Cheng-Hsun Lee
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Cheng-Hsun Lee has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sudipta Bose
Discipline of Accounting and Finance, Newcastle Business School The University of Newcastle Sydney New South Wales Australia
2 shared publications - Allen H. Huang
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
1 shared publication - Archana Patro
Indian Institute of Management, Bodh Gaya, India
1 shared publication Geeti Mishra
1 shared publication- Nafis Rahman
Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong
1 shared publication Tracy Gu
AIA Group Ltd
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 21 January 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
- Vol. 41 (4) , 1807-1839
The Impact of Litigation Risk on the Commission and Detection of Financial Misreporting
Although securities class action lawsuits are one of the most important disciplinary tools to curtail misreporting, studies on their role in financial misreporting suffer from a partial observability problem. This paper uses the US Supreme Court ruling in Tellabs v. Makor that resulted in an increase in litigation risk for certain firms as a natural experiment. We exploit this setting to disentangle the effect of litigation risk on the commission and detection of misreporting. We find that increased litigation risk reduces acts of misreporting while also increasing the rate of detection of misreporting. Cross-sectional analyses confirm that the effect of Tellabs v. Makor is stronger for firms facing higher exposure to class action lawsuits, such as firms with greater institutional ownership and firms with aggressive financial reporting practices, indicating that litigation risk is likely the main mechanism driving the ruling’s effect. Furthermore, the positive association between litigation risk and the detection of misreporting is concentrated among firms led by low-ability CEOs, in line with the intuition that these CEOs are less capable of evading detection. An additional analysis based on a bivariate probit model further corroborates findings from our main analyses. Our study extends the literature on the effects of legal precedents on financial reporting quality and has implications for regulators and investors.
- 21 January 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
- Vol. 41 (4) , 1807-1839
The Impact of Litigation Risk on the Commission and Detection of Financial Misreporting
Although securities class action lawsuits are one of the most important disciplinary tools to curtail misreporting, studies on their role in financial misreporting suffer from a partial observability problem. This paper uses the US Supreme Court ruling in Tellabs v. Makor that resulted in an increase in litigation risk for certain firms as a natural experiment. We exploit this setting to disentangle the effect of litigation risk on the commission and detection of misreporting. We find that increased litigation risk reduces acts of misreporting while also increasing the rate of detection of misreporting. Cross-sectional analyses confirm that the effect of Tellabs v. Makor is stronger for firms facing higher exposure to class action lawsuits, such as firms with greater institutional ownership and firms with aggressive financial reporting practices, indicating that litigation risk is likely the main mechanism driving the ruling’s effect. Furthermore, the positive association between litigation risk and the detection of misreporting is concentrated among firms led by low-ability CEOs, in line with the intuition that these CEOs are less capable of evading detection. An additional analysis based on a bivariate probit model further corroborates findings from our main analyses. Our study extends the literature on the effects of legal precedents on financial reporting quality and has implications for regulators and investors.
- Open Access
- 11 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in IIMB Management Review
- Vol. 37 (4)
The impact of ESG reporting on the cost of equity capital in India: The moderating role of external auditors
- 11 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in IIMB Management Review
- Vol. 37 (4)
Open AccessThe impact of ESG reporting on the cost of equity capital in India: The moderating role of external auditors
- Open Access
- 18 March 2025
- Published by Emerald Publishing in China Accounting and Finance Review
- Vol. 27 (2) , 275-307
CEO turnover in family firms: the corporate transparency perspective
Purpose: We investigate the relationship between family firms and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover and the moderating role of corporate transparency in this association, using firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE).Design/methodology/approach: Using a sample of 15,726 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2019, the study employs ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques to estimate the research models. Several methods were applied to address endogeneity issues in our findings. Additionally, the role of tax avoidance is analyzed as an underlying mechanism in the association between corporate transparency in family firms and CEO turnover.Findings: We find a negative association between family firms and CEO turnover; however, this effect is weakened by corporate transparency. Consistent with the transparency hypothesis, corporate transparency mitigates the Type II agency problem. We also find that tax avoidance serves as an underlying mechanism in the association between corporate transparency in family firms and CEO turnover.Research limitations/implications: Our study contributes to agency theory as it pertains to the Type II agency problem from a corporate transparency perspective. This is achieved by highlighting the behavior of family firms regarding CEO turnover, with our findings adding to the still scarce literature on how the dominant shareholder–minority shareholder conflict varies at different levels of corporate transparency.Practical implications: Policymakers should consider mandating higher levels of corporate transparency, such as more stringent disclosure requirements and regular independent audits, to mitigate the Type II agency problem in family firms. For family firm owners, embracing transparency can lead to better governance and potentially higher firm value, as it aligns more closely with minority shareholders’ interests and reduces conflicts. Minority shareholders can advocate for increased transparency through active participation in annual general meetings, thereby enhancing their ability to monitor management and influence key decisions like CEO turnover.Social implications: The insights benefit broader economic and social activities by reducing conflicts between dominant and minority shareholders and promoting fairness among related parties.Originality/value: Our results contribute to a better understanding of the moderating role of corporate transparency in mitigating the Type II agency problem, with implications for family firm owners and shareholders.
