Andrea Ichino
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Andrea Ichino has a total of 38 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Decio Coviello
HEC Montreal
3 shared publicationsNicola Persico
Northwestern University
3 shared publications- Rudolf Winter-Ebmer
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Linz, Austria
3 shared publications Anna Sanz de Galdeano
1 shared publication- Antonio Filippin
DEMM, University of Milan, Milano, Italy
1 shared publication Armin Falk
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 24 September 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 133 (649) , 323-354
Civicness Drain*
Migration may cause, not only a brain drain, but also a ‘civicness’ drain, leading to a poverty trap. Using migration choices of southern Italian high-school students classified as civic if not cheating in a modified die-roll experiment, we uncover a key role of local civicness (average civicness in the class): a civicness drain is observed only at high and low local civicness. We rationalise this pattern with a model in which civic and uncivic types balance hope versus fear of migration outcomes, taking into account economic gains, risk preferences and their beliefs about being considered civic in the place of destination.
- 24 September 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 133 (649) , 323-354
Civicness Drain*
Migration may cause, not only a brain drain, but also a ‘civicness’ drain, leading to a poverty trap. Using migration choices of southern Italian high-school students classified as civic if not cheating in a modified die-roll experiment, we uncover a key role of local civicness (average civicness in the class): a civicness drain is observed only at high and low local civicness. We rationalise this pattern with a model in which civic and uncivic types balance hope versus fear of migration outcomes, taking into account economic gains, risk preferences and their beliefs about being considered civic in the place of destination.
- 22 July 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 19 (6) , 3249-3292
Wage Equalization and Regional Misallocation: Evidence from Italian and German Provinces
Italy and Germany have similar geographical differences in firm productivity—with the North more productive than the South in Italy and the West more productive than the East in Germany—but have adopted different models of wage bargaining. Italy sets wages based on nationwide contracts that allow for limited local wage adjustments, while Germany has moved toward a more flexible system that allows for local bargaining. We find that Italy exhibits limited geographical wage differences in nominal terms and almost no relationship between local productivity and local nominal wages, while Germany has larger geographic wage differences and a tighter link between local wages and local productivity. As a consequence, in Italy, low-productivity provinces have higher non-employment rates than high-productivity provinces, because employers cannot lower wages, while in Germany the relationship between non-employment and productivity is significantly weaker. We conclude that the Italian system has significant costs in terms of forgone aggregate earnings and employment because it generates a spatial equilibrium where workers queue for jobs in the South and remain unemployed while waiting. If Italy adopted the German system, aggregate employment and earnings would increase by 11.04% and 7.45%, respectively. Our findings are relevant for other European countries.
- 22 July 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 19 (6) , 3249-3292
Wage Equalization and Regional Misallocation: Evidence from Italian and German Provinces
Italy and Germany have similar geographical differences in firm productivity—with the North more productive than the South in Italy and the West more productive than the East in Germany—but have adopted different models of wage bargaining. Italy sets wages based on nationwide contracts that allow for limited local wage adjustments, while Germany has moved toward a more flexible system that allows for local bargaining. We find that Italy exhibits limited geographical wage differences in nominal terms and almost no relationship between local productivity and local nominal wages, while Germany has larger geographic wage differences and a tighter link between local wages and local productivity. As a consequence, in Italy, low-productivity provinces have higher non-employment rates than high-productivity provinces, because employers cannot lower wages, while in Germany the relationship between non-employment and productivity is significantly weaker. We conclude that the Italian system has significant costs in terms of forgone aggregate earnings and employment because it generates a spatial equilibrium where workers queue for jobs in the South and remain unemployed while waiting. If Italy adopted the German system, aggregate employment and earnings would increase by 11.04% and 7.45%, respectively. Our findings are relevant for other European countries.
- 1 August 2019
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 62 (3) , 403-426
Measuring the Gains from Labor Specialization
We estimate the productivity effects of labor specialization using a judicial environment that offers a quasi-experimental setting well suited to this purpose. Judges in this environment are randomly assigned many different types of cases. This assignment generates random streaks of same-type cases, which creates minispecialization events unrelated to the characteristics of judges or cases. We estimate that when judges receive more cases of a certain type, they become faster, that is, more likely to close cases of that type in any one of the corresponding hearings. Quality, as measured by probability of an appeal, is not negatively affected.
