Yin Tang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Yin Tang has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hanyang Xu
Nari Research Institute, Nari Group Corporation, Nanjing 211106, China
2 shared publications - Jia Xue
Management College, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
2 shared publications - Youshi He
School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
2 shared publications - Bing Li
Department of Statistics The Pennsylvania State University
1 shared publication - Ming Liu
Management College, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
1 shared publication - Peng Gao
Business College, Jiangsu University of Technology, Changzhou 213001, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
A nonparametric test for elliptical distribution based on kernel embedding of probabilities
Elliptical distribution is a basic assumption underlying many multivariate statistical methods. For example, in sufficient dimension reduction and statistical graphical models, this assumption is routinely imposed to simplify the data dependence structure. Before applying such methods, we need to decide whether the data are elliptically distributed. Currently existing tests either focus exclusively on spherical distributions, or rely on bootstrap to determine the null distribution, or require specific forms of the alternative distribution. In this paper, we introduce a general nonparametric test for elliptical distribution based on kernel embedding of the probability measure that embodies the two properties that characterize an elliptical distribution: namely, after centering and rescaling, (1) the direction and length of the random vector are independent, and (2) the directional vector is uniformly distributed on the unit sphere. We derive the asymptotic distributions of the test statistic via von-Mises expansion, develop the sample-level procedure to determine the rejection region, and establish the consistency and validity of the proposed test. We also develop the concentration bounds of the test statistic, allowing the dimension to grow with the sample size, and further establish the consistency in this high-dimension setting. We compare our method with several existing methods via simulation studies, and apply our test to a SENIC dataset with and without a transformation aimed to achieve ellipticity.
Open AccessA nonparametric test for elliptical distribution based on kernel embedding of probabilities
Elliptical distribution is a basic assumption underlying many multivariate statistical methods. For example, in sufficient dimension reduction and statistical graphical models, this assumption is routinely imposed to simplify the data dependence structure. Before applying such methods, we need to decide whether the data are elliptically distributed. Currently existing tests either focus exclusively on spherical distributions, or rely on bootstrap to determine the null distribution, or require specific forms of the alternative distribution. In this paper, we introduce a general nonparametric test for elliptical distribution based on kernel embedding of the probability measure that embodies the two properties that characterize an elliptical distribution: namely, after centering and rescaling, (1) the direction and length of the random vector are independent, and (2) the directional vector is uniformly distributed on the unit sphere. We derive the asymptotic distributions of the test statistic via von-Mises expansion, develop the sample-level procedure to determine the rejection region, and establish the consistency and validity of the proposed test. We also develop the concentration bounds of the test statistic, allowing the dimension to grow with the sample size, and further establish the consistency in this high-dimension setting. We compare our method with several existing methods via simulation studies, and apply our test to a SENIC dataset with and without a transformation aimed to achieve ellipticity.
- Open Access
- 6 May 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 14 (9) , 5587
Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Model: Corporate Low-Carbon Manufacturing, Chinese Government Supervision, and Public Media Investigation
Government supervision and media investigation play an important role in regulating manufacturing produce mode and reducing carbon emissions. In terms of theoretical implications, this study uses the tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate the dynamic decision-making process of stable strategies among three participating stakeholders: manufacturing enterprises, government regulatory departments, and media survey agencies. The payoff matrix and replicator dynamic functions of three parties are specifically calculated based on the evolutionary game theory. From a lower-carbon economy perspective, the main factors (revenue, subsidy, cost, and loss) that affect the stable strategies of three stakeholders are included in the sensitivity analysis. In terms of practical implications, this paper describes the evolutionary dynamic process of the stability condition using numerical simulation tests, and it proposes the promotion mechanism of four different supervision stages of manufacturing production mode. In the beginning and early stage, strengthened government supervision and active media investigation have a positive effect on reducing the heavy-polluting manufacturer proportion in China. Under this circumstance, the lower cost, in-creased revenue, and added subsidies all motivate firms to adopt the lower-carbon production mode. With the maturity of the supervision platform, public media will gradually reduce their investigations and interventions to the manufacturing business, and finally engage in no-investigation. This paper also demonstrates that lower penalties and subsidies are not related to the optimal strategy among three stakeholders, and the extravagant survey cost will reduce the enthusiasm of public media to investigate manufacturing firms.
