Pin Zhou

Existing research has separately explored cash hedging and partial vertical ownership (PVO), yet their joint impact on supply chain operations—especially under overlapping external risks and internal ownership structures—remains underexplored. This study investigates how PVO influences a risk-averse supplier’s cash hedging strategies and profitability. We develop a two-tier supply chain model with an upstream supplier and two downstream manufacturers (one holding PVO), using a mean-variance framework and binary hedging strategy (full/no hedging). We reveal a paradox: while vertical ownership seemingly should intensify hedging through risk-sharing, PVO in fact reduces supplier’s hedging likelihood by mitigating standalone risk aversion, thereby raising the threshold. Uniform pricing under PVO raises hedging thresholds more than differentiated pricing, enhancing risk absorption. Higher PVO boosts the partially owned manufacturer’s profits at the supplier’s expense, particularly with low production costs. Increased product substitution diminishes profits for all firms and weakens hedging advantages due to market volatility. Sequential manufacturer decisions lower the supplier’s hedging threshold relative to simultaneous decisions. An increase in the partial hedging ratio leads to an inverse U-shaped pattern in the supplier’s hedging threshold. This study shows that firms must consider PVO when making hedging and pricing plans. Managers should balance risk and market share, and pay attention to how ownership and product similarity affect risk decisions.

Zinc–air batteries (ZABs) have received focused research due to their advantages such as high energy utilization and low pollution. However, the slow oxygen reduction reaction (ORR) and the high price of Pt/C catalysts severely limit the efficiency of ZABs. Therefore, the development of efficient, stable and inexpensive catalysts has become the key to the development of ZABs. In this study, we introduce Cu nanoclusters (NCs) to form coupled catalysts with FeNC catalyst, which can modulate and stabilize the geometry and electronic structure of the Fe active center during the reaction process. The Cu NCs also can promote the electron transfer of Fe atoms, thus significantly improving the electrocatalytic performance of the catalyst. The half-wave potential of the obtained Cu[ ]@FeNC catalysts reaches 0.91[ ]V and still possesses 82% activity after 60 000[ ]s durability test, which is a significant improvement over commercial Pt/C under the same conditions. When assembled into ZABs, its power density reaches 259[ ]mW cm[ ], which is significantly improved compared with the 199[ ]mW cm[ ] of the Pt/C catalyst.

This paper tests how quickly firms recover from the shock caused by the COVID‐19 pandemic under different sourcing strategies. Our findings indicate that firms with geographically concentrated suppliers experience slower recovery compared to those with geographically dispersed suppliers following the outbreak of the COVID‐19 pandemic. Further analysis also reveals that firms with geographically concentrated suppliers recover more rapidly if their suppliers are less affected by the COVID‐19 pandemic, if they maintain long‐term supplier relationships, or if they hold higher levels of cash reserves.

This paper examines the quality information disclosure strategy of a monopolist when faced with two distinct consumer types: fairness‐sensitive and fairness‐insensitive consumers. We develop a game‐theoretic model that accounts for consumer heterogeneity in willingness to pay and their rational updates to quality expectations based on the firm's choice of disclosure or nondisclosure. Our findings reveal that the firm's nondisclosure can alleviate price reductions driven by fairness concerns among consumers. The resulting opacity in quality information, stemming from the firm's nondisclosure strategy, enhances profitability by enabling the firm to charge a higher retail price as consumers' fairness concerns escalate. Furthermore, we demonstrate that consumers' fairness concerns can act as a barrier to quality information disclosure and exert a non‐monotonic influence on consumer surplus, which contrasts sharply with the conventional wisdom that such concerns unequivocally benefit consumers.

This paper investigates the effect of cost learning on the manufacturer's procurement strategy in the presence of multiple local divisions and market competition, and the strategy preferences of stakeholders, such as the supplier. Firms are often confronted with a critical procurement decision: centralization versus decentralization. For this paper, we incorporate the learning effect into this crucial strategy and demonstrate its ubiquity and significant practical implications in today's technological environment. We develop a two-period model with an upstream supplier and a downstream manufacturer with multiple divisions and examine the equilibrium outcomes under the two procurement methods. The results show that, due to the cost learning effect, the manufacturer might switch his choice from centralized procurement to decentralized one; and the manufacturer may switch back to centralized one when the rate of product substitution is small. However, the preferences of the supplier, channel, and consumers may shift from decentralized procurement to a centralized one. When the product homogenization between local divisions becomes large enough and as the learning rate increases, the manufacturer shifts its optimal procurement strategy from centralization to decentralization. However, the supplier, channel, and consumers are always better off under decentralized procurement. When the learning rate is large, the preferences of the supplier and the manufacturer achieve consistency and a win-win relationship benefiting the channel and consumers. This paper is the first to take the upstream learning effect into account in the firms’ optimal purchasing strategy and advise managers of group corporations consisting of multiple local sales divisions with business expansion needs. Our findings suggest that the effect of cost learning has a critical impact on firms’ purchasing preferences, the profitability of both parties, and consumer surplus.

This paper examines the relationship between air pollution levels and regulators’ enforcement levels and observes that air pollution levels in firms’ locations reduce enforcement from regulators. Moreover, regulators are more likely to suffer from type II errors when air pollution levels in firms’ locations are higher, verifying the effect of regulators’ unwillingness to travel due to air pollution. The cross-sectional analysis suggests that enforcement from regulatory authorities in areas with lower air pollution levels than in firms’ locations, positioned at great distances from firms’ locations, and with greater workloads is less strict when air pollution levels in firms’ locations are higher. We further test whether air pollution levels reduce the efficiency of regulators and find that firms with lower earnings quality and weaker corporate governance are less likely to be subjected to enforcement by regulators when air pollution levels in the firms’ locations are higher.

This study constructs a mixed oligopoly model that includes a public enterprise and two private enterprises. Game theory was adopted to explore the effects of carbon emission reduction policies. In addition, this study analyzes the optimal carbon emission trading prices and privatization decisions. The results show that the proportion of state-owned shares and the equity efficiency gap affect the equilibrium results for different carbon emission policies. Privatization increases the profits of public firms but does not necessarily increase social welfare. Different carbon emission reduction policies have different effects on the equilibrium results. Moreover, the emission reduction target is not completely consistent with the maximum social welfare target and should be comprehensively considered. The government can intervene by setting carbon emission trading prices and making privatization decisions. Full and partial privatization may be optimal decisions.

This paper constructs a mixed oligopoly model composed of a public enterprise and two private enterprises, and explores the equilibrium results under different carbon emission policies. In addition, this paper also analyzes the optimal carbon emission trading price and the optimal privatization level decision. The results show that the proportion of state-owned shares and the equity efficiency gap have impacts on the equilibrium results under different carbon emission policies. Privatization increases the profits of public firm but does not necessarily promote social welfare. Different carbon emission policy decisions have different impacts on the equilibrium results, and the emission reduction target is not completely consistent with the maximum social welfare target. The government can intervene by setting carbon emissions trading prices and making privatization decisions. Both full and partial privatization may be the optimal decision.