Angeliki Charalampaki
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Angeliki Charalampaki has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Elisa Filevich
Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Berlin
6 shared publicationsHermann Müller
Neuromotor Behavior Laboratory, Justus Liebig University
4 shared publicationsLisa K. Maurer
Neuromotor Behavior Laboratory, Justus Liebig University
4 shared publicationsHeiko Maurer
Neuromotor Behavior Laboratory, Justus Liebig University
3 shared publicationsCaroline Peters
Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Berlin, Philippstraße 13 Haus 6, 10115 Berlin, Germany; Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Luisenstraße 56, 10115 Berlin, Germany; Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Faculty of Life Sciences, Department of Psychology, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany
2 shared publicationsJulius Verrel
Institute of Systems Motor Science, Universität zu Lübeck, Germany
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 December 2025
- Published by Society for Neuroscience in eneuro
- Vol. 13 (1)
Comparing Metacognitive Representations of Bodily and External Agency
We studied the role of movement and outcome information in forming metacognitive representations of agency. Human participants ( N = 40; 25 female, 15 male, 0 diverse) completed a goal-oriented task: a semivirtual version of a ball-throwing game. In two conditions, we manipulated either the visual representation of the throwing movement or its proximal outcome (the resulting ball trajectory). We measured participants’ accuracy in a discrimination agency task, as well as confidence in their responses and tested for differences in the electrophysiological (EEG) signal using mass linear mixed-effect modeling. We found no mean differences between participants’ metacognitive efficiency between conditions. However, through exploratory analyses, we found that metacognitive sensitivity did not correlate between the two conditions and that the EEG signal differed between the two conditions during the agency discrimination task. We cautiously interpret these results as suggesting that although both movement and outcome information contribute to participants’ sense of agency, they may do so through distinct processes. These findings highlight the need for further research examining the potential neurophysiological differences corresponding to the conceptual distinction between bodily and external agency.
- 9 December 2025
- Published by Society for Neuroscience in eneuro
- Vol. 13 (1)
Open AccessComparing Metacognitive Representations of Bodily and External Agency
We studied the role of movement and outcome information in forming metacognitive representations of agency. Human participants ( N = 40; 25 female, 15 male, 0 diverse) completed a goal-oriented task: a semivirtual version of a ball-throwing game. In two conditions, we manipulated either the visual representation of the throwing movement or its proximal outcome (the resulting ball trajectory). We measured participants’ accuracy in a discrimination agency task, as well as confidence in their responses and tested for differences in the electrophysiological (EEG) signal using mass linear mixed-effect modeling. We found no mean differences between participants’ metacognitive efficiency between conditions. However, through exploratory analyses, we found that metacognitive sensitivity did not correlate between the two conditions and that the EEG signal differed between the two conditions during the agency discrimination task. We cautiously interpret these results as suggesting that although both movement and outcome information contribute to participants’ sense of agency, they may do so through distinct processes. These findings highlight the need for further research examining the potential neurophysiological differences corresponding to the conceptual distinction between bodily and external agency.
- Open Access
Dissociation of movement and outcome representations in metacognition of agency
We studied the role of movement and outcome information in forming metacognitive representations of agency. Participants completed a goal-oriented task, a virtual version of a ball-throwing game. In two conditions, we manipulated either the visual representation of the throwing movement or its distal outcome (the resulting ball flight/trajectory). We measured participants’ accuracy in a discrimination agency task, as well as confidence in their responses and tested for differences in the electrophysiological (EEG) signal using linear mixed effect models. We found no mean differences between participants’ metacognitive efficiency between conditions, but we also found that metacognitive sensitivity did not correlate between the two conditions, suggesting a dissociation in their underlying mechanisms. Furthermore, exploratory analyses pointed toward a difference in the EEG signal between the two conditions. Taken together, our results suggest that while movement and outcome information contribute equally to participants’ sense of agency, they may do so through distinct underlying processes.
Open AccessDissociation of movement and outcome representations in metacognition of agency
We studied the role of movement and outcome information in forming metacognitive representations of agency. Participants completed a goal-oriented task, a virtual version of a ball-throwing game. In two conditions, we manipulated either the visual representation of the throwing movement or its distal outcome (the resulting ball flight/trajectory). We measured participants’ accuracy in a discrimination agency task, as well as confidence in their responses and tested for differences in the electrophysiological (EEG) signal using linear mixed effect models. We found no mean differences between participants’ metacognitive efficiency between conditions, but we also found that metacognitive sensitivity did not correlate between the two conditions, suggesting a dissociation in their underlying mechanisms. Furthermore, exploratory analyses pointed toward a difference in the EEG signal between the two conditions. Taken together, our results suggest that while movement and outcome information contribute equally to participants’ sense of agency, they may do so through distinct underlying processes.
