Erik Brockbank
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Erik Brockbank has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Edward Vul
Univ Calif San Diego, San Diego, CA USA
7 shared publications- Tobias Gerstenberg
Department of Psychology, Stanford University
5 shared publications - Judith Ellen Fan
Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA
4 shared publications David Barner
Department of Psychology
3 shared publicationsArnav Verma
2 shared publications- Caren M. Walker
Department of Psychology University of California San Diego
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Asking the right questions? What people learn about strangers in conversation
When meeting somebody for the first time, how do we get to know them? In the current work, we investigate how people learn about others’ personalities through the questions they ask in conversation. Across two studies, participants completed a personality inventory then were paired with an online partner for a ten-minute chat. They were either instructed to get to know their partner in freeform conversation or were provided questions to discuss. The questions were either informative or uninformative for getting to know a stranger. Participants completed the same personality inventory about their partner afterwards. We test whether choosing from informative questions enabled participants to form a more accurate impression of their partner. We find that freeform conversation improved personality predictions overall, but differences in the informativeness of the questions discussed had minimal effects on accuracy; deep questions may only be as good as the disclosures they elicit.
- 13 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessAsking the right questions? What people learn about strangers in conversation
When meeting somebody for the first time, how do we get to know them? In the current work, we investigate how people learn about others’ personalities through the questions they ask in conversation. Across two studies, participants completed a personality inventory then were paired with an online partner for a ten-minute chat. They were either instructed to get to know their partner in freeform conversation or were provided questions to discuss. The questions were either informative or uninformative for getting to know a stranger. Participants completed the same personality inventory about their partner afterwards. We test whether choosing from informative questions enabled participants to form a more accurate impression of their partner. We find that freeform conversation improved personality predictions overall, but differences in the informativeness of the questions discussed had minimal effects on accuracy; deep questions may only be as good as the disclosures they elicit.
- Open Access
- 23 May 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Leave a trace: Recursive reasoning about deceptive behavior
How do people reason about others when planning deceptive actions? How do detectives infer what suspects did based on the traces their actions left behind? In this work, we explore deception in a setting where agents steal other's snacks and try to determine the most likely thief. We propose a computational model that combines inverse planning with recursive theory of mind to select misleading actions and reason over evidence arising from such plans. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate thatsuspects strategically modify their behavior when acting deceptively, aligning with our model's predictions. Experiment 2 reveals that detectives show increased uncertainty when evaluating potentially deceptive suspects—a finding consistent with our model, though alternative explanations exist. Our results suggest that people are adept at deceptive action planning, but struggle to reason about such plans, pointing to possible limits in recursive theory of mind.
- 23 May 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessLeave a trace: Recursive reasoning about deceptive behavior
How do people reason about others when planning deceptive actions? How do detectives infer what suspects did based on the traces their actions left behind? In this work, we explore deception in a setting where agents steal other's snacks and try to determine the most likely thief. We propose a computational model that combines inverse planning with recursive theory of mind to select misleading actions and reason over evidence arising from such plans. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate thatsuspects strategically modify their behavior when acting deceptively, aligning with our model's predictions. Experiment 2 reveals that detectives show increased uncertainty when evaluating potentially deceptive suspects—a finding consistent with our model, though alternative explanations exist. Our results suggest that people are adept at deceptive action planning, but struggle to reason about such plans, pointing to possible limits in recursive theory of mind.
- Open Access
- 12 May 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
How do we get to know someone? Diagnostic questions for inferring personal traits
When first meeting somebody, we’re faced with the challenge of “getting to know them.” Why do some questions seem to enable this better than others? In Experiment 1, participants (N=185) evaluated a large bank of conversational questions. We found that questions varied along a reliable latent dimension of interpersonal depth ranging from “small talk” to “deep” questions. In Experiment 2 (N=188), participants answered a subset of these questions along with a number of self-report personality scales. Using a language model to estimate how informative participants’ free responses were, we find that individualized personality predictions were more accurate when incorporating free responses; furthermore, responses to deeper questions supported more accurate personality inferences than small talk. Taken together, results suggest not only that responses contained the statistical information necessary to make abstract social inferences, but also that people have accurate intuitions about which conversational topics enable learning about and connecting with others.
