Bella M. DePaulo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Bella M. DePaulo has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Deborah A. Kashy
2 shared publicationsAmy L. Blank
University of Virginia
1 shared publicationGregory W. Swaim
University of Virginia
1 shared publicationHarris Cooper
1 shared publicationJames J. Lindsay
1 shared publicationJennifer A. Epstein
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 1998
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 74 (1) , 63-79
Everyday lies in close and casual relationships.
In 2 diary studies, 77 undergraduates and 70 community members recorded their social interactions and lies for a week. Because lying violates the openness and authenticity that people value in their close relationships, we predicted (and found) that participants would tell fewer lies per social interaction to the people to whom they felt closer and would feel more uncomfortable when they did lie to those people. Because altruistic lies can communicate caring, we also predicted (and found) that relatively more of the lies told to best friends and friends would be altruistic than self-serving, whereas the reverse would be true of lies told to acquaintances and strangers. Also consistent with predictions, lies told to closer partners were more often discovered.
- 1 January 1998
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 74 (1) , 63-79
Everyday lies in close and casual relationships.
In 2 diary studies, 77 undergraduates and 70 community members recorded their social interactions and lies for a week. Because lying violates the openness and authenticity that people value in their close relationships, we predicted (and found) that participants would tell fewer lies per social interaction to the people to whom they felt closer and would feel more uncomfortable when they did lie to those people. Because altruistic lies can communicate caring, we also predicted (and found) that relatively more of the lies told to best friends and friends would be altruistic than self-serving, whereas the reverse would be true of lies told to acquaintances and strangers. Also consistent with predictions, lies told to closer partners were more often discovered.
- 1 November 1997
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Review
- Vol. 1 (4) , 346-357
The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception
A meta-analysis was conducted of research on the relation between judges' accuracy at detecting deception and their confidence in their judgments. A total of 18 independent samples revealed an average weighted accuracy-confidence correlation of .04, a relation not significantly different from zero. However, confidence was positively correlated with judges' tendency to perceive messages as truthful, regardless of the actual truthfulness of the messages. Judges were also more confident when they really were rating truths compared to when they were rating lies. Also, men were more confident than women, and judges who had a closer relationship to the message sender felt more confident in their judgments of truths and lies. Methodological and theoretical explanations for these findings are discussed.
- 1 November 1997
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Review
- Vol. 1 (4) , 346-357
The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception
A meta-analysis was conducted of research on the relation between judges' accuracy at detecting deception and their confidence in their judgments. A total of 18 independent samples revealed an average weighted accuracy-confidence correlation of .04, a relation not significantly different from zero. However, confidence was positively correlated with judges' tendency to perceive messages as truthful, regardless of the actual truthfulness of the messages. Judges were also more confident when they really were rating truths compared to when they were rating lies. Also, men were more confident than women, and judges who had a closer relationship to the message sender felt more confident in their judgments of truths and lies. Methodological and theoretical explanations for these findings are discussed.
- 1 January 1996
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 70 (5) , 979-995
Lying in everyday life.
In 2 diary studies of lying, 77 college students reported telling 2 lies a day, and 70 community members told 1. Participants told more self-centered lies than other-oriented lies, except in dyads involving only women, in which other-oriented lies were as common as self-centered ones. Participants told relatively more self-centered lies to men and relatively more other-oriented lies to women. Consistent with the view of lying as an everyday social interaction process, participants said that they did not regard their lies as serious and did not plan them much or worry about being caught. Still, social interactions in which lies were told were less pleasant and less intimate than those in which no lies were told.
- 1 January 1996
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 70 (5) , 979-995
Lying in everyday life.
In 2 diary studies of lying, 77 college students reported telling 2 lies a day, and 70 community members told 1. Participants told more self-centered lies than other-oriented lies, except in dyads involving only women, in which other-oriented lies were as common as self-centered ones. Participants told relatively more self-centered lies to men and relatively more other-oriented lies to women. Consistent with the view of lying as an everyday social interaction process, participants said that they did not regard their lies as serious and did not plan them much or worry about being caught. Still, social interactions in which lies were told were less pleasant and less intimate than those in which no lies were told.
- 1 January 1996
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 71 (4) , 703-716
Truth and investment: Lies are told to those who care.
Participants discussed paintings they liked and disliked with artists who were or were not personally invested in them. Participants were urged to be honest or polite or were given no special instructions. There were no conditions under which the artists received totally honest feedback about the paintings they cared about. As predicted by the defensibility postulate, participants stonewalled, amassed misleading evidence, and conveyed positive evaluations by implications. They also told some outright lies. But the participants also communicated clearly their relative degrees of liking for the different special paintings. The results provide new answers to the question of why beliefs about other people's appraisals do not always correspond well with their actual appraisals.
- 1 January 1996
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 71 (4) , 703-716
Truth and investment: Lies are told to those who care.
Participants discussed paintings they liked and disliked with artists who were or were not personally invested in them. Participants were urged to be honest or polite or were given no special instructions. There were no conditions under which the artists received totally honest feedback about the paintings they cared about. As predicted by the defensibility postulate, participants stonewalled, amassed misleading evidence, and conveyed positive evaluations by implications. They also told some outright lies. But the participants also communicated clearly their relative degrees of liking for the different special paintings. The results provide new answers to the question of why beliefs about other people's appraisals do not always correspond well with their actual appraisals.
- 1 June 1992
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Vol. 18 (3) , 276-285
Expressiveness and Expressive Control
Dispositionally expressive and unexpressive male subjects told truths and lies under low and high scrutiny. Subjects acted expressive, inhibited, and naturally. Judges rated subjects' performances. Subjects were able to regulate their expressiveness deliberately, but they were less successful when more highly scrutinized. Dispositionally expressive subjects appeared more expressive and attractive than unexpressive subjects. Unlike unexpressive subjects, they did not appear any less attractive when trying to act inhibited than when trying to act expressive, nor did they appear any more deceptive when lying than when telling the truth. Unexpressive people, even when trying to act expressive, did not appear as expressive as expressive people when the latter were acting naturally. Similarly, expressive people, even when trying to act inhibited, did not appear as inhibited as the unexpressive people acting naturally. Differences in expressiveness were conveyed most compellingly in channels that included nonverbal cues.
- 1 June 1992
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Vol. 18 (3) , 276-285
Expressiveness and Expressive Control
Dispositionally expressive and unexpressive male subjects told truths and lies under low and high scrutiny. Subjects acted expressive, inhibited, and naturally. Judges rated subjects' performances. Subjects were able to regulate their expressiveness deliberately, but they were less successful when more highly scrutinized. Dispositionally expressive subjects appeared more expressive and attractive than unexpressive subjects. Unlike unexpressive subjects, they did not appear any less attractive when trying to act inhibited than when trying to act expressive, nor did they appear any more deceptive when lying than when telling the truth. Unexpressive people, even when trying to act expressive, did not appear as expressive as expressive people when the latter were acting naturally. Similarly, expressive people, even when trying to act inhibited, did not appear as inhibited as the unexpressive people acting naturally. Differences in expressiveness were conveyed most compellingly in channels that included nonverbal cues.