Akio Hoshi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Akio Hoshi has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Kotaro Inoue
Tokyo Inst Technol, Sch Engn Japan, Tokyo, Japan
4 shared publications- Kazunori (Icko) Suzuki
Waseda University, Graduate School of Business and Finance
3 shared publications Marc Bremer
3 shared publicationsAkira Tokutsu
1 shared publication- Curtis J. Milhaupt
Columbia Law School
1 shared publication - Daiji Kawaguchi
The University of Tokyo
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance Conference of 2025 Edited Transcript
This is the edited transcript of an international conference based on the substance of the book, Zenichi Shishido & Wei Shen, Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance: Comparative Enterprise Law among the US, Japan, and China (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), which proposes an analytical framework: the firm as the forum of incentive bargaining among the four indispensable capital providers (management and employees as the human capital providers; shareholders and creditors as the monetary capital providers) and the state as the fifth player that participates in the incentive bargaining from outside the forum, basically via management. Panel 1 discusses the pros and cons of the framework and the role of the state in the incentive bargaining, including law-making. Panel 2 discusses the comparative corporate governance of start-ups and listed family firms, including the role of the state. Panel 3 discusses the incentives of human capital providers: management and employees, and comparative board systems. Panel 4 discusses the incentives of monetary capital providers: shareholders and creditors. The final panel is a wrap-up and Q&A.
- 2 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessIncentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance Conference of 2025 Edited Transcript
This is the edited transcript of an international conference based on the substance of the book, Zenichi Shishido & Wei Shen, Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance: Comparative Enterprise Law among the US, Japan, and China (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), which proposes an analytical framework: the firm as the forum of incentive bargaining among the four indispensable capital providers (management and employees as the human capital providers; shareholders and creditors as the monetary capital providers) and the state as the fifth player that participates in the incentive bargaining from outside the forum, basically via management. Panel 1 discusses the pros and cons of the framework and the role of the state in the incentive bargaining, including law-making. Panel 2 discusses the comparative corporate governance of start-ups and listed family firms, including the role of the state. Panel 3 discusses the incentives of human capital providers: management and employees, and comparative board systems. Panel 4 discusses the incentives of monetary capital providers: shareholders and creditors. The final panel is a wrap-up and Q&A.
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium
Some Private Law Issues Towards the Introduction of Digital Yen
This article provides an overview of the current status of the Japanese government’s and the Bank of Japan’s examination of Digital Yen, and discusses some of the legal issues that must be resolved before the Digital Yen is actually issued, with a focus on private law issues. Although many issues would be resolved by applying the existing legal doctrines formed in connection with bank transfers and existing digital money, some issues would require further statutory reform in Japan.
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium
Some Private Law Issues Towards the Introduction of Digital Yen
This article provides an overview of the current status of the Japanese government’s and the Bank of Japan’s examination of Digital Yen, and discusses some of the legal issues that must be resolved before the Digital Yen is actually issued, with a focus on private law issues. Although many issues would be resolved by applying the existing legal doctrines formed in connection with bank transfers and existing digital money, some issues would require further statutory reform in Japan.
- Open Access
- 2 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Corporate Law Studies
- Vol. 24 (2) , 587-623
The peculiar development of anti-takeover measures in Japan
- 2 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Corporate Law Studies
- Vol. 24 (2) , 587-623
Open AccessThe peculiar development of anti-takeover measures in Japan
- 1 July 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Asian Journal of Comparative Law
- Vol. 16 (1) , 106-123
Interpretation of Corporate Acquisition Contracts in Japan: A Legal Transplant through Contract Drafting
This article explores Japanese transactional lawyers’ attempts to transplant American legal practice concerning corporate acquisition contracts into Japan. Despite their extensive efforts to disseminate legal concepts originating from the common law into the Japanese legal community, their transplantation attempts produced somewhat unexpected results by the promoters of the transplant. Faced with unfamiliar drafting styles and legal concepts, Japanese courts interpreted American-style corporate acquisition contracts in accordance with traditional Japanese-style contract interpretation. As a result, attempts by Japanese practitioners at transplantation were incomplete. This incompleteness is attributable to their inattention to the differences in approaches to contract interpretation between Japanese and New York courts. New York's approach is much more formalistic and literal than Japan's. If fully aware, however, they could have filled the gap by using functional substitutes for American techniques of controlling adjudicators’ contract interpretation which would effectively operate under Japanese law. Japan's experience confirms that a widely supported view in comparative law scholarship that transplanted law does not necessarily operate in the recipient jurisdiction as it did in its host jurisdiction is applicable to the transplantation of contract drafting practices.