- 12 May 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessHow do we get to know someone? Diagnostic questions for inferring personal traits
When first meeting somebody, we’re faced with the challenge of “getting to know them.” Why do some questions seem to enable this better than others? In Experiment 1, participants (N=185) evaluated a large bank of conversational questions. We found that questions varied along a reliable latent dimension of interpersonal depth ranging from “small talk” to “deep” questions. In Experiment 2 (N=188), participants answered a subset of these questions along with a number of self-report personality scales. Using a language model to estimate how informative participants’ free responses were, we find that individualized personality predictions were more accurate when incorporating free responses; furthermore, responses to deeper questions supported more accurate personality inferences than small talk. Taken together, results suggest not only that responses contained the statistical information necessary to make abstract social inferences, but also that people have accurate intuitions about which conversational topics enable learning about and connecting with others.
- Open Access
- 24 April 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Evaluating convergence between two data visualization literacy assessments
Data visualizations play a crucial role in communicating patterns in quantitative data, making data visualization literacy a key target of STEM education. However, it is currently unclear to what degree different assessments of data visualization literacy measure the same underlying constructs. Here, we administered two widely used graph comprehension assessments (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2011; Lee, Kim, & Kwon, 2016) to both a university-based convenience sample and a demographically representative sample of adult participants in the United States (N=1,113). Our analysis of individual variability in test performance suggests that overall scores are correlated between assessments and associated with the amount of prior coursework in mathematics. However, further exploration of individual error patterns suggests that these assessments probe somewhat distinct components of data visualization literacy, and we do not find evidence that these components correspond to the categories that guided the design of either test (e.g., questions that require retrieving values rather than making comparisons). Together, these findings suggest opportunities for development of more comprehensive assessments of data visualization literacy that are organized by components that better account for detailed behavioral patterns.
- 24 April 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessEvaluating convergence between two data visualization literacy assessments
Data visualizations play a crucial role in communicating patterns in quantitative data, making data visualization literacy a key target of STEM education. However, it is currently unclear to what degree different assessments of data visualization literacy measure the same underlying constructs. Here, we administered two widely used graph comprehension assessments (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2011; Lee, Kim, & Kwon, 2016) to both a university-based convenience sample and a demographically representative sample of adult participants in the United States (N=1,113). Our analysis of individual variability in test performance suggests that overall scores are correlated between assessments and associated with the amount of prior coursework in mathematics. However, further exploration of individual error patterns suggests that these assessments probe somewhat distinct components of data visualization literacy, and we do not find evidence that these components correspond to the categories that guided the design of either test (e.g., questions that require retrieving values rather than making comparisons). Together, these findings suggest opportunities for development of more comprehensive assessments of data visualization literacy that are organized by components that better account for detailed behavioral patterns.
- Open Access
- 5 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications
- Vol. 10 (1) , 15
Evaluating convergence between two data visualization literacy assessments
Data visualizations play a crucial role in communicating patterns in quantitative data, making data visualization literacy a key target of STEM education. However, it is currently unclear to what degree different assessments of data visualization literacy measure the same underlying constructs. Here, we administered two widely used graph comprehension assessments (Galesic and Garcia-Retamero in Med Dec Mak 31:444–457, 2011; Lee et al. in IEEE Trans Vis Comput Graph 235:51–560, 2016) to both a university-based convenience sample and a demographically representative sample of adult participants in the USA (N=1,113). Our analysis of individual variability in test performance suggests that overall scores are correlated between assessments and associated with the amount of prior coursework in mathematics. However, further exploration of individual error patterns suggests that these assessments probe somewhat distinct components of data visualization literacy, and we do not find evidence that these components correspond to the categories that guided the design of either test (e.g., questions that require retrieving values rather than making comparisons). Together, these findings suggest opportunities for development of more comprehensive assessments of data visualization literacy that are organized by components that better account for detailed behavioral patterns.