- 1 October 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 153 (10) , 2427-2440
Contributions of tactile information to the sense of agency and its metacognitive representations.
Despite the ubiquitous presence of tactile information in our daily activities, studies of how we experience agency of our actions have rarely relied on manipulated visuo-tactile feedback. Instead, what is often manipulated are the distal (and arbitrarily associated) consequences of our actions. The few studies that did investigate whether tactile information contributes to the experience of agency have been limited to the binary assessment of tactile feedback about the outcome of an action being present or absent. Here, we went beyond the coarse comparison of agency with versus without tactile feedback and introduced instead an experimental manipulation where we could control the amount of mismatch between predictions and observations. Participants (N = 40) reached with their right hand toward a ridged plate with a specific orientation and saw online feedback that could match or differ from their action in one of three ways: the physical plate's orientation, the action's timing, or the hand's position in space. Absolute subjective ratings revealed that an increased mismatch in tactile information led to a diminished sense of agency, similar to what has been reported for spatial and temporal mismatches. Further, estimations of metacognitive efficiency revealed similar Mratios in identifying visuo-tactile violation predictions as compared to visuo-temporal violations (but lower than visuospatial). These findings emphasize the importance of tactile information in shaping our experience of acting voluntarily and show how this important component can be experimentally probed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 October 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 153 (10) , 2427-2440
Contributions of tactile information to the sense of agency and its metacognitive representations.
Despite the ubiquitous presence of tactile information in our daily activities, studies of how we experience agency of our actions have rarely relied on manipulated visuo-tactile feedback. Instead, what is often manipulated are the distal (and arbitrarily associated) consequences of our actions. The few studies that did investigate whether tactile information contributes to the experience of agency have been limited to the binary assessment of tactile feedback about the outcome of an action being present or absent. Here, we went beyond the coarse comparison of agency with versus without tactile feedback and introduced instead an experimental manipulation where we could control the amount of mismatch between predictions and observations. Participants (N = 40) reached with their right hand toward a ridged plate with a specific orientation and saw online feedback that could match or differ from their action in one of three ways: the physical plate's orientation, the action's timing, or the hand's position in space. Absolute subjective ratings revealed that an increased mismatch in tactile information led to a diminished sense of agency, similar to what has been reported for spatial and temporal mismatches. Further, estimations of metacognitive efficiency revealed similar Mratios in identifying visuo-tactile violation predictions as compared to visuo-temporal violations (but lower than visuospatial). These findings emphasize the importance of tactile information in shaping our experience of acting voluntarily and show how this important component can be experimentally probed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
Contributions of tactile information to the sense of agency and its metacognitive representations
We compared the contribution of tactile information to other sources of information in our representations of agency. Participants (N = 40) reached with their right hand toward a ridged plate with a specific orientation and saw online feedback that could match or differ from their action in one of three ways: the physical plate’s orientation, the action’s timing, or the hand’s position in space. Absolute subjective ratings revealed that an increased mismatch in tactile information led to a diminished sense of agency, similar to what has been reported for spatial and temporal mismatches. Further, estimations of metacognitive efficiency revealed similar M-ratios in the identification of tactile violation predictions as compared to temporal violations (but lower than spatial). These findings emphasize the importance of tactile information in shaping our experience of acting voluntarily, and show how this important component can be experimentally probed. Statement of Relevance: The sense of agency is the feeling that we are the authors of our actions. It is essential not only for the control we assert over our bodies but also for how we interact with interfaces like a computer or a mobile phone. Despite the central role of touch in our daily activities, the role of tactile information in forming our sense of agency is often overlooked. In this project, we used a novel experimental design that allowed us to compare the role of tactile information relative to two other sources of information that have been previously reported to affect our agency, namely temporal and spatial information of the action. We provide evidence for the first time that tactile information is crucial for our subjective experience of agency and a tool to study this role further.
Open AccessContributions of tactile information to the sense of agency and its metacognitive representations
We compared the contribution of tactile information to other sources of information in our representations of agency. Participants (N = 40) reached with their right hand toward a ridged plate with a specific orientation and saw online feedback that could match or differ from their action in one of three ways: the physical plate’s orientation, the action’s timing, or the hand’s position in space. Absolute subjective ratings revealed that an increased mismatch in tactile information led to a diminished sense of agency, similar to what has been reported for spatial and temporal mismatches. Further, estimations of metacognitive efficiency revealed similar M-ratios in the identification of tactile violation predictions as compared to temporal violations (but lower than spatial). These findings emphasize the importance of tactile information in shaping our experience of acting voluntarily, and show how this important component can be experimentally probed. Statement of Relevance: The sense of agency is the feeling that we are the authors of our actions. It is essential not only for the control we assert over our bodies but also for how we interact with interfaces like a computer or a mobile phone. Despite the central role of touch in our daily activities, the role of tactile information in forming our sense of agency is often overlooked. In this project, we used a novel experimental design that allowed us to compare the role of tactile information relative to two other sources of information that have been previously reported to affect our agency, namely temporal and spatial information of the action. We provide evidence for the first time that tactile information is crucial for our subjective experience of agency and a tool to study this role further.
