Eric de Bodt
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Eric de Bodt has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- B. Espen Eckbo
Dartmouth College Tuck School of Business and Norwegian School of Economics
1 shared publication - Helen Bollaert
Helen Bollaert is from SKEMA Business School—Université Côte d’Azur, Avenue Willy Brandt, F-59777 Euralille, France
1 shared publication Irina Demidova
Independent Researcher Paris France
1 shared publication- Jean-Gabriel Cousin
Université de Lille, France
1 shared publication Micah S. Officer
Loyola Marymount University, USA
1 shared publication- Muhammad Farooq Ahmad
SKEMA Business School – Université Côte d'Azur
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 February 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (5) , 2194-2228
Competition Shocks, Rival Reactions, and Stock Return Comovement
To protect inframarginal rents, rivals react to competition shocks by increasing product differentiation or lowering costs by standardizing products and production processes. We test these two mutually exclusive reactions by exploiting changes in rivals’ idiosyncratic stock return comovement following significant tariff cuts. While increased product differentiation implies a reduction in return comovement, greater standardization implies the opposite (a comovement increase). Difference-in-differences (DID) tests indicate that tariff cuts cause a significant increase in return comovement—in particular among within-industry “followers.” Treatment effects on cash flows, product counts, similarity scores, and business segment counts further support cost-cutting strategies.
- 18 February 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (5) , 2194-2228
Open AccessCompetition Shocks, Rival Reactions, and Stock Return Comovement
To protect inframarginal rents, rivals react to competition shocks by increasing product differentiation or lowering costs by standardizing products and production processes. We test these two mutually exclusive reactions by exploiting changes in rivals’ idiosyncratic stock return comovement following significant tariff cuts. While increased product differentiation implies a reduction in return comovement, greater standardization implies the opposite (a comovement increase). Difference-in-differences (DID) tests indicate that tariff cuts cause a significant increase in return comovement—in particular among within-industry “followers.” Treatment effects on cash flows, product counts, similarity scores, and business segment counts further support cost-cutting strategies.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Critical Finance Review
- Vol. 13 (3-4) , 265-304
The Relation Between Equity Misvaluation and Stock Payment in Mergers is Spurious
Publishers of Foundations and Trends, making research accessible
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Critical Finance Review
- Vol. 13 (3-4) , 265-304
The Relation Between Equity Misvaluation and Stock Payment in Mergers is Spurious
Publishers of Foundations and Trends, making research accessible
- 6 September 2022
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Finance
- Vol. 43 (3) , 37-117
Mergers and Acquisitions Across Cultures
We examine the effect of acquirer country culture on the cross-cultural (as opposed to cross-border) acquisition decision, the influence of social integration on this cross-cultural decision and the effect of the acquirer’s culture on bid premium and probability of deal completion. We classify acquirer and target countries into GLOBE culture clusters. Sedulity-oriented and tradition-oriented cultures are less likely to acquire outside their home culture cluster, and greater social integration between acquirer and target countries mitigates this reluctance. Sedulity (tradition) oriented cultures pay lower (higher) bid premiums in cross-cultural transactions and are more (less) likely to complete them. JEL Classification: G34, M14, Z1
- 6 September 2022
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Finance
- Vol. 43 (3) , 37-117
Mergers and Acquisitions Across Cultures
We examine the effect of acquirer country culture on the cross-cultural (as opposed to cross-border) acquisition decision, the influence of social integration on this cross-cultural decision and the effect of the acquirer’s culture on bid premium and probability of deal completion. We classify acquirer and target countries into GLOBE culture clusters. Sedulity-oriented and tradition-oriented cultures are less likely to acquire outside their home culture cluster, and greater social integration between acquirer and target countries mitigates this reluctance. Sedulity (tradition) oriented cultures pay lower (higher) bid premiums in cross-cultural transactions and are more (less) likely to complete them. JEL Classification: G34, M14, Z1
- 25 August 2021
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 27 (4) , 589-619
Takeover duration and negotiation process
We study the relations between takeover negotiations duration, competition and learning, focusing on the private phase of bidder‐initiated transactions. While the negotiation goes on, both parties learn about true deal synergies. At any moment, rival bidders can show up and compete for the target. Using a discrete‐time finite‐horizon dynamic programming approach, we derive the equilibrium relations between the negotiation duration, the pressure of potential competition and the learning process. Next, we perform a calibration exercise on a large sample of merger negotiations with hand‐collected data from the Securities and Exchange Commission filings. Our results provide evidence of a very competitive M&A (Mergers and acquisitions) market.
- 25 August 2021
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 27 (4) , 589-619
Takeover duration and negotiation process
We study the relations between takeover negotiations duration, competition and learning, focusing on the private phase of bidder‐initiated transactions. While the negotiation goes on, both parties learn about true deal synergies. At any moment, rival bidders can show up and compete for the target. Using a discrete‐time finite‐horizon dynamic programming approach, we derive the equilibrium relations between the negotiation duration, the pressure of potential competition and the learning process. Next, we perform a calibration exercise on a large sample of merger negotiations with hand‐collected data from the Securities and Exchange Commission filings. Our results provide evidence of a very competitive M&A (Mergers and acquisitions) market.