Yacov Y. Haimes
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Yacov Y. Haimes has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Barry M. Horowitz
Center for Risk Management of Engineering Systems University of Virginia VA
1 shared publication- Erik Bond
University of Virginia Capstone Team; Systems and Information Engineering Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904
1 shared publication Eva Andrijcic
Center for Risk Management of Engineering Systems University of Virginia VA
1 shared publication- George Park
University of Virginia Capstone Team; Systems and Information Engineering Department, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904
1 shared publication - Joost Reyes Santos
Department of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering the George Washington University Washington District of Columbia USA
1 shared publication Joshua Bogdanor
Center for Risk Management of Engineering Systems University of Virginia VA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 18 May 2015
- Published by Wiley in Systems Engineering
- Vol. 18 (3) , 284-299
Assessing Systemic Risk to Cloud‐Computing Technology as Complex Interconnected Systems of Systems
This paper presents a methodology for modeling cloud‐computing technology (CCT), its users, and, most important, would‐be malicious intruders as complex interdependent and interconnected systems of systems (S‐o‐S). The paper posits and demonstrates that due to the inherent structure of CCT as S‐o‐S, users of public CCT are at a higher risk of unlawful intrusion than users of non‐CCT systems . At the same time, the flexibility and the agility of CCT S‐o‐S provide advantages relative to most non‐CCT S‐o‐S. The need is for the CCT community to employ these advantages as an integral part of its cyber security strategy. Our analysis builds on the following theory and methodology: we consider CCT and its users as complex interconnected hardware and software subsystems that interact as S‐o‐S through shared states, resources, and subsystems, which are connected in series (rather than in parallel, as is the case for most non‐CCT systems); exploiting the serial connectivity of CCT S‐o‐S, we use fault‐tree analysis to demonstrate the resulting unreliability of CCT S‐o‐S; building on the published literature, we incorporate Pareto‐optimal frontiers to compare the risks faced by security‐conscious users of CCT (e.g., large corporations) versus those faced by cost‐conscious users (e.g., small or startup companies); and we show that users of CCT as S‐o‐S are at a higher risk than users of non‐CCT systems for certain assumptions and types of cyber attacks . The paper is structured as follows: Part A outlines the characteristics of CCT S‐o‐S, addresses the inherent vulnerability of CCT S‐o‐S to cyber intrusion and attack, and provides a brief literature review; Part B offers a rationale for modeling CCT as interconnected and interdependent S‐o‐S; Part C demonstrates, through the use of fault‐tree analysis, the higher risk faced by CCT and its users as complex S‐o‐S; Part D presents an economic analysis of the security of CCT as S‐o‐S; and Part E offers conclusions and lessons learned.
- 18 May 2015
- Published by Wiley in Systems Engineering
- Vol. 18 (3) , 284-299
Assessing Systemic Risk to Cloud‐Computing Technology as Complex Interconnected Systems of Systems
This paper presents a methodology for modeling cloud‐computing technology (CCT), its users, and, most important, would‐be malicious intruders as complex interdependent and interconnected systems of systems (S‐o‐S). The paper posits and demonstrates that due to the inherent structure of CCT as S‐o‐S, users of public CCT are at a higher risk of unlawful intrusion than users of non‐CCT systems . At the same time, the flexibility and the agility of CCT S‐o‐S provide advantages relative to most non‐CCT S‐o‐S. The need is for the CCT community to employ these advantages as an integral part of its cyber security strategy. Our analysis builds on the following theory and methodology: we consider CCT and its users as complex interconnected hardware and software subsystems that interact as S‐o‐S through shared states, resources, and subsystems, which are connected in series (rather than in parallel, as is the case for most non‐CCT systems); exploiting the serial connectivity of CCT S‐o‐S, we use fault‐tree analysis to demonstrate the resulting unreliability of CCT S‐o‐S; building on the published literature, we incorporate Pareto‐optimal frontiers to compare the risks faced by security‐conscious users of CCT (e.g., large corporations) versus those faced by cost‐conscious users (e.g., small or startup companies); and we show that users of CCT as S‐o‐S are at a higher risk than users of non‐CCT systems for certain assumptions and types of cyber attacks . The paper is structured as follows: Part A outlines the characteristics of CCT S‐o‐S, addresses the inherent vulnerability of CCT S‐o‐S to cyber intrusion and attack, and provides a brief literature review; Part B offers a rationale for modeling CCT as interconnected and interdependent S‐o‐S; Part C demonstrates, through the use of fault‐tree analysis, the higher risk faced by CCT and its users as complex S‐o‐S; Part D presents an economic analysis of the security of CCT as S‐o‐S; and Part E offers conclusions and lessons learned.
