Sander van Triest
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Sander van Triest has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Christopher Williams
Department Strategy, Entrepreneurship & International Business ESSCA School of Management Boulogne‐Billancourt France
4 shared publicationsBianca A.C. Groen
2 shared publications- Erik M. van Raaij
RSM Erasmus University
2 shared publications Helena Kloosterman
Amsterdam Business School University of Amsterdam Amsterdam The Netherlands
2 shared publications- Igor Goncharov
WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management, Vallendar, Germany
2 shared publications - Bei Shi
University of Amsterdam
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
How Management Control Mechanisms Shape Employee Use of Generative AI
This study investigates whether management controls determine the extent of employee use of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) at work. GenAI offers substantial productivity benefits and it is easily accessible, yet its use varies widely across employees. We argue that using GenAI extensively is costly for employees, requiring an investment of time that competes with current performance, and introducing uncertainty into established workflows as it is difficult to predict for what tasks GenAI is or is not useful. We further argue that different types of control impact whether employees bear these costs and, thus, determine the extent of GenAI use. Using a survey with a matched sample of 127 employee-manager dyads, we find that management controls are significantly associated with GenAI use: results controls and action controls are negatively associated with use, whereas personnel controls are positively associated with it. We do not find an association between cultural controls and employee GenAI use. Further, we find that the relation between results controls and employee GenAI use is concentrated among employees who perform jobs with highly measurable output. Our findings suggest that management control mechanisms are an important determinant of how employees engage with GenAI.
- 26 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHow Management Control Mechanisms Shape Employee Use of Generative AI
This study investigates whether management controls determine the extent of employee use of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) at work. GenAI offers substantial productivity benefits and it is easily accessible, yet its use varies widely across employees. We argue that using GenAI extensively is costly for employees, requiring an investment of time that competes with current performance, and introducing uncertainty into established workflows as it is difficult to predict for what tasks GenAI is or is not useful. We further argue that different types of control impact whether employees bear these costs and, thus, determine the extent of GenAI use. Using a survey with a matched sample of 127 employee-manager dyads, we find that management controls are significantly associated with GenAI use: results controls and action controls are negatively associated with use, whereas personnel controls are positively associated with it. We do not find an association between cultural controls and employee GenAI use. Further, we find that the relation between results controls and employee GenAI use is concentrated among employees who perform jobs with highly measurable output. Our findings suggest that management control mechanisms are an important determinant of how employees engage with GenAI.
- Open Access
- 13 May 2026
- Published by Wiley in European Management Review
Understanding organizational–professional conflict: The effects of organizational controls and professional field strength
Organizational–professional conflict (OPC) occurs when organizations encourage professionals such as doctors, accountants, and lawyers to behave in ways that are not consistent with their professional norms. This may lead to unethical behavior, while it also reduces job satisfaction and increases turnover intentions. We take a novel approach for understanding OPC by examining the role played by formal and informal controls within the organization in which the professional is working, as well as the strength of the broader professional field of which the professional is a member. Using a sample of 449 qualified professional employees from a wide range of organizations and industries, we find that (1) formal behavior control does not influence OPC, (2) formal output control is positively linked to OPC, (3) informal social control reduces OPC, and (4) a stronger professional field mitigates the impact of output and social controls. The results extend recent insights into OPC while guiding professional organizations in terms of how their control systems may reduce the negative consequences of OPC amongst key employees.
- 13 May 2026
- Published by Wiley in European Management Review
Open AccessUnderstanding organizational–professional conflict: The effects of organizational controls and professional field strength
Organizational–professional conflict (OPC) occurs when organizations encourage professionals such as doctors, accountants, and lawyers to behave in ways that are not consistent with their professional norms. This may lead to unethical behavior, while it also reduces job satisfaction and increases turnover intentions. We take a novel approach for understanding OPC by examining the role played by formal and informal controls within the organization in which the professional is working, as well as the strength of the broader professional field of which the professional is a member. Using a sample of 449 qualified professional employees from a wide range of organizations and industries, we find that (1) formal behavior control does not influence OPC, (2) formal output control is positively linked to OPC, (3) informal social control reduces OPC, and (4) a stronger professional field mitigates the impact of output and social controls. The results extend recent insights into OPC while guiding professional organizations in terms of how their control systems may reduce the negative consequences of OPC amongst key employees.
