PLPeinan Li

Peinan Li

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Peinan Li has a total of 44 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    NXT: Sharable Trusted Execution Environment for Multi-Tenant NPU Cluster

    by Shiwen Wang, Peinan Li, Yunkai Bai, Wu Luo, Guang Yan, Dan Meng, Rui Hou

    Cloud AI services have experienced rapid development, raising concerns to privacy protection of cloud tenants. Many proposals have been made to use the NPU Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to protect AI workloads on the cloud. However, existing designs typically bind NPUs exclusively to a single tenant, preventing multiple tenants from sharing the computing power of the TEE-NPUs. As such, we have designed a novel TEE for discrete NPUs, named NXT (NPU eXtension for Trust), which breaks the exclusive binding architecture and allows multiple tenants to securely share the TEE-NPU cluster. Firstly, we introduced an NPU Trusted Agent (NTA) to the most privileged level of the TEE system to assist in the global scheduling of the TEE-NPU cluster. Secondly, we implemented a flexible isolation mechanism to provide security for multi-tenant fine-grained sharing of NPU resources. Thirdly, we support efficient communication between workloads within TEE-NPUs and with legacy NPUs, accelerating multi-workload collaborative computing. We evaluated NXT by extending gem5 and a cycle-accurate NPU simulator to build a prototype. Results show that NXT improves overall utilization by up to 3.49× and ANTT by up to 7.24×, with only 6.38% average overhead for scheduling and isolation. It also boosts parallel inference performance by 58.3% for GPT-2(XL) and 63.6% for LLaMA-13B compared to static protection schemes.

  • Open Access

    Sonar: A Hardware Fuzzing Framework to Uncover Contention Side Channels in Processors

    by Kanqi Zhang, Peinan Li, Miao Li, Xin Tian, Zelong Du, Quanchen Liu, Yongqiang Lyu, Yu Jiang, Dan Meng, Rui Hou


  • Open Access

    Chameleon: An Efficient FHE Scheme Switching Acceleration on GPUs

    by Zhiwei Wang, Haoqi He, Lutan Zhao, Peinan Li, Zhihao Li, Dan Meng, Rui Hou

    Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables direct computation on encrypted data, making it a crucial technology for privacy protection. However, FHE suffers from significant performance bottlenecks. In this context, GPU acceleration offers a promising solution to bridge the performance gap. Existing efforts primarily focus on single-class FHE schemes, which fail to meet the diverse requirements of data types and functions, prompting the development of hybrid multi-class FHE schemes. However, studies have yet to thoroughly investigate specific GPU optimizations for hybrid FHE schemes. In this article, we present an efficient GPU-based FHE scheme switching acceleration named Chameleon. First, we propose a scalable NTT acceleration design that adapts to larger CKKS polynomials and smaller TFHE polynomials. Specifically, Chameleon tackles synchronization issues by fusing stages to reduce synchronization, employing polynomial coefficient shuffling to minimize synchronization scale, and utilizing an SM-aware combination strategy to identify the optimal switching point. Second, Chameleon is the first to comprehensively analyze and optimize critical switching operations. It introduces CMux-level parallelization to accelerate LUT evaluation and a homomorphic rotation-free matrix-vector multiplication to improve repacking efficiency. Finally, Chameleon outperforms the state-of-the-art GPU implementations by 1.23× in CKKS HMUL and 1.15× in bootstrapping. It also achieves up to 4.87× and 1.51× speedups for TFHE bootstrapping compared to CPU and GPU versions, respectively, and delivers a 67.3× average speedup for scheme switching over CPU-based implementation.


  • Open Access

    SecPaging: Secure Enclave Paging with Hardware-Enforced Protection against Controlled-Channel Attacks

    by Yunkai Bai, Peinan Li, Yubiao Huang, Shiwen Wang, Xingbin Wang, Dan Meng, Rui Hou

    As a prevalent privacy-preserving technology, Trusted Execution Environment has become widely adopted in numerous commercial processors. Nonetheless, they remain susceptible to various controlled-channel attacks. Untrusted operating systems can deduce enclave secrets by manipulating page tables or observing allocation- or swap-based page faults. In this paper, we propose SecPaging, a novel secure enclave paging mechanism based on hardware-enforced and microcode-supported protection to prevent these attacks. First, enclave PTEs are protected through hardware isolation, preventing privileged attackers from malicious tampering or observations. Second, an Eager-Allocation mechanism is employed to prevent allocation-based controlled-channel attacks. Besides, a Record-Reload mechanism is proposed to prevent swap-based controlled-channel attacks. We simulate SecPaging on real SGX. Experiments demonstrate that controlled channel attacks can be defended with minimal performance overhead.


