Adel Bino
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Adel Bino has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mohammad Tayeh
University of Jordan
4 shared publications - Ghada Tayem
The University of Jordan
2 shared publications - Ahmad Ahmad
The University of Jordan
1 shared publication - Diana Abu-Ghunmi
Department of Finance, The University of Jordan, Amman 11942, Jordan
1 shared publication - Elisabeta Pana
Department of Business and Economics, Illinois Wesleyan University, Bloomington, USA
1 shared publication - Ghassan Omet
University of Jordan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Why Do Family Firms Hold Cash? Agency Conflicts and Valuation Perspectives
This study aims to examine whether family firms differ from nonfamily firms in their propensity to save cash, particularly in response to new investment opportunities, and to assess how investors value the cash holdings of family versus nonfamily firms in light of potential agency concerns. The study uses the context of Jordan—a small emerging market characterized by weak investor protection and the dominance of family-managed firms, a setting that exacerbates principal–principal conflicts. Employing treatment effects and propensity score matching estimation techniques to address the endogeneity between family control and firm cash holdings, this study finds that family enterprises maintain significantly higher cash reserves than their nonfamily counterparts. Moreover, the analysis finds that family firms do not exhibit a significantly greater propensity to save cash in response to new investment opportunities, implying that financial flexibility concerns are not significantly different between family and nonfamily firms. However, the results further demonstrate that investors assign a higher valuation to cash held by nonfamily firms, suggesting that investors associate family control with potential agency conflicts regarding the deployment of cash reserves.
Open AccessWhy Do Family Firms Hold Cash? Agency Conflicts and Valuation Perspectives
This study aims to examine whether family firms differ from nonfamily firms in their propensity to save cash, particularly in response to new investment opportunities, and to assess how investors value the cash holdings of family versus nonfamily firms in light of potential agency concerns. The study uses the context of Jordan—a small emerging market characterized by weak investor protection and the dominance of family-managed firms, a setting that exacerbates principal–principal conflicts. Employing treatment effects and propensity score matching estimation techniques to address the endogeneity between family control and firm cash holdings, this study finds that family enterprises maintain significantly higher cash reserves than their nonfamily counterparts. Moreover, the analysis finds that family firms do not exhibit a significantly greater propensity to save cash in response to new investment opportunities, implying that financial flexibility concerns are not significantly different between family and nonfamily firms. However, the results further demonstrate that investors assign a higher valuation to cash held by nonfamily firms, suggesting that investors associate family control with potential agency conflicts regarding the deployment of cash reserves.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2025
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Journal of Governance and Regulation
- Vol. 14 (3) , 93
How ownership structure in family vs non-family firms affects agency costs: A study of corporate governance in a MENA market
This study investigates the relationship between corporate ownership and agency costs in an emerging market characterized by prevalence of family-owned public corporations. The sample includes 69 non-financial firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) over the period 2010–2021. The analysis is based upon comparing between family and non-family firms using alternative panel data estimation methods to address potential endogeneity concerns. The results show low levels of agency costs in both family and non-family firms. Furthermore, we find a negative association between the ownership percentage of the largest owner in both family and non-family-owned firms and agency costs. Managerial ownership is also negatively related to agency costs, but only for family-owned firms. This implies that large shareholders provide effective monitoring of management in family firms only, while managers and shareholders’ interests tend to be aligned regardless of the identity of the largest shareholder. Lastly, this study provides policy implications on the role of corporate ownership structure in a less developed country with small economy.
- 1 August 2025
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Journal of Governance and Regulation
- Vol. 14 (3) , 93
Open AccessHow ownership structure in family vs non-family firms affects agency costs: A study of corporate governance in a MENA market
This study investigates the relationship between corporate ownership and agency costs in an emerging market characterized by prevalence of family-owned public corporations. The sample includes 69 non-financial firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) over the period 2010–2021. The analysis is based upon comparing between family and non-family firms using alternative panel data estimation methods to address potential endogeneity concerns. The results show low levels of agency costs in both family and non-family firms. Furthermore, we find a negative association between the ownership percentage of the largest owner in both family and non-family-owned firms and agency costs. Managerial ownership is also negatively related to agency costs, but only for family-owned firms. This implies that large shareholders provide effective monitoring of management in family firms only, while managers and shareholders’ interests tend to be aligned regardless of the identity of the largest shareholder. Lastly, this study provides policy implications on the role of corporate ownership structure in a less developed country with small economy.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Cogent Business & Management
- Vol. 8 (1)
Has the current global financial crisis significantly affected momentum profitability?
