Tal Rabin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Tal Rabin has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fabrice Benhamouda
Algorand Foundation, New York, USA
3 shared publications - Hugo Krawczyk
Amazon Web Services, New York, NY, USA
2 shared publications - Shai Halevi
Algorand Foundation
2 shared publications - Yuval Ishai
Technion
2 shared publications Abhishek Shah
Columbia University
1 shared publication- Alex Nicita
Columbia University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 394-408
Encrypted Matrix-Vector Products from Secret Dual Codes
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 394-408
Open AccessEncrypted Matrix-Vector Products from Secret Dual Codes
- 29 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 62-91
SPRINT: High-Throughput Robust Distributed Schnorr Signatures
- 29 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 62-91
SPRINT: High-Throughput Robust Distributed Schnorr Signatures
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 337-373
Proactive Secret Sharing with Constant Communication
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 337-373
Proactive Secret Sharing with Constant Communication
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 830-844
Analyzing the Real-World Security of the Algorand Blockchain
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 830-844
Open AccessAnalyzing the Real-World Security of the Algorand Blockchain
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 203-235
Additive Randomized Encodings and Their Applications
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 203-235
Additive Randomized Encodings and Their Applications
- Open Access
- 23 July 2021
- Published by Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium Advisory Board in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
- Vol. 2021 (4) , 528-548
Gage MPC: Bypassing Residual Function Leakage for Non-Interactive MPC
Existing models for non-interactive MPC cannot provide full privacy for inputs, because they inherently leak the residual function (i.e., the output of the function on the honest parties’ input together with all possible values of the adversarial inputs). For example, in any non-interactive sealed-bid auction, the last bidder can figure out what was the highest previous bid. We present a new MPC model which avoids this privacy leak. To achieve this, we utilize a blockchain in a novel way, incorporating smart contracts and arbitrary parties that can be incentivized to perform computation (“bounty hunters,” akin to miners). Security is maintained under a monetary assumption about the parties: an honest party can temporarily supply a recoverable collateral of value higher than the computational cost an adversary can expend. We thus construct non-interactive MPC protocols with strong security guarantees (full security, no residual leakage) in the short term. Over time, as the adversary can invest more and more computational resources, the security guarantee decays. Thus, our model, which we call Gage MPC, is suitable for secure computation with limited-time secrecy, such as auctions. A key ingredient in our protocols is a primitive we call “Gage Time Capsules” (GaTC): a time capsule that allows a party to commit to a value that others are able to reveal but only at a designated computational cost. A GaTC allows a party to commit to a value together with a monetary collateral. If the original party properly opens the GaTC, it can recover the collateral. Otherwise, the collateral is used to incentivize bounty hunters to open the GaTC. This primitive is used to ensure completion of Gage MPC protocols on the desired inputs. As a requisite tool (of independent interest), we present a generalization of garbled circuit that are more robust: they can tolerate exposure of extra input labels. This is in contrast to Yao’s garbled circuits, whose secrecy breaks down if even a single extra label is exposed. Finally, we present a proof-of-concept implementation of a special case of our construction, yielding an auction functionality over an Ethereum-like blockchain.
- 23 July 2021
- Published by Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium Advisory Board in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
- Vol. 2021 (4) , 528-548
Open AccessGage MPC: Bypassing Residual Function Leakage for Non-Interactive MPC
Existing models for non-interactive MPC cannot provide full privacy for inputs, because they inherently leak the residual function (i.e., the output of the function on the honest parties’ input together with all possible values of the adversarial inputs). For example, in any non-interactive sealed-bid auction, the last bidder can figure out what was the highest previous bid. We present a new MPC model which avoids this privacy leak. To achieve this, we utilize a blockchain in a novel way, incorporating smart contracts and arbitrary parties that can be incentivized to perform computation (“bounty hunters,” akin to miners). Security is maintained under a monetary assumption about the parties: an honest party can temporarily supply a recoverable collateral of value higher than the computational cost an adversary can expend. We thus construct non-interactive MPC protocols with strong security guarantees (full security, no residual leakage) in the short term. Over time, as the adversary can invest more and more computational resources, the security guarantee decays. Thus, our model, which we call Gage MPC, is suitable for secure computation with limited-time secrecy, such as auctions. A key ingredient in our protocols is a primitive we call “Gage Time Capsules” (GaTC): a time capsule that allows a party to commit to a value that others are able to reveal but only at a designated computational cost. A GaTC allows a party to commit to a value together with a monetary collateral. If the original party properly opens the GaTC, it can recover the collateral. Otherwise, the collateral is used to incentivize bounty hunters to open the GaTC. This primitive is used to ensure completion of Gage MPC protocols on the desired inputs. As a requisite tool (of independent interest), we present a generalization of garbled circuit that are more robust: they can tolerate exposure of extra input labels. This is in contrast to Yao’s garbled circuits, whose secrecy breaks down if even a single extra label is exposed. Finally, we present a proof-of-concept implementation of a special case of our construction, yielding an auction functionality over an Ethereum-like blockchain.