Daniel Uroz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Daniel Uroz has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ricardo Julio Rodríguez
Universidad de Zaragoza
4 shared publications Ricardo J. Rodríguez
2 shared publications- Carlos Gañán
Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 767-768
Poster: Empirical Analysis of Lifespan Increase of IoT C&C Domains
The increasing prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) devices have made them attractive targets for malware, highlighting the critical need to understand the dynamics of IoT Command and Control (C&C). While previous research observed short-lived C&Cs, recent observations indicate that the lifespan of domain names linked to IoT botnets is extending, deviating from previously recorded survival rates. To understand and characterize this emerging trend, we collected and examined 1049 IoT malware samples from late 2022 to early 2023, identifying 549 unique domains contacted by these samples. Domains were classified as malicious if detected by VirusTotal or followed a Domain Generation Algorithm pattern. Using data from WhoisXMLAPI and DNSDB Scout, we analyzed registration information and historical DNS resolutions, and identified relationships. Our findings reveal that the majority of C&C domains belong to Qsnatch and Mirai malware families, with an average lifespan of 2.7 years. Notably, seven active domains had an average lifespan of 5.7 years. We also observed a significant number of domains under the .vg and .ws TLDs, but with lack of passive DNS and registration information.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 767-768
Open AccessPoster: Empirical Analysis of Lifespan Increase of IoT C&C Domains
The increasing prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) devices have made them attractive targets for malware, highlighting the critical need to understand the dynamics of IoT Command and Control (C&C). While previous research observed short-lived C&Cs, recent observations indicate that the lifespan of domain names linked to IoT botnets is extending, deviating from previously recorded survival rates. To understand and characterize this emerging trend, we collected and examined 1049 IoT malware samples from late 2022 to early 2023, identifying 549 unique domains contacted by these samples. Domains were classified as malicious if detected by VirusTotal or followed a Domain Generation Algorithm pattern. Using data from WhoisXMLAPI and DNSDB Scout, we analyzed registration information and historical DNS resolutions, and identified relationships. Our findings reveal that the majority of C&C domains belong to Qsnatch and Mirai malware families, with an average lifespan of 2.7 years. Notably, seven active domains had an average lifespan of 5.7 years. We also observed a significant number of domains under the .vg and .ws TLDs, but with lack of passive DNS and registration information.
- 30 March 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 9 (19) , 19062-19072
Characterization and Evaluation of IoT Protocols for Data Exfiltration
Data exfiltration relies primarily on network protocols for unauthorized data transfers from information systems. In addition to well-established Internet protocols (such as DNS, ICMP, or NTP, among others), adversaries can use newer protocols such as Internet of Things (IoT) protocols to inadvertently exfiltrate data. These IoT protocols are specifically designed to meet the limitations of IoT devices and networks, where minimal bandwidth usage and low power consumption are desirable. In this article, we review the suitability of IoT protocols for exfiltrating data. In particular, we focus on the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP; version 1.0), the message queuing telemetry transport protocol (MQTT; in its versions 3.1.1 and 5.0), and the advanced message queuing protocol (AMQP; version 1.0). For each protocol, we review its specification and calculate the overhead and available space to exfiltrate data in each protocol message. In addition, we empirically measure the elapsed time to exfiltrate different amounts of data. In this regard, we develop a software tool (dubbed CHITON) to encapsulate and exfiltrate data within the IoT protocol messages. Our results show that both MQTT and AMQP outperform CoAP. Additionally, MQTT and AMQP protocols are best suited for exfiltrating data, as both are commonly used to connect to IoT cloud providers through IoT gateways and are therefore more likely to be allowed in business networks. Finally, we also provide suggestions and recommendations to detect data exfiltration in IoT protocols.
