Virginia Valian

Understanding jokes may differ between mono- and bilinguals because of differences in lexical access; fluency and sense of humor may also be relevant. Three experiments examined English-language joke comprehension in monolingual (n = 91) and bilingual (n = 111) undergraduates, Russian–English bilinguals (n = 39), and MTurk monolinguals (n = 77). Participants rated jokes and non-jokes in English as funny or not funny. We assessed the effects of bilingualism, language dominance, fluency, sense of humor, experience, and motivation on response time (RT) and sensitivity (d′) in identifying jokes. Bilingualism predicted neither RT nor d′ in mono- and English-dominant bilingual undergraduates; English fluency predicted d′. Russians were slower than English-dominant bilinguals but were more not less sensitive to humor. MTurk monolinguals were faster than undergraduates and equally sensitive; sense of humor predicted sensitivity. Overall, humor processing is alternately affected by fluency, sense of humor, and motivation, depending on the population. Bilingualism per se is not a factor.

Three important issues bear on understanding the connection between bilingualism and executive function. The first is the absence of a fine-grained task analysis for executive functions and other cognitive processes. The second is the absence of a theory of the cognitive mechanisms underlying the deployment of two or more languages and thus the absence of a solid basis on which to make predictions about what domain-general performances, if any, bilinguals should excel in. The third is the relation between neural and behavioral consequences of bilingualism. These three issues must be taken in account in trying to understand the variability among findings showing benefits of bilingualism for executive function.

This chapter argues that formal psycholinguistic experiments test performance models directly, competence models only very indirectly. Even if psycholinguists did subscribe to a Platonist view, they would be in error to rely on psychological experiment rather than linguistic intuition as a basis for information about a speaker-hearer’s knowlege, or competence. Intuitions are seen as necessary data, though the linguist’s dependence on intuitions is often seen as unfortunate, because of the problematic character of intuitions. The list of problems seems formidable until one realizes that the same criticisms hold, and to the same extent, for formal experimental results. The role that intuitions play in the construction of grammars testifies to the existence of linguistic knowledge, independent of whether that knowledge is considered to be in the domain of linguistics or psychology. Perhaps what makes having intuitions seem more likely to error is that it is subjective.