Ke Jiang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Ke Jiang has a total of 41 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Yusheng Wang
4 shared publicationsDie Wang
3 shared publications- Yusheng Wang
Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology
3 shared publications Zhendong Li
3 shared publications- Zhendong Li
School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
3 shared publications Daming You
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 8 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 211
Dynamic assessment of carbon pricing mechanisms: Reconciling emission reduction incentives and economic efficiency
- 8 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 211
Dynamic assessment of carbon pricing mechanisms: Reconciling emission reduction incentives and economic efficiency
- 8 August 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in INFOR: Information Systems and Operational Research
- Vol. 64 (1) , 146-180
Blockchain-enabled price competition for green product design
- 8 August 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in INFOR: Information Systems and Operational Research
- Vol. 64 (1) , 146-180
Blockchain-enabled price competition for green product design
- 20 June 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Ocean & Coastal Management
- Vol. 269
How environmental fairness concerns impact the effectiveness of watershed ecological compensation mechanisms?
- 20 June 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Ocean & Coastal Management
- Vol. 269
How environmental fairness concerns impact the effectiveness of watershed ecological compensation mechanisms?
- 12 June 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Ocean & Coastal Management
- Vol. 269
Does individuals' expected policy utility drive watershed ecological compensation in China's Xin'an river basin pilot?
- 12 June 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Ocean & Coastal Management
- Vol. 269
Does individuals' expected policy utility drive watershed ecological compensation in China's Xin'an river basin pilot?
- 27 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Environment, Development and Sustainability
- Vol. 28 (10) , 1-33
Incentive coordination for effective sharing of low-carbon technology innovation
- 27 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Environment, Development and Sustainability
- Vol. 28 (10) , 1-33
Incentive coordination for effective sharing of low-carbon technology innovation
- Open Access
- 1 November 2024
- Published by EDP Sciences in RAIRO - Operations Research
- Vol. 58 (6) , 5275-5300
Driving factors on corporate green investments behaviors: from the strategic intersection of governments regulation and public participation
As the global community confronts the challenges of climate change, businesses face increasing pressure to adopt sustainable practices. This study develops a tripartite game model to investigate the impact of green investments on corporate performance, considering the dynamic interplay between governments regulations and public participation in shaping strategic initiatives. First, the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) is identified by solving replicator dynamic equations and performing stability analysis of equilibrium points. Next, the practicability and rationality of the evolutionary game model are assessed by analyzing ESSs under various corporate green investment scenarios. Finally, a case-based example is provided to validate the theoretical findings and support the following arguments: there are eight equilibrium points and four potential ESSs in the game model; the selection of each ESS is primarily determined by the trade-off between costs and revenues for each stakeholder; increased governmental regulatory costs prompt a strategic shift, incentivizing corporations to enhance green investments; while rising penalties drive a preference for green options; and corporations recognizing compensatory responsibilities are steered towards sustainable pathways.
- 1 November 2024
- Published by EDP Sciences in RAIRO - Operations Research
- Vol. 58 (6) , 5275-5300
Open AccessDriving factors on corporate green investments behaviors: from the strategic intersection of governments regulation and public participation
As the global community confronts the challenges of climate change, businesses face increasing pressure to adopt sustainable practices. This study develops a tripartite game model to investigate the impact of green investments on corporate performance, considering the dynamic interplay between governments regulations and public participation in shaping strategic initiatives. First, the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) is identified by solving replicator dynamic equations and performing stability analysis of equilibrium points. Next, the practicability and rationality of the evolutionary game model are assessed by analyzing ESSs under various corporate green investment scenarios. Finally, a case-based example is provided to validate the theoretical findings and support the following arguments: there are eight equilibrium points and four potential ESSs in the game model; the selection of each ESS is primarily determined by the trade-off between costs and revenues for each stakeholder; increased governmental regulatory costs prompt a strategic shift, incentivizing corporations to enhance green investments; while rising penalties drive a preference for green options; and corporations recognizing compensatory responsibilities are steered towards sustainable pathways.