Brendan Saltaformaggio
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Brendan Saltaformaggio has a total of 58 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dongyan Xu
Purdue Univ, Dept Comp Sci, 305 N Univ St, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
5 shared publications- David Oygenblik
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
3 shared publications - Dongyan Xu
Purdue University
2 shared publications - Mingxuan Yao
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA
2 shared publications Omar Alrawi
Georgia Institute of Technology
2 shared publicationsRohit Bhatia
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2357-2371
Finding FAULTs in Architectural Backdoors: Why Trigger Detection Fails Under Real-World Conditions
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2357-2371
Open AccessFinding FAULTs in Architectural Backdoors: Why Trigger Detection Fails Under Real-World Conditions
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2189-2203
VillainNet: Targeted Poisoning Attacks Against SuperNets Along the Accuracy-Latency Pareto Frontier
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2189-2203
Open AccessVillainNet: Targeted Poisoning Attacks Against SuperNets Along the Accuracy-Latency Pareto Frontier
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1364-1378
Enhanced Web Application Security Through Proactive Dead Drop Resolver Remediation
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1364-1378
Open AccessEnhanced Web Application Security Through Proactive Dead Drop Resolver Remediation
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1305-1319
Lock the Door But Keep the Window Open: Extracting App-Protected Accessibility Information from Browser-Rendered Websites
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1305-1319
Open AccessLock the Door But Keep the Window Open: Extracting App-Protected Accessibility Information from Browser-Rendered Websites
- 14 June 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 19 (5) , 3218-3230
This Hacker Knows Physics: Device Physics Aware Mimicry Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems
Recent work proposed to improve the security of CPSs by authenticating the CPS devices through the device operation times in the response packets from the devices, due to the strong correlation between the timing fingerprints and the physics of the devices. Although such a technique may be effective in defending against naive attackers, an advanced attacker may monitor the operation of the CPS before launching a device physics aware mimicry attack. In this paper, we show how the spoofed response packets can be crafted by an attacker to deceive the CPS device authentication method based on the device operation times. Specifically, we use the timing and physical measurements embedded in the packets to reconstruct the devices in the physical system, which can be used to spoof response packets corresponding to the actual model and configuration of the devices in the CPS. We demonstrate the performance of our technique in realistic testbeds with real devices. Finally, we propose an upgraded defense mechanism that may be used against such mimicry attacks.
- 14 June 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 19 (5) , 3218-3230
This Hacker Knows Physics: Device Physics Aware Mimicry Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems
Recent work proposed to improve the security of CPSs by authenticating the CPS devices through the device operation times in the response packets from the devices, due to the strong correlation between the timing fingerprints and the physics of the devices. Although such a technique may be effective in defending against naive attackers, an advanced attacker may monitor the operation of the CPS before launching a device physics aware mimicry attack. In this paper, we show how the spoofed response packets can be crafted by an attacker to deceive the CPS device authentication method based on the device operation times. Specifically, we use the timing and physical measurements embedded in the packets to reconstruct the devices in the physical system, which can be used to spoof response packets corresponding to the actual model and configuration of the devices in the CPS. We demonstrate the performance of our technique in realistic testbeds with real devices. Finally, we propose an upgraded defense mechanism that may be used against such mimicry attacks.
- 19 May 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 19 (6) , 58-65
Modeling Large-Scale Manipulation in Open Stock Markets
- 19 May 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 19 (6) , 58-65
Modeling Large-Scale Manipulation in Open Stock Markets
- 1 May 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1156-1171
TARDIS: Rolling Back The Clock On CMS-Targeting Cyber Attacks
Over 55% of the world’s websites run on Content Management Systems (CMS). Unfortunately, this huge user population has made CMS-based websites a high-profile target for hackers. Worse still, the vast majority of the website hosting industry has shifted to a "backup and restore" model of security, which relies on error-prone AV scanners to prompt users to roll back to a pre-infection nightly snapshot. This research had the opportunity to study these nightly backups for over 300,000 unique production websites. In doing so, we measured the attack landscape of CMS-based websites and assessed the effectiveness of the backup and restore protection scheme. To our surprise, we found that the evolution of tens of thousands of attacks exhibited clear long-lived multi-stage attack patterns. We now propose TARDIS, an automated provenance inference technique, which enables the investigation and remediation of CMS-targeting attacks based on only the nightly backups already being collected by website hosting companies. With the help of our industry collaborator, we applied TARDIS to the nightly backups of those 300K websites and found 20,591 attacks which lasted from 6 to 1,694 days, some of which were still yet to be detected.
- 1 May 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1156-1171
TARDIS: Rolling Back The Clock On CMS-Targeting Cyber Attacks
Over 55% of the world’s websites run on Content Management Systems (CMS). Unfortunately, this huge user population has made CMS-based websites a high-profile target for hackers. Worse still, the vast majority of the website hosting industry has shifted to a "backup and restore" model of security, which relies on error-prone AV scanners to prompt users to roll back to a pre-infection nightly snapshot. This research had the opportunity to study these nightly backups for over 300,000 unique production websites. In doing so, we measured the attack landscape of CMS-based websites and assessed the effectiveness of the backup and restore protection scheme. To our surprise, we found that the evolution of tens of thousands of attacks exhibited clear long-lived multi-stage attack patterns. We now propose TARDIS, an automated provenance inference technique, which enables the investigation and remediation of CMS-targeting attacks based on only the nightly backups already being collected by website hosting companies. With the help of our industry collaborator, we applied TARDIS to the nightly backups of those 300K websites and found 20,591 attacks which lasted from 6 to 1,694 days, some of which were still yet to be detected.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Internet Society
Automating Patching of Vulnerable Open-Source Software Versions in Application Binaries
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Internet Society
Automating Patching of Vulnerable Open-Source Software Versions in Application Binaries
- 5 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 77, 737-744
Gemini: Guest-transparent honey files via hypervisor-level access redirection
- 5 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 77, 737-744
Gemini: Guest-transparent honey files via hypervisor-level access redirection
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 73, 235-248
Toward a more dependable hybrid analysis of android malware using aspect-oriented programming
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 73, 235-248
Toward a more dependable hybrid analysis of android malware using aspect-oriented programming