- 1 April 2007
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-6
Risk Analysis for the Security of VDOT Smart Traffic Centers
This paper assesses risks related to hurricane and pandemic scenarios and evaluates risk management alternatives to enhance preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Such disasters could potentially disrupt the operations of critical transportation infrastructure systems. Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) manages Virginia's highway infrastructure through its five high-technology communications hubs called smart traffic centers (STCs). STCs are staffed by transportation engineers, who monitor traffic flow, provide traveler information, and manage incidents. In the event of incidents, STC operators dispatch roadside assistance and post warnings to motorists via variable messaging signs and public radio advisories. Transportation system failures further compound a disaster's devastating economic, physical, and social consequences. A hurricane makes roads inaccessible, resulting in the inability of the general workforce to commute. Since STCs enable workforce mobility, the hurricane's effects are magnified should the STC itself be impacted. The STC's physical structure is vulnerable to high winds and flooding, which may disconnect its power supply, disable communications, or damage essential equipment. A pandemic, on the other hand, can impact the health and availability of STC employees, who require specialized training and experience with intelligent transportation systems. It is critical for the STCs to develop continuity of operations (COOP) plans. Such plans identify and detail specific procedures for maintaining essential functions in the event of a disaster. The Virginia information technology agency (VITA) and Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) require STCs to comply with COOP standards and other security policies. The project team employed risk-based methodologies to assist the STCs in achieving compliance. In particular, this paper discusses four case studies featuring the development and application of: (i) probabilistic risk analysis tools (e.g., data mining, regression analysis, and Monte Carlo simulation using incident databases), (ii) a dynamic recovery analysis model aided by geographic information systems (GIS) to predict the ripple effects of disasters across multiple sectors, and (iii) multi-criteria tradeoff analysis to evaluate the efficacy of risk management solutions. The results and findings from this research will contribute to Virginia's preparedness planning for managing disasters.
- 1 April 2007
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-6
Risk Analysis for the Security of VDOT Smart Traffic Centers
This paper assesses risks related to hurricane and pandemic scenarios and evaluates risk management alternatives to enhance preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Such disasters could potentially disrupt the operations of critical transportation infrastructure systems. Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) manages Virginia's highway infrastructure through its five high-technology communications hubs called smart traffic centers (STCs). STCs are staffed by transportation engineers, who monitor traffic flow, provide traveler information, and manage incidents. In the event of incidents, STC operators dispatch roadside assistance and post warnings to motorists via variable messaging signs and public radio advisories. Transportation system failures further compound a disaster's devastating economic, physical, and social consequences. A hurricane makes roads inaccessible, resulting in the inability of the general workforce to commute. Since STCs enable workforce mobility, the hurricane's effects are magnified should the STC itself be impacted. The STC's physical structure is vulnerable to high winds and flooding, which may disconnect its power supply, disable communications, or damage essential equipment. A pandemic, on the other hand, can impact the health and availability of STC employees, who require specialized training and experience with intelligent transportation systems. It is critical for the STCs to develop continuity of operations (COOP) plans. Such plans identify and detail specific procedures for maintaining essential functions in the event of a disaster. The Virginia information technology agency (VITA) and Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) require STCs to comply with COOP standards and other security policies. The project team employed risk-based methodologies to assist the STCs in achieving compliance. In particular, this paper discusses four case studies featuring the development and application of: (i) probabilistic risk analysis tools (e.g., data mining, regression analysis, and Monte Carlo simulation using incident databases), (ii) a dynamic recovery analysis model aided by geographic information systems (GIS) to predict the ripple effects of disasters across multiple sectors, and (iii) multi-criteria tradeoff analysis to evaluate the efficacy of risk management solutions. The results and findings from this research will contribute to Virginia's preparedness planning for managing disasters.