Brandon Ferlito
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Brandon Ferlito has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michiel De Proost
Bioethics Institute Ghent, Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
6 shared publications - Seppe Segers
Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Bioethics Institute Ghent, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
4 shared publications - Heidi Mertes
Bioethics Institute Ghent, Department of Philosophy and Moral Science, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
2 shared publications - Ames Dhai
University of the Witwatersrand
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Monash Bioethics Review
- p. 1-19
Power, privilege and moral responsibility: learning from I.M. Young's Social Connection Model in the context of AI-driven healthcare
Artificial intelligence (AI) in healthcare is assumed to introduce risks that are not easily addressed by dominant philosophical models for thinking about responsibility. When an AI tool makes an error that results in patient harm, the question of who is responsible is rarely straightforward. Dominant models of responsibility work when harm can be traced to a single actor, but they fail in socio-technical systems where decisions and actions are distributed across multiple human and technological agents. Iris Marion Young’s social connection model of responsibility offers a systematic way to rethink responsibility in these contexts. Rather than locating responsibility solely after harms occur, Young proposes a forward-looking account that attaches responsibility to those who participate in and benefit from the structural processes that produce harm. Young’s framework organised around parameters of reasoning—power, privilege, interest, collective ability, and personal connection— provides an alternative way for understanding differentiated responsibilities across core actors in AI-driven healthcare.
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Monash Bioethics Review
- p. 1-19
Open AccessPower, privilege and moral responsibility: learning from I.M. Young's Social Connection Model in the context of AI-driven healthcare
Artificial intelligence (AI) in healthcare is assumed to introduce risks that are not easily addressed by dominant philosophical models for thinking about responsibility. When an AI tool makes an error that results in patient harm, the question of who is responsible is rarely straightforward. Dominant models of responsibility work when harm can be traced to a single actor, but they fail in socio-technical systems where decisions and actions are distributed across multiple human and technological agents. Iris Marion Young’s social connection model of responsibility offers a systematic way to rethink responsibility in these contexts. Rather than locating responsibility solely after harms occur, Young proposes a forward-looking account that attaches responsibility to those who participate in and benefit from the structural processes that produce harm. Young’s framework organised around parameters of reasoning—power, privilege, interest, collective ability, and personal connection— provides an alternative way for understanding differentiated responsibilities across core actors in AI-driven healthcare.
- Open Access
- 5 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Bioethics Review
- Vol. 18 (4) , 761-780
Is Digital Healthcare Better Than None? The Digital Health Technology Dilemma in Low-Income Countries
Digital health technologies (DHTs) are often promoted as solutions to healthcare access challenges in low-income countries (LICs), where a lack of infrastructure, healthcare professionals, and regulatory capacity makes them especially appealing. In such contexts, DHTs can provide services that would otherwise remain out of reach. Yet their implementation raises significant ethical and regulatory concerns. These concerns are heightened in LICs, where technologies designed in high-income countries may perform less reliably, accountability is weak, and corporate interests often dominate development and governance. This paper compares DHTs with Early Access Programmes (EAPs) for investigational therapies, both of which involve offering imperfect interventions under conditions of uncertainty. While EAPs are tightly regulated, DHTs are often introduced with limited oversight and marketed as final solutions. Unlike pharmaceuticals, which carry immediate risks such as severe side effects, the risks associated with DHTs are typically indirect or delayed, manifesting through misdiagnoses, breaches of privacy and confidentiality, digital inequalities, and the erosion of trust in healthcare systems. Using examples from Uganda and Malawi, the analysis highlights how permissive adoption risks promoting a ‘better than nothing’ standard of care, while rigid regulation may deny immediate benefits. We argue for a tiered approach: conditional, context-sensitive oversight that expands access without normalising lower standards of care, embedding privacy, confidentiality, equity, and accountability as central design criteria.
- 5 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Bioethics Review
- Vol. 18 (4) , 761-780
Open AccessIs Digital Healthcare Better Than None? The Digital Health Technology Dilemma in Low-Income Countries
Digital health technologies (DHTs) are often promoted as solutions to healthcare access challenges in low-income countries (LICs), where a lack of infrastructure, healthcare professionals, and regulatory capacity makes them especially appealing. In such contexts, DHTs can provide services that would otherwise remain out of reach. Yet their implementation raises significant ethical and regulatory concerns. These concerns are heightened in LICs, where technologies designed in high-income countries may perform less reliably, accountability is weak, and corporate interests often dominate development and governance. This paper compares DHTs with Early Access Programmes (EAPs) for investigational therapies, both of which involve offering imperfect interventions under conditions of uncertainty. While EAPs are tightly regulated, DHTs are often introduced with limited oversight and marketed as final solutions. Unlike pharmaceuticals, which carry immediate risks such as severe side effects, the risks associated with DHTs are typically indirect or delayed, manifesting through misdiagnoses, breaches of privacy and confidentiality, digital inequalities, and the erosion of trust in healthcare systems. Using examples from Uganda and Malawi, the analysis highlights how permissive adoption risks promoting a ‘better than nothing’ standard of care, while rigid regulation may deny immediate benefits. We argue for a tiered approach: conditional, context-sensitive oversight that expands access without normalising lower standards of care, embedding privacy, confidentiality, equity, and accountability as central design criteria.
- 24 August 2025
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 51 (12) , 807-808
Trapped in the promising role of digital twins?
- 24 August 2025
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 51 (12) , 807-808
Trapped in the promising role of digital twins?