- 11 February 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 38 (1) , 183-207
Do Customers Complicate Control? The Impact of Customer Contact on Information Asymmetry in Employee–Supervisor Relationships
Employees who have contact with outside customers may obtain private information from these customers, and they may also adapt rules to meet customer demands. This increases information asymmetry between the employees and their supervisors, complicating supervisor control. However, customer contact may also reduce information asymmetry: Customer information may be used by supervisors, whereas customers may have a disciplining effect through increasing employees’ felt accountability and motivation. In a sample of 516 employee–supervisor relationships, I find a negative relationship between outside customer contact and both employee and supervisor assessment of information asymmetry. These relationships are more negative when supervisors and employees are less experienced. Additional analyses show that the relationship is less negative in not-for-profit organizations, where clients typically are less powerful. The results are consistent with outside customers having a disciplining function rather than being a source of private information, and more so when supervisor monitoring is less effective. Data Availability: The data that support the findings of this study are available upon request. The data are not publicly available due to confidentiality reasons.
- 11 February 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 38 (1) , 183-207
Do Customers Complicate Control? The Impact of Customer Contact on Information Asymmetry in Employee–Supervisor Relationships
Employees who have contact with outside customers may obtain private information from these customers, and they may also adapt rules to meet customer demands. This increases information asymmetry between the employees and their supervisors, complicating supervisor control. However, customer contact may also reduce information asymmetry: Customer information may be used by supervisors, whereas customers may have a disciplining effect through increasing employees’ felt accountability and motivation. In a sample of 516 employee–supervisor relationships, I find a negative relationship between outside customer contact and both employee and supervisor assessment of information asymmetry. These relationships are more negative when supervisors and employees are less experienced. Additional analyses show that the relationship is less negative in not-for-profit organizations, where clients typically are less powerful. The results are consistent with outside customers having a disciplining function rather than being a source of private information, and more so when supervisor monitoring is less effective. Data Availability: The data that support the findings of this study are available upon request. The data are not publicly available due to confidentiality reasons.
- Open Access
- 15 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting and Business Research
- Vol. 56 (5) , 1-25
What determines managers' use of subjective performance information?
- 15 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting and Business Research
- Vol. 56 (5) , 1-25
Open AccessWhat determines managers' use of subjective performance information?
- Open Access
- 15 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Your Boss Wants You at the Office: Supervisor Discretion and Employee Working from Home
We investigate how supervisor discretion is related to the extent of employee working from home (WFH). In the pre-corona pandemic period, WFH was uncommon, and after the pandemic anecdotal and survey evidence shows many organizations want their employees to return to the office. It is unclear whether this preference is shared by the employees’ supervisors, who likely experience the effects of WFH more directly. In a sample of 557 employee-supervisor dyads across various organizations and industries, we find that supervisor discretion is strongly negatively related to the extent of employee WFH (as measured by the share of work time working from home). Employees whose supervisors have to adhere to organizational WFH policy work from home twice as much as employees whose supervisors have full discretion over the WFH policy. Similarly, the extent of overall discretion supervisors experience in their daily work is significantly negatively related to employee WFH. The latter relationship is positively moderated by supervisors’ own WFH performance: supervisors who feel less effective when working from home use their discretion to limit employee WFH.
- 15 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessYour Boss Wants You at the Office: Supervisor Discretion and Employee Working from Home
We investigate how supervisor discretion is related to the extent of employee working from home (WFH). In the pre-corona pandemic period, WFH was uncommon, and after the pandemic anecdotal and survey evidence shows many organizations want their employees to return to the office. It is unclear whether this preference is shared by the employees’ supervisors, who likely experience the effects of WFH more directly. In a sample of 557 employee-supervisor dyads across various organizations and industries, we find that supervisor discretion is strongly negatively related to the extent of employee WFH (as measured by the share of work time working from home). Employees whose supervisors have to adhere to organizational WFH policy work from home twice as much as employees whose supervisors have full discretion over the WFH policy. Similarly, the extent of overall discretion supervisors experience in their daily work is significantly negatively related to employee WFH. The latter relationship is positively moderated by supervisors’ own WFH performance: supervisors who feel less effective when working from home use their discretion to limit employee WFH.