- 18 March 2025
- Published by Emerald Publishing in China Accounting and Finance Review
- Vol. 27 (2) , 275-307
Open AccessCEO turnover in family firms: the corporate transparency perspective
Purpose: We investigate the relationship between family firms and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover and the moderating role of corporate transparency in this association, using firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE).Design/methodology/approach: Using a sample of 15,726 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2019, the study employs ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques to estimate the research models. Several methods were applied to address endogeneity issues in our findings. Additionally, the role of tax avoidance is analyzed as an underlying mechanism in the association between corporate transparency in family firms and CEO turnover.Findings: We find a negative association between family firms and CEO turnover; however, this effect is weakened by corporate transparency. Consistent with the transparency hypothesis, corporate transparency mitigates the Type II agency problem. We also find that tax avoidance serves as an underlying mechanism in the association between corporate transparency in family firms and CEO turnover.Research limitations/implications: Our study contributes to agency theory as it pertains to the Type II agency problem from a corporate transparency perspective. This is achieved by highlighting the behavior of family firms regarding CEO turnover, with our findings adding to the still scarce literature on how the dominant shareholder–minority shareholder conflict varies at different levels of corporate transparency.Practical implications: Policymakers should consider mandating higher levels of corporate transparency, such as more stringent disclosure requirements and regular independent audits, to mitigate the Type II agency problem in family firms. For family firm owners, embracing transparency can lead to better governance and potentially higher firm value, as it aligns more closely with minority shareholders’ interests and reduces conflicts. Minority shareholders can advocate for increased transparency through active participation in annual general meetings, thereby enhancing their ability to monitor management and influence key decisions like CEO turnover.Social implications: The insights benefit broader economic and social activities by reducing conflicts between dominant and minority shareholders and promoting fairness among related parties.Originality/value: Our results contribute to a better understanding of the moderating role of corporate transparency in mitigating the Type II agency problem, with implications for family firm owners and shareholders.
- 31 August 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 49 (1-2) , 111-139
Non‐generally accepted accounting principles disclosures and audit committee chairs’ external directorships
I examine the relation between the quality of non‐generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) earnings disclosures and the number of external directorships held by a firm's independent audit committee chair (ACC). I find that firms with ACCs holding more external directorships provide higher quality non‐GAAP disclosures than those who do not hold outside board positions. When the ACC has at least one external directorship, the firm's non‐GAAP exclusions are more transitory, indicating that they are of higher quality. In addition, when the ACC has at least one external directorship, non‐GAAP exclusions that are incremental to those excluded by analysts are smaller in magnitude and therefore are less aggressive. Overall, the results suggest that the number of external directorships ACCs holds plays an important role in firms’ non‐GAAP disclosures. The results are consistent with a reputation cost perspective, where ACCs with more external directorships face higher reputation concerns from having more to lose, resulting in stronger monitoring and thus higher quality non‐GAAP disclosures.
- 31 August 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 49 (1-2) , 111-139
Non‐generally accepted accounting principles disclosures and audit committee chairs’ external directorships
I examine the relation between the quality of non‐generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) earnings disclosures and the number of external directorships held by a firm's independent audit committee chair (ACC). I find that firms with ACCs holding more external directorships provide higher quality non‐GAAP disclosures than those who do not hold outside board positions. When the ACC has at least one external directorship, the firm's non‐GAAP exclusions are more transitory, indicating that they are of higher quality. In addition, when the ACC has at least one external directorship, non‐GAAP exclusions that are incremental to those excluded by analysts are smaller in magnitude and therefore are less aggressive. Overall, the results suggest that the number of external directorships ACCs holds plays an important role in firms’ non‐GAAP disclosures. The results are consistent with a reputation cost perspective, where ACCs with more external directorships face higher reputation concerns from having more to lose, resulting in stronger monitoring and thus higher quality non‐GAAP disclosures.
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 17 (2)
Do family firms engage in less tax avoidance than non-family firms? The corporate opacity perspective
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
- Vol. 17 (2)
Do family firms engage in less tax avoidance than non-family firms? The corporate opacity perspective