XSXiaotong Sun

Xiaotong Sun

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Xiaotong Sun has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Can Information Design Resolve Electric Vehicle Charging Chaos?

    by Qianni Wang, Xiaotong Sun, Yu (Marco) Nie, Jiayang Li

    Charging remains an obstacle to the mass adoption of electric vehicles (EVs), especially for long-distance travel. If many EV drivers take to the road around the same time, their “range anxiety” may create a self-fulfilling prophecy. As drivers anticipate uncertainty and congestion at charging stations, they tend to make decisions about when and where to charge that could collectively lead to chaos and inefficiency. Here, we show that information design can persuade drivers to adopt decisions that are better for the system while being consistent with their self-interest as defined by the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Our stylized model incorporates a congestion effect into drivers’ payoffs and assumes that the information designer can leverage its private knowledge about the charging condition to influence heterogeneous drivers whose type is defined by their vehicle’s remaining range. We consider both public and private information designs. The former does not depend on the driver type, whereas the latter does. For the private design problem, we propose a novel cutoff structure that enables us to reformulate an infinite-dimensional problem as a finite one. Our analysis shows that, in a one-station, two-state model equipped with a linear cost function, the optimal public design reduces to full information revelation. Moreover, the optimal private design within the proposed cutoff-based class yields significantly better outcomes and, in some cases, can even attain the system optimum. The model is further extended to a corridor setting to examine the impact of different information release schedules. Numerical results show that the private design with sequential release consistently yields the best performance. Under public design, however, the relative effectiveness of different release schedules depends on the spatial configuration of the corridor, among other factors. Funding: This research is supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation’s Civil Infrastructure System (CIS) Program [Grant CMMI #2225087]. J. Li is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72501242]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2025.0017 .


  • Open Access

    What Determines Travelers' Acceptance of MaaS? Insights from a Meta-Analysis

    by Manlian Pan, Yipeng Chen, Xu Zhang, Xiaotong Sun

    Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) has attracted attention for its potential to promote efficient and sustainable travel behaviors. However, its practical success remains uncertain, and existing studies report highly inconsistent findings on user preferences and their determinants. To address this gap, this study combines bibliometric analysis and meta-analysis to map and quantify the empirical patterns and determinants of MaaS acceptance across diverse contexts. Out of 141 full-text studies reviewed, 46 met the criteria for meta-regression. Two dimensions of explanatory factors are examined: (1) subject attributes, including geographical and temporal factors, sociodemographics, and habitual travel behaviors; and (2) design features, covering data characteristics, travel modes, and pricing structures. Geographical and temporal trends reveal lower acceptance in early-adopting regions, notably Europe, and a decline in more recent studies. The pooled MaaS acceptance rate is 55.3\%, closely aligned with the arithmetic mean (54.9\%), suggesting that heterogeneity across studies is substantial yet generally balanced. Nonetheless, publication-bias tests indicate a mild overestimation of the true acceptance rate. Meta-regression results further show that subject attributes exert stronger effects than design features. Respondents from the younger generation, car owners, and large households are more likely to accept MaaS. Among design features, the negative effect of including more travel modes is statistically significant, suggesting that ``more may not be better'' in bundle design. Evidence on willingness-to-pay remains limited, but descriptive findings reveal distinct regional and bundle-level variation. Overall, this study provides a quantitative synthesis that clarifies the main drivers of MaaS acceptance and informs future research and policy directions toward more adaptive MaaS design.

  • Economic Analysis of On-Street Parking with Urban Delivery

    by Zhengtian Xu, Xiaotong Sun

    The surge in online shopping has dramatically increased the demand for short-term curb access for package pickups and deliveries, leading to heightened competition for limited curb space. This paper addresses the problem of how the unique parking demand of deliverers, particularly their parking duration for delivery attempts linked to parking space availability, affects the dynamics of urban curb parking systems. We develop continuum models of a curb parking system and perform analytical analyses to understand the dynamics and steady-state properties of the system under the influence of increased urban deliveries. We conduct comparative statics to examine how various curb management measures, such as pricing, parking duration caps, and dedicated delivery bays, influence the equilibrium conditions, followed by comparisons of the theoretical capacity of these measures. We further demonstrate the working mechanism of delivery bays and their role in forestalling specific failures within a hybrid system with both general parkers and deliverers. Finally, we investigate curb management strategies in nonstationary operational contexts and prescribe the optimal strategies therein. Our findings offer valuable insights into the unique properties that deliverers introduce to curb parking dynamics, highlighting the need for a strategic reevaluation of current management practices. We find that pricing strategies for metered parking to general parkers prove to be more efficient and flexible compared with other interventions. Notably, our analysis suggests that when curb parking pricing is optimally calibrated, the necessity for dedicated delivery bays diminishes. Furthermore, we reveal that optimal curb management strategies could diverge in response to surges in demand, depending on whether the increase sources from general parkers or deliverers. To be effective, the sizing of delivery bays must align with the underlying causes of parking scarcity. History: This paper has been accepted for the Transportation Science Special Section on ISTTT25 Conference. Funding: This work was supported by the George Washington University [University Facilitating Fund]. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2024.0569 .


  • The Dual Effects of Team Contest Design on On-Demand Service Work Schedules

    by Tingting Dong, Xiaotong Sun, Qi Luo, Jian Wang, Yafeng Yin

    Emerging on-demand service platforms (OSPs) have recently embraced teamwork as a strategy for stimulating workers’ productivity and mediating temporal supply and demand imbalances. This research investigates the team contest scheme design problem considering work schedules. Introducing teams on OSPs creates a hierarchical single-leader multi-follower game. The leader (platform) establishes rewards and intrateam revenue-sharing rules for distributing workers’ payoffs. Each follower (team) competes with others by coordinating the schedules of its team members to maximize the total expected utility. The concurrence of interteam competition and intrateam coordination causes dual effects, which are captured by an equilibrium analysis of the followers’ game. To align the platform’s interest with workers’ heterogeneous working-time preferences, we propose a profit-maximizing contest scheme consisting of a winner’s reward and time-varying payments. A novel algorithm that combines Bayesian optimization, duality, and a penalty method solves the optimal scheme in the nonconvex equilibrium-constrained problem. Our results indicate that teamwork is a useful strategy with limitations. Under the proposed scheme, team contest always benefits workers. Intrateam coordination helps teams strategically mitigate the negative externalities caused by overcompetition among workers. For the platform, the optimal scheme can direct teams’ schedules toward more profitable market equilibria when workers have inaccurate perceptions of the market. History: This paper has been accepted for the Service Science Special Issue on Innovation in Transportation-Enabled Urban Services. Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant FW-HTF-P 2222806]. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/serv.2023.0320 .