Samuel Plach

The COVID‐19 pandemic opened a polycrisis of interrelated disruptions and compounding economic and subjective uncertainty that likely shaped fertility in high‐income countries, especially in its second phase, in which the Ukraine war was a major source and amplifier of uncertainty. Yet fertility evidence remains largely limited to the pandemic. We estimate monthly “excess” total fertility rates (TFRs) and find that declines compared to projected pre‐polycrisis trends were short‐lived during the first phase and excess TFRs overall positive in all 26 sample countries except Eastern Europe and Portugal. Instead, during the second phase, excess TFRs are strongly and increasingly negative in Eastern and Central Europe, Greece, Portugal, France, Denmark, and Sweden. Investigating potential explanatory variables, we find that the total, energy, and housing consumer price indices and reversed consumer confidence are negatively associated with excess TFRs, especially in Eastern and Central Europe, Greece, France, Denmark, and Sweden. Refugee inflows, the economic policy uncertainty index, and the geopolitical risk index show weaker negative associations. But country heterogeneity is large. Our analysis suggests that fertility dynamics are closely linked to the polycrisis, citizens’ economic conditions and confidence are the strongest correlates, and extensive welfare regimes alone may not consistently sustain fertility under accumulating uncertainty.

Fertility rates are declining across much of the globe, yet the forces driving this decline have become increasingly complex, and classic theories have become less adequate to explain recent trends. While economic and gender-related explanations have long dominated fertility research, emerging global uncertainties, such as climate change, democratic backsliding, economic crises, and regional conflicts, may also shape how individuals evaluate childbearing. In addition to the more classical factors, this cross-national study examines how macrolevel uncertainties influence perceptions of fertility intentions in Italy, Argentina, the United States, and Germany. These countries offer distinct fertility trajectories and face unique combinations of sociopolitical and environmental challenges. Using a conjoint experiment, we examine how individuals evaluate, across hypothetical scenarios, their intention of having a child under varying household, policy, and macrolevel conditions. Across all four countries, material security remains central: household income is the strongest predictor of fertility intentions, with homeownership and childcare playing smaller roles. At the same time, perceptions of macrolevel stability, including expectations about climate conditions, economic prospects, democratic functioning, and peace, exert substantial and meaningful effects, comparable to homeownership and childcare provision but more pronounced than those associated with gender-role arrangements. Cross-country differences show that macroeconomic stability and climate change are most consequential in Argentina, while in the United States respondents are less responsive to geopolitical conflict. These findings show that individuals evaluate childbearing not only through their immediate circumstances, but also through expectations about broader societal futures, highlighting the importance of incorporating macrolevel uncertainty when explaining contemporary fertility decline.

Taking stock of individuals’ perceived family ideals is particularly important in the current moment given unprecedented fertility declines and the diversification of households in advanced industrial societies. Study participants in urban China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, the United States, Italy, Spain, and Norway were asked to evaluate vignettes describing families whose characteristics vary on ten dimensions. In contrast to previous studies that focused on a single dimension, such as fertility ideals or gender roles, this holistic vignette approach identifies the relative importance of each dimension. Multilevel regression analysis reveals both expected and unexpected findings. Parenthood remains a positive ideal, but the number of children does not matter once other family dimensions are considered, a potentially important finding in light of conventional wisdom regarding the two-children ideal. When evaluating families with at least one child, respondents tend to positively evaluate more traditional arrangements, including valuing marriage relative to cohabitation and, particularly, divorce. Also, in addition to financial resources, good communication between immediate and extended family members, as well as maintaining respect in the larger community, are highly salient attributes of an ideal family. Notwithstanding some important cross-national differences, egalitarian gender roles and avoiding work–family conflict are also valued positively. Overall, even as the study reveals some notable variations between societies, respondents across countries identify similar components of an ideal family.

Drawing on past pandemics, scholars have suggested that the COVID-19 pandemic will bring about fertility decline. Evidence from actual birth data has so far been scarce. This brief report uses data on vital statistics from a selection of high-income countries, including the United States. The pandemic has been accompanied by a significant drop in crude birth rates beyond that predicted by past trends in 7 out of the 22 countries considered, with particularly strong declines in southern Europe: Italy (−9.1%), Spain (−8.4%), and Portugal (−6.6%). Substantial heterogeneities are, however, observed.