- 1 August 2019
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 62 (3) , 403-426
Measuring the Gains from Labor Specialization
We estimate the productivity effects of labor specialization using a judicial environment that offers a quasi-experimental setting well suited to this purpose. Judges in this environment are randomly assigned many different types of cases. This assignment generates random streaks of same-type cases, which creates minispecialization events unrelated to the characteristics of judges or cases. We estimate that when judges receive more cases of a certain type, they become faster, that is, more likely to close cases of that type in any one of the corresponding hearings. Quality, as measured by probability of an appeal, is not negatively affected.
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 128 (615) , 2843-2875
INELASTIC BUYERS AND COMPETITION
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 128 (615) , 2843-2875
INELASTIC BUYERS AND COMPETITION
- 1 October 2018
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 36 (4) , 885-921
Tower of Babel in the Classroom: Immigrants and Natives in Italian Schools
- 1 October 2018
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 36 (4) , 885-921
Tower of Babel in the Classroom: Immigrants and Natives in Italian Schools
- Open Access
- 1 June 2017
- Published by Elsevier in The Journal of the Economics of Ageing
- Vol. 9, 14-29
Too old to work, too young to retire?
- 1 June 2017
- Published by Elsevier in The Journal of the Economics of Ageing
- Vol. 9, 14-29
Open AccessToo old to work, too young to retire?
- 1 October 2016
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 18 (4) , 545-558
Multitasking, Multiarmed Bandits, and the Italian Judiciary
We model how a judge schedules cases as a multiarmed bandit problem. The model indicates that a first-in-first-out (FIFO) scheduling policy is optimal when the case completion hazard rate function is monotonic. But there are two ways to implement FIFO in this context: at the hearing level or at the case level. Our model indicates that the former policy, prioritizing the oldest hearing, is optimal when the case completion hazard rate function decreases, and the latter policy, prioritizing the oldest case, is optimal when the case completion hazard rate function increases. This result convinced six judges of the Roman Labor Court of Appeals—a court that exhibits increasing hazard rates—to switch from hearing-level FIFO to case-level FIFO. Tracking these judges for eight years, we estimate that our intervention decreased the average case duration by 12% and the probability of a decision being appealed to the Italian supreme court by 3.8%, relative to a 44-judge control sample.
- 1 October 2016
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 18 (4) , 545-558
Multitasking, Multiarmed Bandits, and the Italian Judiciary
We model how a judge schedules cases as a multiarmed bandit problem. The model indicates that a first-in-first-out (FIFO) scheduling policy is optimal when the case completion hazard rate function is monotonic. But there are two ways to implement FIFO in this context: at the hearing level or at the case level. Our model indicates that the former policy, prioritizing the oldest hearing, is optimal when the case completion hazard rate function decreases, and the latter policy, prioritizing the oldest case, is optimal when the case completion hazard rate function increases. This result convinced six judges of the Roman Labor Court of Appeals—a court that exhibits increasing hazard rates—to switch from hearing-level FIFO to case-level FIFO. Tracking these judges for eight years, we estimate that our intervention decreased the average case duration by 12% and the probability of a decision being appealed to the Italian supreme court by 3.8%, relative to a 44-judge control sample.
- 2 May 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 13 (5) , 906-947
THE INEFFICIENCY OF WORKER TIME USE
- 2 May 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 13 (5) , 906-947
THE INEFFICIENCY OF WORKER TIME USE
- 1 October 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Labour Economics
- Vol. 30, 41-42
Comments on "Gender and the labor market: What have we learned from field and lab experiments?"
- 1 October 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Labour Economics
- Vol. 30, 41-42
Comments on "Gender and the labor market: What have we learned from field and lab experiments?"
- 1 October 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Labour Economics
- Vol. 30, 113-128
Freeing the Italian school system
- 1 October 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Labour Economics
- Vol. 30, 113-128
Freeing the Italian school system