Giuseppe Flavio Artese
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Giuseppe Flavio Artese has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mark-Oliver Casper
University of Kassel
2 shared publications - Juan Diego Bogotá
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland
1 shared publication Julian Kiverstein
Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam University Medical Centre, Amsterdam, Netherlands
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 43 (1) , 187-200
The Experience of Affordances in an Intersubjective World
Our paper is concerned with theories of direct perception in ecological psychology that first emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. Ecological psychology continues to be influential among philosophers and cognitive scientists today who defend a 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) approach to the scientific study of cognition. Ecological psychologists have experimentally investigated how animals are able to directly perceive their surrounding environment and what it affords to them. We pursue questions about direct perception through a discussion of the ecological psychologist’s concept of affordances. In recent years, psychologists and philosophers have begun to mark out two explanatory roles for the affordance concept. In one role, affordances are cast as belonging to a shared, publicly available environment, and existing independent of the experience of any perceiving and acting animal. In a second role, affordances are described in phenomenological terms, in relation to an experiencing animal that has its own peculiar needs, interests and personal history. Our aim in this paper is to argue for a single phenomenological or experiential understanding of the affordance concept. We make our argument, first of all, based on William James’ concept of pure experience developed in his later, radical empiricist writings. James thought of pure experience as having a field structure that is organized by the selective interest and needs of the perceiver. We will argue however that James did not emphasize sufficiently the social and intersubjective character of the field of experience. Drawing on the phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch, we will argue that psychological factors like individual needs and attention must be thought of as already confronted with a social reality. On the phenomenological reading of affordances we develop, direct perception of affordances is understood as taking place within an intersubjective world structured by human social and cultural life.
- 20 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 43 (1) , 187-200
Open AccessThe Experience of Affordances in an Intersubjective World
Our paper is concerned with theories of direct perception in ecological psychology that first emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. Ecological psychology continues to be influential among philosophers and cognitive scientists today who defend a 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) approach to the scientific study of cognition. Ecological psychologists have experimentally investigated how animals are able to directly perceive their surrounding environment and what it affords to them. We pursue questions about direct perception through a discussion of the ecological psychologist’s concept of affordances. In recent years, psychologists and philosophers have begun to mark out two explanatory roles for the affordance concept. In one role, affordances are cast as belonging to a shared, publicly available environment, and existing independent of the experience of any perceiving and acting animal. In a second role, affordances are described in phenomenological terms, in relation to an experiencing animal that has its own peculiar needs, interests and personal history. Our aim in this paper is to argue for a single phenomenological or experiential understanding of the affordance concept. We make our argument, first of all, based on William James’ concept of pure experience developed in his later, radical empiricist writings. James thought of pure experience as having a field structure that is organized by the selective interest and needs of the perceiver. We will argue however that James did not emphasize sufficiently the social and intersubjective character of the field of experience. Drawing on the phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch, we will argue that psychological factors like individual needs and attention must be thought of as already confronted with a social reality. On the phenomenological reading of affordances we develop, direct perception of affordances is understood as taking place within an intersubjective world structured by human social and cultural life.
- 27 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 277-305
Affordances, the Social Environment, and the Notion of Field: State of the Debate and Methodological Insights
- 27 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 277-305
Affordances, the Social Environment, and the Notion of Field: State of the Debate and Methodological Insights
- 13 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 27-48
A Methodological Response to the Motley Crew Argument: Explaining Cognitive Phenomena Through Enactivism and Ethology
- 13 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 27-48
A Methodological Response to the Motley Crew Argument: Explaining Cognitive Phenomena Through Enactivism and Ethology
- 28 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 181-190
A Husserlian Approach to Affectivity and Temporality in Affordance Perception
- 28 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 181-190
A Husserlian Approach to Affectivity and Temporality in Affordance Perception
- 14 September 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
- Vol. 53 (2) , 177-192
Gurwitsch’s Field of Consciousness and Radical Embodied Cognitive Science: A Case of Mutual Enlightenment
This article tests the waters concerning a possible integration of Gurwitsch’s theory of consciousness into 4E research. More specifically, it is suggested that radical embodied approaches can benefit from Gurwitsch’s distinction between theme, thematic field and margin in order to methodically grasp how contextual and attentional factors can modulate affordance perception. On the other hand, Gurwitsch’s choice to locate the awareness of embodiment (most of the time) in the domain of the margin can generate important theoretical problems in light of empirical evidence often brought up by situated cognition researchers. Following Gallagher’s suggestion that phenomenology and cognitive science can enlighten each other, I argue that Gurwitsch’s notion of a field of consciousness can be an invaluable tool for research on affordances. Nonetheless, at the same time, the results of embodied cognitive science should lead us to revisit some of his intuitions regarding the role of bodily awareness.
- 14 September 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
- Vol. 53 (2) , 177-192
Gurwitsch’s Field of Consciousness and Radical Embodied Cognitive Science: A Case of Mutual Enlightenment
This article tests the waters concerning a possible integration of Gurwitsch’s theory of consciousness into 4E research. More specifically, it is suggested that radical embodied approaches can benefit from Gurwitsch’s distinction between theme, thematic field and margin in order to methodically grasp how contextual and attentional factors can modulate affordance perception. On the other hand, Gurwitsch’s choice to locate the awareness of embodiment (most of the time) in the domain of the margin can generate important theoretical problems in light of empirical evidence often brought up by situated cognition researchers. Following Gallagher’s suggestion that phenomenology and cognitive science can enlighten each other, I argue that Gurwitsch’s notion of a field of consciousness can be an invaluable tool for research on affordances. Nonetheless, at the same time, the results of embodied cognitive science should lead us to revisit some of his intuitions regarding the role of bodily awareness.