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Science and Engineering Ethics
- Vol. 30 (4) , 1-14
Responsibility Gap(s) Due to the Introduction of AI in Healthcare: An Ubuntu-Inspired Approach
Due to its enormous potential, artificial intelligence (AI) can transform healthcare on a seemingly infinite scale. However, as we continue to explore the immense potential of AI, it is vital to consider the ethical concerns associated with its development and deployment. One specific concern that has been flagged in the literature is the responsibility gap (RG) due to the introduction of AI in healthcare. When the use of an AI algorithm or system results in a negative outcome for a patient(s), to whom can or should responsibility for that outcome be assigned? Although the concept of the RG was introduced in Anglo-American and European philosophy, this paper aims to broaden the debate by providing an Ubuntu-inspired perspective on the RG. Ubuntu, deeply rooted in African philosophy, calls for collective responsibility, and offers a uniquely forward-looking approach to address the alleged RG caused by AI in healthcare. An Ubuntu-inspired perspective can serve as a valuable guide and tool when addressing the alleged RG. Incorporating Ubuntu into the AI ethics discourse can contribute to a more ethical and responsible integration of AI in healthcare.
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Science and Engineering Ethics
- Vol. 30 (4) , 1-14
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessResponsibility Gap(s) Due to the Introduction of AI in Healthcare: An Ubuntu-Inspired Approach
Due to its enormous potential, artificial intelligence (AI) can transform healthcare on a seemingly infinite scale. However, as we continue to explore the immense potential of AI, it is vital to consider the ethical concerns associated with its development and deployment. One specific concern that has been flagged in the literature is the responsibility gap (RG) due to the introduction of AI in healthcare. When the use of an AI algorithm or system results in a negative outcome for a patient(s), to whom can or should responsibility for that outcome be assigned? Although the concept of the RG was introduced in Anglo-American and European philosophy, this paper aims to broaden the debate by providing an Ubuntu-inspired perspective on the RG. Ubuntu, deeply rooted in African philosophy, calls for collective responsibility, and offers a uniquely forward-looking approach to address the alleged RG caused by AI in healthcare. An Ubuntu-inspired perspective can serve as a valuable guide and tool when addressing the alleged RG. Incorporating Ubuntu into the AI ethics discourse can contribute to a more ethical and responsible integration of AI in healthcare.
- 23 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Bioethics Review
- Vol. 16 (3) , 471-481
Navigating the Landscape of Digital Twins in Medicine: A Relational Bioethical Inquiry
This perspective article explores the use of digital twins (DTs) in medicine, highlighting its capacity to simulate risks and personalize treatments while examining the emerging bioethical concerns. Central concerns include power dynamics, exclusion, and misrepresentation. We propose adopting a relational bioethical approach that advocates for a comprehensive assessment of DTs in medicine, extending beyond individual interactions to consider broader structural relations and varying levels of access to power. This can be achieved through two key relational recommendations: acknowledging the impact of uneven relational structures on access to medical care and promoting social justice by evaluating resource allocation. While DTs in medicine offer promising advancements, a relational bioethical lens may provide a nuanced understanding, fostering equitable, inclusive and responsible integration of DTs into medical practice.
- 23 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Bioethics Review
- Vol. 16 (3) , 471-481
Navigating the Landscape of Digital Twins in Medicine: A Relational Bioethical Inquiry
This perspective article explores the use of digital twins (DTs) in medicine, highlighting its capacity to simulate risks and personalize treatments while examining the emerging bioethical concerns. Central concerns include power dynamics, exclusion, and misrepresentation. We propose adopting a relational bioethical approach that advocates for a comprehensive assessment of DTs in medicine, extending beyond individual interactions to consider broader structural relations and varying levels of access to power. This can be achieved through two key relational recommendations: acknowledging the impact of uneven relational structures on access to medical care and promoting social justice by evaluating resource allocation. While DTs in medicine offer promising advancements, a relational bioethical lens may provide a nuanced understanding, fostering equitable, inclusive and responsible integration of DTs into medical practice.
- 30 August 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 23 (9) , 91-93
Digital Simulacra and the Call for Epistemic Responsibility: An Ubuntu Perspective
- 30 August 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 23 (9) , 91-93
Digital Simulacra and the Call for Epistemic Responsibility: An Ubuntu Perspective
- 15 May 2023
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 49 (8) , 545-546
Ubuntu as a complementary perspective for addressing epistemic (in)justice in medical machine learning
- 15 May 2023
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 49 (8) , 545-546
Ubuntu as a complementary perspective for addressing epistemic (in)justice in medical machine learning
- Open Access
- 20 December 2017
- Published by South African Medical Association NPC in South African Journal of Bioethics and Law
- Vol. 10 (2) , 50
The Life Esidimeni tragedy: A human-rights perspective
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) affirms that all human beings are entitled to core rights essential to human fulfilment. Although all human rights are important, the ICESCR’s guarantee of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health may be the most significant. Having good health is necessary for human wellbeing. Paramount to this is the freedom of individuals to exercise their human rights. As seen with the Life Esidimeni tragedy, people with mental illnesses often find it more difficult than others to achieve the fulfilment of their rights. This article discusses human-rights legal instruments, and focuses on the rights to health, life and dignity in the context of the tragedy. It also examines how the realisation of human rights can have meaningful results for mentally ill people.
- 20 December 2017
- Published by South African Medical Association NPC in South African Journal of Bioethics and Law
- Vol. 10 (2) , 50
Open AccessThe Life Esidimeni tragedy: A human-rights perspective
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) affirms that all human beings are entitled to core rights essential to human fulfilment. Although all human rights are important, the ICESCR’s guarantee of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health may be the most significant. Having good health is necessary for human wellbeing. Paramount to this is the freedom of individuals to exercise their human rights. As seen with the Life Esidimeni tragedy, people with mental illnesses often find it more difficult than others to achieve the fulfilment of their rights. This article discusses human-rights legal instruments, and focuses on the rights to health, life and dignity in the context of the tragedy. It also examines how the realisation of human rights can have meaningful results for mentally ill people.