Sarah Lindop
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Sarah Lindop has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Collins Gyakari Ntim
University of Southampton
3 shared publications Dennis A. Thomas
School of Management and Business, Aberystwyth University , Aberystwyth, UK
3 shared publications- Abdullah Aldousari
Department of Accounting and Finance, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth SY23 3FL, UK
2 shared publications - Ahmed Mohammed
Department of Accounting and Finance, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth SY23 3FL, UK
2 shared publications - Kevin Holland
School of Management and Business, University of Wales , Aberystwyth
2 shared publications - Hussein A. Abdou
Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 September 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in International Journal of Financial Studies
- Vol. 13 (3) , 174
Bank Risk-Taking During COVID-19: The Role of Private and Public Ownership in GCC
This study explores the ownership–risk relationship in the GCC emerging economies during the COVID-19 pandemic, examining 44 commercial banks classified as private and publicly owned banks. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) method is employed to identify endogeneity issues, with robustness checks using panel data techniques. We analyzed the ownership–risk relationship, including non-linear and interaction effects. The results reveal that public ownership exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with NPLs, where moderate public concentration increases credit risk, while high public control marginally reduces it. Private ownership is linked to higher risk once bank-specific characteristics are controlled, reflecting riskier lending driven by profitability motives. We show that public banks demonstrate resilience due to stable deposits and implicit backing, whereas private banks are more vulnerable to systemic shocks. The impact of ownership structure on credit risk is context-dependent, reflecting heterogeneous ownership objectives in the GCC.
- 12 September 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in International Journal of Financial Studies
- Vol. 13 (3) , 174
Open AccessBank Risk-Taking During COVID-19: The Role of Private and Public Ownership in GCC
This study explores the ownership–risk relationship in the GCC emerging economies during the COVID-19 pandemic, examining 44 commercial banks classified as private and publicly owned banks. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) method is employed to identify endogeneity issues, with robustness checks using panel data techniques. We analyzed the ownership–risk relationship, including non-linear and interaction effects. The results reveal that public ownership exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with NPLs, where moderate public concentration increases credit risk, while high public control marginally reduces it. Private ownership is linked to higher risk once bank-specific characteristics are controlled, reflecting riskier lending driven by profitability motives. We show that public banks demonstrate resilience due to stable deposits and implicit backing, whereas private banks are more vulnerable to systemic shocks. The impact of ownership structure on credit risk is context-dependent, reflecting heterogeneous ownership objectives in the GCC.
- Open Access
- 2 March 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in International Journal of Financial Studies
- Vol. 13 (1) , 33
How Foreign and Domestic Ownership Influenced Risk-Taking in GCC Banks
This study investigates the relationship between ownership structure (foreign and domestic) and bank risk-taking over the period 2014–2022. The analysis includes 66 banks operating in the GCC, divided into 44 domestically owned, and 22 foreign-owned banks. The research examines the relationship across two distinct periods: the pre-pandemic and the COVID-19 pandemic era, using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method, and panel data techniques for robust analysis. The findings reveal that, in both periods, foreign-owned banks exhibited lower credit risk, greater cost efficiency, and less risk-taking compared to domestic counterparts. Domestic banks, while maintaining profitability, relied heavily on capital absorbency, which resulted in elevated credit risk and operational inefficiencies. These inefficiencies, observed among domestic banks, stem from inadequate monitoring of borrowers’ information and the occurrence of moral hazard. Foreign banks played a crucial role in supporting banking sector stability, as their presence enhanced the GDP growth. The results are in line with the “global advantage hypothesis”.
- 2 March 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in International Journal of Financial Studies
- Vol. 13 (1) , 33
Open AccessHow Foreign and Domestic Ownership Influenced Risk-Taking in GCC Banks
This study investigates the relationship between ownership structure (foreign and domestic) and bank risk-taking over the period 2014–2022. The analysis includes 66 banks operating in the GCC, divided into 44 domestically owned, and 22 foreign-owned banks. The research examines the relationship across two distinct periods: the pre-pandemic and the COVID-19 pandemic era, using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method, and panel data techniques for robust analysis. The findings reveal that, in both periods, foreign-owned banks exhibited lower credit risk, greater cost efficiency, and less risk-taking compared to domestic counterparts. Domestic banks, while maintaining profitability, relied heavily on capital absorbency, which resulted in elevated credit risk and operational inefficiencies. These inefficiencies, observed among domestic banks, stem from inadequate monitoring of borrowers’ information and the occurrence of moral hazard. Foreign banks played a crucial role in supporting banking sector stability, as their presence enhanced the GDP growth. The results are in line with the “global advantage hypothesis”.