- Open Access
- 27 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 59
Under which circumstances are enabling control and control extensiveness related to employee performance?
- 27 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 59
Open AccessUnder which circumstances are enabling control and control extensiveness related to employee performance?
- Open Access
- 3 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Management Journal
- Vol. 42 (1) , 89-97
Following the chain of command? How managers balance benefits and risks in granting autonomy to employees
- 3 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Management Journal
- Vol. 42 (1) , 89-97
Open AccessFollowing the chain of command? How managers balance benefits and risks in granting autonomy to employees
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Elsevier in European Management Journal
- Vol. 36 (6) , 727-735
Managing flexible work arrangements: Teleworking and output controls
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Elsevier in European Management Journal
- Vol. 36 (6) , 727-735
Top Cited PapersManaging flexible work arrangements: Teleworking and output controls
- 24 March 2017
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Journal of Innovation Management
- Vol. 21 (03)
PRODUCT LAUNCH PERFORMANCE IN HI-TECH SMEs: NEWNESS TO THE FIRM AND THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS
We investigate the impact of management control mechanisms on the success of new product launches in high-technology small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We argue that internal management controls will alleviate problems associated with product newness. Using survey data from 76 SMEs we find newness to the firm to be negatively related to product launch success, while the use of informal and formal controls have positive effects. Furthermore, informal controls within the SME moderate the negative relationship between newness and launch success. The results add to the debate on the impact of control mechanisms on innovative activities in SMEs.
- 24 March 2017
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Journal of Innovation Management
- Vol. 21 (03)
PRODUCT LAUNCH PERFORMANCE IN HI-TECH SMEs: NEWNESS TO THE FIRM AND THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS
We investigate the impact of management control mechanisms on the success of new product launches in high-technology small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We argue that internal management controls will alleviate problems associated with product newness. Using survey data from 76 SMEs we find newness to the firm to be negatively related to product launch success, while the use of informal and formal controls have positive effects. Furthermore, informal controls within the SME moderate the negative relationship between newness and launch success. The results add to the debate on the impact of control mechanisms on innovative activities in SMEs.
Unintended Consequences of Changing Accounting Standards: The Case of Fair Value Accounting and Mandatory Dividends
A growing body of literature investigates the interaction of changes in accounting standards with institutions such as investor protection laws and corporate governance mechanisms. We examine the unintended consequences of fair value accounting in determining mandated preferred dividends. We study the case of Russian energy conglomerate UES, which had a good corporate governance track record and a consistent dividend history. Following its adoption of fair value accounting, UES reported the highest quarterly profit in world corporate history, but it subsequently omitted dividends for all its shareholders. The case analysis suggests that the transitory nature of fair value adjustments and the interaction with the investment policy were important considerations in justifying the dividend omission. The reduction in preferred dividends was not offset by any capital gains, and led to a wealth transfer from preferred to ordinary shareholders. Thus, requiring the use of fair value accounting when determining the dividend distribution base can lead to unintended consequences and increase agency costs for minority shareholders.
Unintended Consequences of Changing Accounting Standards: The Case of Fair Value Accounting and Mandatory Dividends
A growing body of literature investigates the interaction of changes in accounting standards with institutions such as investor protection laws and corporate governance mechanisms. We examine the unintended consequences of fair value accounting in determining mandated preferred dividends. We study the case of Russian energy conglomerate UES, which had a good corporate governance track record and a consistent dividend history. Following its adoption of fair value accounting, UES reported the highest quarterly profit in world corporate history, but it subsequently omitted dividends for all its shareholders. The case analysis suggests that the transitory nature of fair value adjustments and the interaction with the investment policy were important considerations in justifying the dividend omission. The reduction in preferred dividends was not offset by any capital gains, and led to a wealth transfer from preferred to ordinary shareholders. Thus, requiring the use of fair value accounting when determining the dividend distribution base can lead to unintended consequences and increase agency costs for minority shareholders.