Xiangyu Mao

Numerous small and micro enterprises in Industrial clusters cannot directly participate in low-carbon technology co-innovation cooperation due to their limited technological research and development capabilities, and they need to rely on the diffusion of the results of low-carbon technology co-innovation cooperation in order to obtain the necessary technology and knowledge. However, scientific research is still needed to clarify the diffusion mechanism of cooperative results in a cluster environment and what factors can accelerate the diffusion efficiency. To address this gap, this paper constructs a complex network game model using a scale-free network as its framework. Through simulation analysis, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) Increasing equipment procurement subsidies can promote the diffusion of outcomes, and the larger the cluster, the greater the subsidy required; (2) Increasing carbon emission tax rates can also promote diffusion, but it is necessary to assess corporate affordability based on cluster scale and scientifically formulate tax rates; (3) Carbon tax incentives have limited effects on the diffusion of outcomes, and large-scale clusters exhibit sluggish responses to them; (4) Enhancing cluster management capabilities and fostering distinctive features can promote diffusion, with large-scale clusters demanding even higher standards; (5) Adjusting the prices of low-carbon products has a limited impact on diffusion and is not a sufficient condition; large-scale clusters are insensitive to this factor.

Although the rapid development of new energy vehicles (NEV) has contributed greatly to China’s carbon emission reduction, it has also brought about a problem that needs to be solved, namely the effective recycling of waste batteries. Existing recycling of waste batteries is plagued by a series of problems such as a single recycling channel, inconsistent recycling standards, lack of recycling technology, rampant irregular recycling enterprises, and low consumer participation. Meanwhile, due to the immaturity of the recycling market, the lack of clarity of existing regulations, and the lack of supervision and management, the above problems are becoming more and more serious. Therefore, to solve these problems, this paper constructs a four-party stochastic evolutionary game model including government regulators, NEV enterprises, third-party recycling enterprises, and consumers. Focus on analyzing the impact of relevant parameters on the choice of strategies by participants, and put forward proposed countermeasures to promote the effective recycling of waste batteries based on the conclusions.

Considering consumer channel preferences, our paper establishes a two‐echelon differential low‐carbon supply chain model and discusses the effects of member's cost‐sharing and fairness concerns on equilibrium results. From a static perspective, the results indicate that retailers' fairness concern behavior will lead to a decrease in pricing and participants' efforts while manufacturers cost‐sharing strategy will only enhance retailers' advertising efforts. From a dynamic perspective, products' greenness, long‐term benefits of manufacturers and retailers, and social welfare will gradually increase and eventually saturate over time. In most cases, manufacturer‐to‐retailer cost‐sharing is a win–win strategy that not only enhances the long‐term interests but also realizes the greening and upgrading of the supply chain.

Technological innovation of industrial cluster is an important measure to realize low‐carbon development. However, the uncertainty associated with new technologies can have a significant impact on the earnings of enterprises. This paper examines the benefit distribution of collaborative technological innovation in industrial clusters through the gray Shapley value, which makes up for the problem that existing research ignores the impact of the uncertainty of technological innovation on the distribution of benefits and provides a new research perspective. In addition, this paper also provides some countermeasures for the Chinese government to encourage enterprises in industrial clusters carry out low‐carbon innovation activities.

The threat from multinational enterprises to local enterprises in developing countries is increasing with the in‐depth development of global value chain cooperation. To increase the profit distribution of local enterprises in global value chain, it is necessary to analyze the cooperation strategy between local enterprises and multinational enterprises. In this paper, cooperative game theory is applied to form a better understanding of cooperation between local enterprises and multinational enterprises. The Shapley values under different cooperative models are analyzed. Based on the analysis, the paper provides some suggestions for local enterprises to enhance the profit distribution of cooperation with multinational enterprises.

Carbon emission reduction under the Belt and Road Initiative has great significance on China’s goal of carbon peak. To better promote carbon emission reduction, based on the background of the Belt and Road Initiative, this paper analyzes the collaborative carbon emission reduction through investment between Chinese enterprises and local enterprises in developing countries along the Belt and Road Initiative. Considering the efforts of enterprises in carbon reduction, low-carbon infrastructure investment, and promotion of low-carbon products, this paper constructs a differential game model of collaborative carbon reduction cooperation between Chinese enterprises and local enterprises in developing countries along the Belt and Road Initiative. By horizontally comparing Nash non-cooperative mode, Stackelberg master-slave mode, and cooperative mode, the results shows that Chinese enterprises can encourage local enterprises in developing countries along the Belt and Road Initiative to coordinate carbon emission reduction through subsidies, which is Stackelberg master-slave mode. Under the cooperative mode, with the maximum carbon emission reduction efforts of both parties, the total benefit of carbon emission reduction reaches the optimal Pareto equilibrium. In addition, this paper also discusses the influence of related factors on the benefits of carbon emission reduction.