- Open Access
How Do Managers and Shareholders Respond to Taxation? An Analysis of the Introduction of the UK Real Estate Investment Trust Legislation
Corporate finance decisions, measurement of accounting profits, and market valuations are invariably made within the framework of a taxation system(s). Previous research indicates both ambiguity over the influence of taxation on managers’ behaviour and limitations in the ability of shareholders to process tax information. The establishment of the UK's Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) regime in 2006 allowed quoted companies to opt out of company level taxation. We examine managers’ and shareholders’ responses, that is, their ability to process information. When compared with shareholders, managers demonstrated a greater knowledge of the legislation, and of its applicability. For example, managers appeared to pre‐empt the effects of the legislation. Our findings have implications for tax policy makers and taxpayers, acting as a warning of the potential downside of increased cooperation when trying to make more appropriately formed legislation. Further, managers appeared to be willing to trade off the interests of shareholders for their own personal gain, which is surprising given the visibility of the REIT conversion process and illustrates the limitations of shareholder control over managers’ behaviour. We find shareholders were able to accurately assess the general effects of the legislation but were unable to identify specific companies likely to benefit. Without any increase in shareholder sophistication, concerns exist over the effectiveness of shareholders in acting as monitors of managers’ decision making.
Open AccessHow Do Managers and Shareholders Respond to Taxation? An Analysis of the Introduction of the UK Real Estate Investment Trust Legislation
Corporate finance decisions, measurement of accounting profits, and market valuations are invariably made within the framework of a taxation system(s). Previous research indicates both ambiguity over the influence of taxation on managers’ behaviour and limitations in the ability of shareholders to process tax information. The establishment of the UK's Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) regime in 2006 allowed quoted companies to opt out of company level taxation. We examine managers’ and shareholders’ responses, that is, their ability to process information. When compared with shareholders, managers demonstrated a greater knowledge of the legislation, and of its applicability. For example, managers appeared to pre‐empt the effects of the legislation. Our findings have implications for tax policy makers and taxpayers, acting as a warning of the potential downside of increased cooperation when trying to make more appropriately formed legislation. Further, managers appeared to be willing to trade off the interests of shareholders for their own personal gain, which is surprising given the visibility of the REIT conversion process and illustrates the limitations of shareholder control over managers’ behaviour. We find shareholders were able to accurately assess the general effects of the legislation but were unable to identify specific companies likely to benefit. Without any increase in shareholder sophistication, concerns exist over the effectiveness of shareholders in acting as monitors of managers’ decision making.
- 30 January 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal of Human Resource Management
- Vol. 30 (6) , 921-963
Executive pay and performance: the moderating effect of CEO power and governance structure
This paper examines the crucial question of whether chief executive officer (CEO) power and corporate governance (CG) structure can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) using a large up-to-date South African data-set. Our findings are threefold. First, when direct links between executive pay and performance are examined, we find a positive, but relatively small PPS. Second, our results show that in a context of concentrated ownership and weak board structures; the second-tier agency conflict (director monitoring power and opportunism) is stronger than the first-tier agency problem (CEO power and self-interest). Third, additional analysis suggests that CEO power and CG structure have a moderating effect on the PPS. Specifically, we find that the PPS is higher in firms with more reputable, founding and shareholding CEOs, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards, more powerful and long-tenured CEOs. Overall, our evidence sheds new important theoretical and empirical insights on explaining the PPS with specific focus on the predictions of the optimal contracting and managerial power hypotheses. The findings are generally robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, pay, and performance proxies.