- 30 March 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 9 (19) , 19062-19072
Characterization and Evaluation of IoT Protocols for Data Exfiltration
Data exfiltration relies primarily on network protocols for unauthorized data transfers from information systems. In addition to well-established Internet protocols (such as DNS, ICMP, or NTP, among others), adversaries can use newer protocols such as Internet of Things (IoT) protocols to inadvertently exfiltrate data. These IoT protocols are specifically designed to meet the limitations of IoT devices and networks, where minimal bandwidth usage and low power consumption are desirable. In this article, we review the suitability of IoT protocols for exfiltrating data. In particular, we focus on the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP; version 1.0), the message queuing telemetry transport protocol (MQTT; in its versions 3.1.1 and 5.0), and the advanced message queuing protocol (AMQP; version 1.0). For each protocol, we review its specification and calculate the overhead and available space to exfiltrate data in each protocol message. In addition, we empirically measure the elapsed time to exfiltrate different amounts of data. In this regard, we develop a software tool (dubbed CHITON) to encapsulate and exfiltrate data within the IoT protocol messages. Our results show that both MQTT and AMQP outperform CoAP. Additionally, MQTT and AMQP protocols are best suited for exfiltrating data, as both are commonly used to connect to IoT cloud providers through IoT gateways and are therefore more likely to be allowed in business networks. Finally, we also provide suggestions and recommendations to detect data exfiltration in IoT protocols.
- 1 May 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 361-372
Evaluation of the Executional Power in Windows using Return Oriented Programming
Code-reuse techniques have emerged as a way to defeat the control-flow defenses that prevent the injection and execution of new code, as they allow an adversary to hijack the control flow of a victim program without injected code. A well-known code-reuse attack technique is Return-OrientedProgramming (ROP), which considers and links together (relatively short) code snippets, named ROP gadgets, already present in the victim’s memory address space through a controlled use of the stack values of the victim program. Although ROP attacks are known to be Turing-complete, there are still open question such as the quantification of the executional power of an adversary, which is determined by whatever code exists in the memory of a victim program, and whether an adversary can build a ROP chain, made up of ROP gadgets, for any kind of algorithm. To fill these gaps, in this paper we first define a virtual language, dubbed ROPLANG, that defines a set of operations (specifically, arithmetic, assignment, dereference, logical, and branching operations) which are mapped to ROP gadgets. We then use it to evaluate the executional power of an adversary in Windows 7 and Windows 10, in both 32- and 64-bit versions. In addition, we have developed ROP3, a tool that accepts a set of program files and a ROP chain described with our language and returns the code snippets that make up the ROP chain. Our results show that there are enough ROP gadgets to simulate any virtual operation and that branching operations are the less frequent ones. As expected, our results also indicate that the larger a program file is, the more likely to find ROP gadgets within it for every virtual operation.
- 1 May 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 361-372
Evaluation of the Executional Power in Windows using Return Oriented Programming
Code-reuse techniques have emerged as a way to defeat the control-flow defenses that prevent the injection and execution of new code, as they allow an adversary to hijack the control flow of a victim program without injected code. A well-known code-reuse attack technique is Return-OrientedProgramming (ROP), which considers and links together (relatively short) code snippets, named ROP gadgets, already present in the victim’s memory address space through a controlled use of the stack values of the victim program. Although ROP attacks are known to be Turing-complete, there are still open question such as the quantification of the executional power of an adversary, which is determined by whatever code exists in the memory of a victim program, and whether an adversary can build a ROP chain, made up of ROP gadgets, for any kind of algorithm. To fill these gaps, in this paper we first define a virtual language, dubbed ROPLANG, that defines a set of operations (specifically, arithmetic, assignment, dereference, logical, and branching operations) which are mapped to ROP gadgets. We then use it to evaluate the executional power of an adversary in Windows 7 and Windows 10, in both 32- and 64-bit versions. In addition, we have developed ROP3, a tool that accepts a set of program files and a ROP chain described with our language and returns the code snippets that make up the ROP chain. Our results show that there are enough ROP gadgets to simulate any virtual operation and that branching operations are the less frequent ones. As expected, our results also indicate that the larger a program file is, the more likely to find ROP gadgets within it for every virtual operation.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Universidad Castilla la Mancha
A Review of “On Challenges in Verifying Trusted Executable Files in Memory Forensics”
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Universidad Castilla la Mancha
Open AccessA Review of “On Challenges in Verifying Trusted Executable Files in Memory Forensics”
- Open Access
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation
- Vol. 32 (S)
On Challenges in Verifying Trusted Executable Files in Memory Forensics
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation
- Vol. 32 (S)
Open AccessOn Challenges in Verifying Trusted Executable Files in Memory Forensics
- Open Access
- 1 April 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Digital Investigation
- Vol. 28, S95-S104
Characteristics and detectability of Windows auto-start extensibility points in memory forensics
- 1 April 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Digital Investigation
- Vol. 28, S95-S104
Open AccessCharacteristics and detectability of Windows auto-start extensibility points in memory forensics