- Open Access
Motor outcomes congruent with intentions may sharpen metacognitive representations
We can monitor our intentional movements, in order to describe how we move our bodies. But it is unclear which information this metacognitive monitoring relies on. For example, when throwing a ball to hit a target, we might use the visual information about how the ball flew to metacognitively assess our performance. Alternatively, we might disregard the ball trajectory — given that it is not directly relevant to our goal — and metacognitively assess our performance based solely on whether we reached the goal of hitting the target. In two experiments we aimed to distinguish between these two alternatives and asked whether the distal outcome of a goal-directed action (hitting or missing a target) informs the metacognitive representations of our own movements. Participants performed a semi-virtual task where they moved their arm to throw a virtual ball at a target. After each throw, participants discriminated which of two ball trajectories displayed on the screen corresponded to the flight path of their throw and then rated their confidence in this decision. The task included two conditions that differed on whether the distal outcome of the two trajectories shown matched ( congruent ) or differed ( incongruent ). Participants were significantly more accurate in discriminating between the two trajectories, and responded faster in the incongruent condition and, accordingly, were significantly more confident on these trials. Crucially, we found significant differences in metacognitive performance (measured as meta-d’/d’) between the two conditions only on successful trials, where the virtual ball had hit the target. These results indicate that participants successfully incorporated information about the outcome of the movement into both their discrimination and confidence responses. However, information about the outcome selectively sharpened the precision of confidence ratings only when the outcome of their throw matched their intention. We argue that these findings underline the separation between the different levels of information that may contribute to body monitoring, and we provide evidence that intentions might play a central role in metacognitive motor representations. Highlights: Participants threw a virtual ball to hit a target Following their throw participants selected between two plausible trajectories On half the trials, the two alternative trajectories differed in their distal outcome. Discrimination and confidence were higher in trials with different outcome. Metacognitive performance was best in hit trials when the alternative missed.
Open AccessMotor outcomes congruent with intentions may sharpen metacognitive representations
We can monitor our intentional movements, in order to describe how we move our bodies. But it is unclear which information this metacognitive monitoring relies on. For example, when throwing a ball to hit a target, we might use the visual information about how the ball flew to metacognitively assess our performance. Alternatively, we might disregard the ball trajectory — given that it is not directly relevant to our goal — and metacognitively assess our performance based solely on whether we reached the goal of hitting the target. In two experiments we aimed to distinguish between these two alternatives and asked whether the distal outcome of a goal-directed action (hitting or missing a target) informs the metacognitive representations of our own movements. Participants performed a semi-virtual task where they moved their arm to throw a virtual ball at a target. After each throw, participants discriminated which of two ball trajectories displayed on the screen corresponded to the flight path of their throw and then rated their confidence in this decision. The task included two conditions that differed on whether the distal outcome of the two trajectories shown matched ( congruent ) or differed ( incongruent ). Participants were significantly more accurate in discriminating between the two trajectories, and responded faster in the incongruent condition and, accordingly, were significantly more confident on these trials. Crucially, we found significant differences in metacognitive performance (measured as meta-d’/d’) between the two conditions only on successful trials, where the virtual ball had hit the target. These results indicate that participants successfully incorporated information about the outcome of the movement into both their discrimination and confidence responses. However, information about the outcome selectively sharpened the precision of confidence ratings only when the outcome of their throw matched their intention. We argue that these findings underline the separation between the different levels of information that may contribute to body monitoring, and we provide evidence that intentions might play a central role in metacognitive motor representations. Highlights: Participants threw a virtual ball to hit a target Following their throw participants selected between two plausible trajectories On half the trials, the two alternative trajectories differed in their distal outcome. Discrimination and confidence were higher in trials with different outcome. Metacognitive performance was best in hit trials when the alternative missed.
- 18 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Consciousness and Cognition
- Vol. 101, 103307
Sense of agency as synecdoche: Multiple neurobiological mechanisms may underlie the phenomenon summarized as sense of agency
- 18 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Consciousness and Cognition
- Vol. 101, 103307
Sense of agency as synecdoche: Multiple neurobiological mechanisms may underlie the phenomenon summarized as sense of agency
- Open Access
- 1 May 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Brain Stimulation
- Vol. 13 (3) , 815-818
Probing EEG activity in the targeted cortex after focal transcranial electrical stimulation
- 1 May 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Brain Stimulation
- Vol. 13 (3) , 815-818
Open AccessProbing EEG activity in the targeted cortex after focal transcranial electrical stimulation