- 6 May 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 14 (9) , 5587
Open AccessMulti-Agent Evolutionary Game Model: Corporate Low-Carbon Manufacturing, Chinese Government Supervision, and Public Media Investigation
Government supervision and media investigation play an important role in regulating manufacturing produce mode and reducing carbon emissions. In terms of theoretical implications, this study uses the tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate the dynamic decision-making process of stable strategies among three participating stakeholders: manufacturing enterprises, government regulatory departments, and media survey agencies. The payoff matrix and replicator dynamic functions of three parties are specifically calculated based on the evolutionary game theory. From a lower-carbon economy perspective, the main factors (revenue, subsidy, cost, and loss) that affect the stable strategies of three stakeholders are included in the sensitivity analysis. In terms of practical implications, this paper describes the evolutionary dynamic process of the stability condition using numerical simulation tests, and it proposes the promotion mechanism of four different supervision stages of manufacturing production mode. In the beginning and early stage, strengthened government supervision and active media investigation have a positive effect on reducing the heavy-polluting manufacturer proportion in China. Under this circumstance, the lower cost, in-creased revenue, and added subsidies all motivate firms to adopt the lower-carbon production mode. With the maturity of the supervision platform, public media will gradually reduce their investigations and interventions to the manufacturing business, and finally engage in no-investigation. This paper also demonstrates that lower penalties and subsidies are not related to the optimal strategy among three stakeholders, and the extravagant survey cost will reduce the enthusiasm of public media to investigate manufacturing firms.
- Open Access
- 7 September 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 13 (18) , 10016
Incentives for Corporate Environmental Information Disclosure in China: Public Media Pressure, Local Government Supervision and Interactive Effects
Disclosing environmental information is essential for listed firms to demonstrate social conscience. To fulfill government and public media supervision, Chinese listed firms are increasing the quality and quantity of disclosed environmental information. This elicits a new topic of interest: the correlation between media/government supervision and corporate environmental information disclosure (EID). The paper addresses this issue through data analysis and factor correlation study in data from some high-pollution firms in China during 2017–2019. The study first introduces a standardized definition for the quantification of media and government supervision, as well as the degree to which the corporation discloses the environmental information. Then, the correlations between the factors are isolated and refined to three sub-topics: (1) how public media and local government supervision affect the quality of corporate EID; (2) how is the interactive effect of public media and government supervision related to corporate EID; (3) how is the distinct ownership of corporate affect the government supervision on corporate EID. The concluding result from the above factor analysis could provide guidance for authorities to adjust certain laws and regulations so that the media and government supervision better motivates the corporate EID, and furthermore, better sustainable development of ecological environment.
- 7 September 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 13 (18) , 10016
Open AccessIncentives for Corporate Environmental Information Disclosure in China: Public Media Pressure, Local Government Supervision and Interactive Effects
Disclosing environmental information is essential for listed firms to demonstrate social conscience. To fulfill government and public media supervision, Chinese listed firms are increasing the quality and quantity of disclosed environmental information. This elicits a new topic of interest: the correlation between media/government supervision and corporate environmental information disclosure (EID). The paper addresses this issue through data analysis and factor correlation study in data from some high-pollution firms in China during 2017–2019. The study first introduces a standardized definition for the quantification of media and government supervision, as well as the degree to which the corporation discloses the environmental information. Then, the correlations between the factors are isolated and refined to three sub-topics: (1) how public media and local government supervision affect the quality of corporate EID; (2) how is the interactive effect of public media and government supervision related to corporate EID; (3) how is the distinct ownership of corporate affect the government supervision on corporate EID. The concluding result from the above factor analysis could provide guidance for authorities to adjust certain laws and regulations so that the media and government supervision better motivates the corporate EID, and furthermore, better sustainable development of ecological environment.