in countries where government institutions are fair, effective and impartial. We also find that people are generally more likely to engage in pro-environmental behavior in both the private and public sphere in countries where the quality of government is high.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 20 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Climate Policy
- Vol. 21 (1) , 33-46
Who do you trust? How trust in partial and impartial government institutions influences climate policy attitudes
While previous research shows that environmental policy attitudes depend on trust in government, existing studies have either focused exclusively on trust in politicians and democratic institutions (political trust) or conflated such measures with trust in a wider range of impartial government institutions and actors. In this study, we distinguish between trust in partial institutions that enact laws and policies on the one hand, and trust in impartial institutions that exercise government authority and enforce policies on the other, and systematically analyse their respective influence on climate policy preferences. In addition to investigating the direct influences of trust, we also focus on how trust in government institutions moderates the relationship between climate change concern and climate policy attitudes cross-nationally. Using European Social Survey data from 2016, we demonstrate that individual-level trust in both partial and impartial government institutions constitutes an important determinant of climate policy attitudes. Moreover, while we find no evidence of direct effects of trust at the country level, we demonstrate that individuals who are concerned about climate change are more likely to hold positive attitudes towards climate policies in high-trust countries, particularly where trust in impartial institutions such as the legal system and the police is high. Key policy insights
- 20 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Climate Policy
- Vol. 21 (1) , 33-46
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessWho do you trust? How trust in partial and impartial government institutions influences climate policy attitudes
While previous research shows that environmental policy attitudes depend on trust in government, existing studies have either focused exclusively on trust in politicians and democratic institutions (political trust) or conflated such measures with trust in a wider range of impartial government institutions and actors. In this study, we distinguish between trust in partial institutions that enact laws and policies on the one hand, and trust in impartial institutions that exercise government authority and enforce policies on the other, and systematically analyse their respective influence on climate policy preferences. In addition to investigating the direct influences of trust, we also focus on how trust in government institutions moderates the relationship between climate change concern and climate policy attitudes cross-nationally. Using European Social Survey data from 2016, we demonstrate that individual-level trust in both partial and impartial government institutions constitutes an important determinant of climate policy attitudes. Moreover, while we find no evidence of direct effects of trust at the country level, we demonstrate that individuals who are concerned about climate change are more likely to hold positive attitudes towards climate policies in high-trust countries, particularly where trust in impartial institutions such as the legal system and the police is high. Key policy insights