- 30 January 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal of Human Resource Management
- Vol. 30 (6) , 921-963
Executive pay and performance: the moderating effect of CEO power and governance structure
This paper examines the crucial question of whether chief executive officer (CEO) power and corporate governance (CG) structure can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) using a large up-to-date South African data-set. Our findings are threefold. First, when direct links between executive pay and performance are examined, we find a positive, but relatively small PPS. Second, our results show that in a context of concentrated ownership and weak board structures; the second-tier agency conflict (director monitoring power and opportunism) is stronger than the first-tier agency problem (CEO power and self-interest). Third, additional analysis suggests that CEO power and CG structure have a moderating effect on the PPS. Specifically, we find that the PPS is higher in firms with more reputable, founding and shareholding CEOs, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination and remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards, more powerful and long-tenured CEOs. Overall, our evidence sheds new important theoretical and empirical insights on explaining the PPS with specific focus on the predictions of the optimal contracting and managerial power hypotheses. The findings are generally robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, pay, and performance proxies.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Financial Analysis
- Vol. 30, 363-383
Corporate governance and risk reporting in South Africa: A study of corporate risk disclosures in the pre- and post-2007/2008 global financial crisis periods
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Financial Analysis
- Vol. 30, 363-383
Top Cited PapersCorporate governance and risk reporting in South Africa: A study of corporate risk disclosures in the pre- and post-2007/2008 global financial crisis periods
- 25 November 2013
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Applied Accounting Research
- Vol. 14 (3) , 203-223
Dividend taxation and the pricing of UK equities
Purpose: – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which UK equity prices reflect shareholder level taxation on dividends (dividend tax capitalisation). Despite an extensive theoretical and empirical literature controversy exists. Design/methodology/approach: – Using a sample of UK firm year ends from 1991 to 2007 archival accounting and share price data are used to test for the presence or otherwise of dividend tax capitalisation. Findings: – The paper finds evidence of equity values reflecting shareholder level dividend taxation. In particular, a significant reduction in the valuation of retained earnings, a measure of dividend paying potential, is observed around the July 1997 abolition of the repayment of dividend tax credits to tax exempt shareholders. This suggests a link between shareholder level taxation of dividends and firms’ cost of capital. Research limitations/implications: – The analysis focuses on share prices and is therefore subject to an underlying assumption of shareholders’ understanding tax and other potential relevant information. Practical implications: – The taxation of dividends is an important issue because of the potential for it to influence firms’ cost of capital and therefore investment decisions. Further, non-tax costs may be incurred to the extent that attempts are made to mitigate any “adverse” tax effects. Social implications: – The results indicate that taxation of dividends and share prices are associated and therefore also indirectly firms’ cost of capital. This linkage has implications for investment appraisal and the allocation of capital between competing demands. Originality/value: – In using an asset valuation approach the limitations of alternate methods of examining shareholder level taxation of dividends are avoided, e.g. analysis of dividend drop of ratios.
- 25 November 2013
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Applied Accounting Research
- Vol. 14 (3) , 203-223
Dividend taxation and the pricing of UK equities
Purpose: – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which UK equity prices reflect shareholder level taxation on dividends (dividend tax capitalisation). Despite an extensive theoretical and empirical literature controversy exists. Design/methodology/approach: – Using a sample of UK firm year ends from 1991 to 2007 archival accounting and share price data are used to test for the presence or otherwise of dividend tax capitalisation. Findings: – The paper finds evidence of equity values reflecting shareholder level dividend taxation. In particular, a significant reduction in the valuation of retained earnings, a measure of dividend paying potential, is observed around the July 1997 abolition of the repayment of dividend tax credits to tax exempt shareholders. This suggests a link between shareholder level taxation of dividends and firms’ cost of capital. Research limitations/implications: – The analysis focuses on share prices and is therefore subject to an underlying assumption of shareholders’ understanding tax and other potential relevant information. Practical implications: – The taxation of dividends is an important issue because of the potential for it to influence firms’ cost of capital and therefore investment decisions. Further, non-tax costs may be incurred to the extent that attempts are made to mitigate any “adverse” tax effects. Social implications: – The results indicate that taxation of dividends and share prices are associated and therefore also indirectly firms’ cost of capital. This linkage has implications for investment appraisal and the allocation of capital between competing demands. Originality/value: – In using an asset valuation approach the limitations of alternate methods of examining shareholder level taxation of dividends are avoided, e.g. analysis of dividend drop of ratios.
- 18 October 2013
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 36 (2) , 67-96
Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Simultaneous Equation Approach
This paper investigates the association between executive compensation and performance. It uniquely utilises a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms within a three‐stage least squares (3SLS) simultaneous equation framework. Results based on estimating a conventional single equation model indicate that the executive pay and performance sensitivity is relatively weak, whereas those based on estimating a 3SLS model generally suggest improved executive pay and performance sensitivity. Our findings highlight the need for future research to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies when estimating the executive pay and performance link. The findings are generally robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, executive pay and performance proxies. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 18 October 2013
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 36 (2) , 67-96
Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Simultaneous Equation Approach
This paper investigates the association between executive compensation and performance. It uniquely utilises a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms within a three‐stage least squares (3SLS) simultaneous equation framework. Results based on estimating a conventional single equation model indicate that the executive pay and performance sensitivity is relatively weak, whereas those based on estimating a 3SLS model generally suggest improved executive pay and performance sensitivity. Our findings highlight the need for future research to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies when estimating the executive pay and performance link. The findings are generally robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, executive pay and performance proxies. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.