  • Open Access

    EnTurbo: Accelerate Confidential Serverless Computing via Parallelizing Enclave Startup Procedure

    by Yifan Zhu, Peinan Li, Yunkai Bai, Yubiao Huang, Shiwen Wang, Xingbin Wang, Dan Meng, Rui Hou

    Serverless computing has gained widespread attention, and Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are well-suited for safeguarding user privacy. However, the additional startup procedure introduced by TEEs imposes considerable performance overhead on confidential serverless workloads. This paper introduces a novel parallelized enclave startup design, EnTurbo, which eliminates the integrity dependence of the enclave startup procedure, accelerating it while ensuring its security. Additionally, EnTurbo parallelizes the measurement procedure, enabling multi-thread measurement for acceleration with provable security. We evaluate EnTurbo by running confidential serverless workloads on SGX simulation mode. Results show that EnTurbo effectively speeds up enclave serverless by 1.42x-6.48x (SGXv1) and 1.33x-3.76x (SGXv2).


  • Open Access

    HE-Booster: An Efficient Polynomial Arithmetic Acceleration on GPUs for Fully Homomorphic Encryption

    by Zhiwei Wang, Peinan Li, Rui Hou, Zhihao Li, Jiangfeng Cao, XiaoFeng Wang, Dan Meng

    Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables secure offloading of computations to untrusted cloud servers as it allows computing on encrypted data. However, existing well-known FHE schemes suffer from heavy performance overheads. Thus numerous accelerations based on FPGAs, ASICs, and GPUs have been proposed. Compared to FPGAs and ASICs, GPUs have obvious advantages in productivity and development costs. And also, GPUs have already been widely deployed in commercial cloud or supercomputing centers. Therefore, we present HE-Booster, an efficient GPU-based FHE acceleration design. For single-GPU acceleration, a thorough systematic design is exploited to map five common phases in typical FHE schemes to the GPU parallel architecture. In particular, inspired by the regular architecture of NTT/INTT, a novel inter-thread local synchronization is proposed to exploit thread-level parallelism. For multi-GPU acceleration, we propose a scalable parallelization design that exploits data-level parallelism through fine-grained data partition under different representations. Finally, experiments on 1 NVIDIA GPU demonstrate that our work outperforms 251.7×, 78.5× and 164.9× than three mainstream CPU-based libraries HElib, SEAL, and PALISADE, and up to 170.5× speedup is obtained compared to the GPU-accelerated library cuHE. What's more, performing 8 homomorphic multiplications on 8 GPUs can deliver up to a 7.66× performance boost compared to a single-GPU implementation.


  • Architecting the Autocuckoo Filter to Defend Against Cross-Core Cache Attacks

    by Fengkai Yuan, Kai Wang, Jiameng Ying, Rui Hou, Lutan Zhao, Peinan Li, Yifan Zhu, Zhenzhou Ji, Dan Meng

    Cross-core cache timing side channel attacks, which observe cache access behavior of victims running on different physical cores to infer sensitive information, have become a significant threat. Although the attacks are covert, they cause the attacked cachelines to frequently migrate among cache hierarchies, rendering abnormal traffic. Based on this observation, the proposed scheme PiPoMonitor records cache-memory access traffic and prefetch suspicious lines under attack to interfere with adversaries’ probes. In pursuit of security and performance, PiPoMonitor exploits a Cuckoo filter as the recording structure and introduces two features to it, autonomic deletion and relocation accelerating. The former exponentially increases the uncertainty of record eviction against reverse engineering attacks, while the latter leverages a pipelined architecture to alleviate the impact of intensive filter queries on the memory critical path. PiPoMonitor is not only able to effectively mitigate cross-core cache attacks and defeat sophisticated defense-aware attackers, but also induces a negligible performance penalty and acceptable hardware overhead.


  • A Novel Probabilistic Saturating Counter Design for Secure Branch Predictor

    by Lu-Tan Zhao, Rui Hou, Kai Wang, Yu-Lan Su, Pei-Nan Li, Dan Meng


  • Open Access

    PiPoMonitor: Mitigating Cross-core Cache Attacks Using the Auto-Cuckoo Filter

    by Fengkai Yuan, Kai Wang, Rui Hou, Xiaoxin Li, Peinan Li, Lutan Zhao, Jiameng Ying, Amro Awad, Dan Meng

    Cache side channel attacks obtain victim cache line access footprint to infer security-critical information. Among them, cross-core attacks exploiting the shared last level cache are more threatening as their simplicity to set up and high capacity. Stateful approaches of detection-based mitigation observe precise cache behaviors and protect specific cache lines that are suspected of being attacked. However, their recording structures incur large storage overhead and are vulnerable to reverse engineering attacks. Exploring the intrinsic non-determinate layout of a traditional Cuckoo filter, this paper proposes a space efficient Auto-Cuckoo filter to record access footprints, which succeed to decrease storage overhead and resist reverse engineering attacks at the same time. With Auto-Cuckoo filter, we propose PiPoMonitor to detect Ping-Pong patterns and prefetch specific cache line to interfere with adversaries' cache probes. Security analysis shows the PiPoMonitor can effectively mitigate cross-core attacks and the Auto-Cuckoo filter is immune to reverse engineering attacks. Evaluation results indicate PiPoMonitor has negligible impact on performance and the storage overhead is only 0.37%, an order of magnitude lower than previous stateful approaches.