- 1 July 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Asian Journal of Comparative Law
- Vol. 16 (1) , 106-123
Interpretation of Corporate Acquisition Contracts in Japan: A Legal Transplant through Contract Drafting
This article explores Japanese transactional lawyers’ attempts to transplant American legal practice concerning corporate acquisition contracts into Japan. Despite their extensive efforts to disseminate legal concepts originating from the common law into the Japanese legal community, their transplantation attempts produced somewhat unexpected results by the promoters of the transplant. Faced with unfamiliar drafting styles and legal concepts, Japanese courts interpreted American-style corporate acquisition contracts in accordance with traditional Japanese-style contract interpretation. As a result, attempts by Japanese practitioners at transplantation were incomplete. This incompleteness is attributable to their inattention to the differences in approaches to contract interpretation between Japanese and New York courts. New York's approach is much more formalistic and literal than Japan's. If fully aware, however, they could have filled the gap by using functional substitutes for American techniques of controlling adjudicators’ contract interpretation which would effectively operate under Japanese law. Japan's experience confirms that a widely supported view in comparative law scholarship that transplanted law does not necessarily operate in the recipient jurisdiction as it did in its host jurisdiction is applicable to the transplantation of contract drafting practices.
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Japan and the World Economy
- Vol. 41, 99-112
Uncertainty avoiding behavior and cross-border acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific region
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Japan and the World Economy
- Vol. 41, 99-112
Uncertainty avoiding behavior and cross-border acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific region
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers in The Proceedings of Autumn Conference of Tohoku Branch
- Vol. 2016.52, 511
Development of Prediction Technique for Dynamic Stress on Bellows Exhaust Pipe
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers in The Proceedings of Autumn Conference of Tohoku Branch
- Vol. 2016.52, 511
Development of Prediction Technique for Dynamic Stress on Bellows Exhaust Pipe
- Open Access
- 2 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Price of Control in the East Asia and Pac Rim Regions: Law, Culture and Markets
Managerial attitudes to corporate actions have become a hot topic. For example, Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that overconfident managers are more likely to c
- 2 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Price of Control in the East Asia and Pac Rim Regions: Law, Culture and Markets
Managerial attitudes to corporate actions have become a hot topic. For example, Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that overconfident managers are more likely to c
- Open Access
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Price of Control in the East Asia and Pac-Rim Regions: Law, Culture and Markets
This paper examines the price of corporate control observed in cross-border acquisitions in the East Asia-Pac-Rim area. We test if the price of control is diff
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Price of Control in the East Asia and Pac-Rim Regions: Law, Culture and Markets
This paper examines the price of corporate control observed in cross-border acquisitions in the East Asia-Pac-Rim area. We test if the price of control is diff
- Open Access
- 31 August 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Price of Control in the East Asia and Pac-Rim Regions: Law, Culture and Markets
This paper examines the price of corporate control observed in cross-border acquisitions in the East Asia-Pac-Rim area. We test if the price of control is different between Asia and other regions. In particular, we test if the origin of law explains the difference in the price of control. We find that the price of control is higher for a target in the common law nations where the interests of minority shareholders are better protected. However, acquirers from common law countries do not pay a higher price for control in cross-border acquisitions, which is inconsistent with the assertion that firms from common law nations can import good governance to target firms and thus create larger value through acquisitions (as described by Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Erel et al. (2011)). Interestingly, we find that acquirers from countries with a high uncertainty avoidance index pay a higher price for control only in cross-border acquisitions. We interpret this result to mean that acquirers with strong uncertainty avoidance tend to avoid completion risk due to resistance from management and shareholders of target firms in cross-border transactions where acquirers have less experience than in domestic acquisitions. We conclude that after controlling for the origin of law and the propensity to avoid uncertainty, Asian acquirers pay an equivalent price, but Asian targets receive a lower price of control in cross-border acquisitions. This might be because the East Asian-Pac-Rim market for corporate control is less developed.
- 31 August 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Price of Control in the East Asia and Pac-Rim Regions: Law, Culture and Markets
This paper examines the price of corporate control observed in cross-border acquisitions in the East Asia-Pac-Rim area. We test if the price of control is different between Asia and other regions. In particular, we test if the origin of law explains the difference in the price of control. We find that the price of control is higher for a target in the common law nations where the interests of minority shareholders are better protected. However, acquirers from common law countries do not pay a higher price for control in cross-border acquisitions, which is inconsistent with the assertion that firms from common law nations can import good governance to target firms and thus create larger value through acquisitions (as described by Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Erel et al. (2011)). Interestingly, we find that acquirers from countries with a high uncertainty avoidance index pay a higher price for control only in cross-border acquisitions. We interpret this result to mean that acquirers with strong uncertainty avoidance tend to avoid completion risk due to resistance from management and shareholders of target firms in cross-border transactions where acquirers have less experience than in domestic acquisitions. We conclude that after controlling for the origin of law and the propensity to avoid uncertainty, Asian acquirers pay an equivalent price, but Asian targets receive a lower price of control in cross-border acquisitions. This might be because the East Asian-Pac-Rim market for corporate control is less developed.