In this study, we examine the behavior of stock price changes in an emerging market to search for possible momentum incidents. Our findings indicate that the existence of momentum can be characterized by the state of the economy, which is significantly correlated with the down market. We argue that this is due to investors, who have diminishing marginal utility of wealth and, in turn, behave in a risk-averse manner, resulting in loser portfolios being responsible for the vast majority of the observed momentum profitability. Furthermore, we find that momentum profitability is stronger with longer formation and holding periods, despite few cases of winners’ return reversals. Our findings remain robust after controlling for size and book-to-market and earnings-to-market ratios.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Cogent Business & Management
- Vol. 8 (1)
Open AccessHas the current global financial crisis significantly affected momentum profitability?
In this study, we examine the behavior of stock price changes in an emerging market to search for possible momentum incidents. Our findings indicate that the existence of momentum can be characterized by the state of the economy, which is significantly correlated with the down market. We argue that this is due to investors, who have diminishing marginal utility of wealth and, in turn, behave in a risk-averse manner, resulting in loser portfolios being responsible for the vast majority of the observed momentum profitability. Furthermore, we find that momentum profitability is stronger with longer formation and holding periods, despite few cases of winners’ return reversals. Our findings remain robust after controlling for size and book-to-market and earnings-to-market ratios.
- Open Access
- 7 October 2016
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 14 (1) , 48
Asset liquidity, stock liquidity, and ownership concentration: Evidence from the ASE
This paper examines how ownership concentration influences the relation between stock liquidity and asset liquidity. Liquid assets reduce uncertainty of assets in place and hence improve stock liquidity. However, liquid assets are less costly to turn into private benefits compared to other assets. Therefore, liquid assets may result in increasing the uncertainty of assets in place rather than reducing it. In this paper we examine the impact of asset liquidity on stock liquidity conditional on a company’s ownership structure using the context of Jordan. Jordanian companies listed in the ASE are mostly characterized by highly concentrated ownership. In the absence of investor protection, concentrated ownership allows shareholders with large ownership stakes to exercise control over the firm and hence may result in increasing the uncertainty of assets in place. The uncertainty regarding the usage of liquid assets in cash-rich firms leads to greater uncertainty regarding the firm’s cash flows and hence lower stock liquidity. The findings of this study show evidence that as ownership concentration increases asset liquidity becomes negatively related to stock liquidity.
- 7 October 2016
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 14 (1) , 48
Open AccessAsset liquidity, stock liquidity, and ownership concentration: Evidence from the ASE
This paper examines how ownership concentration influences the relation between stock liquidity and asset liquidity. Liquid assets reduce uncertainty of assets in place and hence improve stock liquidity. However, liquid assets are less costly to turn into private benefits compared to other assets. Therefore, liquid assets may result in increasing the uncertainty of assets in place rather than reducing it. In this paper we examine the impact of asset liquidity on stock liquidity conditional on a company’s ownership structure using the context of Jordan. Jordanian companies listed in the ASE are mostly characterized by highly concentrated ownership. In the absence of investor protection, concentrated ownership allows shareholders with large ownership stakes to exercise control over the firm and hence may result in increasing the uncertainty of assets in place. The uncertainty regarding the usage of liquid assets in cash-rich firms leads to greater uncertainty regarding the firm’s cash flows and hence lower stock liquidity. The findings of this study show evidence that as ownership concentration increases asset liquidity becomes negatively related to stock liquidity.
- Open Access
- 30 September 2015
- Published by Pressacademia in Pressacademia
- Vol. 2 (3) , 323
Entrepreneurship in Jordan: regional analysis and envisaged role
- 30 September 2015
- Published by Pressacademia in Pressacademia
- Vol. 2 (3) , 323
Open AccessEntrepreneurship in Jordan: regional analysis and envisaged role
- 14 September 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 37 (2) , 207-221
Firm value and investment policy around stock for stock mergers
- 14 September 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 37 (2) , 207-221
Firm value and investment policy around stock for stock mergers