- 5 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications
- Vol. 10 (1) , 15
Open AccessEvaluating convergence between two data visualization literacy assessments
Data visualizations play a crucial role in communicating patterns in quantitative data, making data visualization literacy a key target of STEM education. However, it is currently unclear to what degree different assessments of data visualization literacy measure the same underlying constructs. Here, we administered two widely used graph comprehension assessments (Galesic and Garcia-Retamero in Med Dec Mak 31:444–457, 2011; Lee et al. in IEEE Trans Vis Comput Graph 235:51–560, 2016) to both a university-based convenience sample and a demographically representative sample of adult participants in the USA (N=1,113). Our analysis of individual variability in test performance suggests that overall scores are correlated between assessments and associated with the amount of prior coursework in mathematics. However, further exploration of individual error patterns suggests that these assessments probe somewhat distinct components of data visualization literacy, and we do not find evidence that these components correspond to the categories that guided the design of either test (e.g., questions that require retrieving values rather than making comparisons). Together, these findings suggest opportunities for development of more comprehensive assessments of data visualization literacy that are organized by components that better account for detailed behavioral patterns.
- Open Access
- 11 June 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Without his cookies, he’s just a monster: A counterfactual simulation model of social explanation
Everyday reasoning about others involves accounting for why they act the way they do. With many explanations for someone’s behavior, how do observers choose the best one? A large body of work in social psychology suggests that people’s explanations rely heavily on traits rather than external factors. Recent results have called this into question, arguing that people balance traits, mental states, and situation to make sense of others’ actions. How might they achieve this? In the current work, we hypothesize that people rely on counterfactual simulation to weigh different explanations for others’ behavior. We propose a computational model of this process that makes concrete predictions about when people will prefer to explain events based on the actor’s traits or their situation. We test the predictions of this model in an experimental paradigm in which trait and situation each guide behavior to varying degrees. Our model predicts people’s causal judgments well overall but is less accurate for trait explanations than situational explanations. In a comparison with simpler causal heuristics, a majority of participants were better predicted by the counterfactual model. These results point the way toward a more comprehensive understanding of how social reasoning is performed within the context of domain-general causal inference.
- 11 June 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessWithout his cookies, he’s just a monster: A counterfactual simulation model of social explanation
Everyday reasoning about others involves accounting for why they act the way they do. With many explanations for someone’s behavior, how do observers choose the best one? A large body of work in social psychology suggests that people’s explanations rely heavily on traits rather than external factors. Recent results have called this into question, arguing that people balance traits, mental states, and situation to make sense of others’ actions. How might they achieve this? In the current work, we hypothesize that people rely on counterfactual simulation to weigh different explanations for others’ behavior. We propose a computational model of this process that makes concrete predictions about when people will prefer to explain events based on the actor’s traits or their situation. We test the predictions of this model in an experimental paradigm in which trait and situation each guide behavior to varying degrees. Our model predicts people’s causal judgments well overall but is less accurate for trait explanations than situational explanations. In a comparison with simpler causal heuristics, a majority of participants were better predicted by the counterfactual model. These results point the way toward a more comprehensive understanding of how social reasoning is performed within the context of domain-general causal inference.
- Open Access
- 28 May 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Whodunnit? Inferring what happened from multimodal evidence
Humans are remarkably adept at inferring the causes of events in their environment; doing so often requires incorporating information from multiple sensory modalities. For instance, if a car slows down in front of us, inferences about why they did so are rapidly revised if we also hear sirens in the distance. Here, we investigate the ability to reconstruct others' actions and events from the past by integrating multimodal information. Participants were asked to infer which of two agents performed an action in a household setting given either visual evidence, auditory evidence, or both. We develop a computational model that makes inferences by generating multimodal simulations, and also evaluate our task on a large language model (GPT-4) and a large multimodal model (GPT-4V). We find that humans are relatively accurate overall and perform best when given multimodal evidence. GPT-4 and GPT-4V performance comes close overall, but is very weakly correlated with participants across individual trials. Meanwhile, the simulation model captures the pattern of human responses well. Multimodal event reconstruction represents a challenge for current AI systems, and frameworks that draw on the cognitive processes underlying people's ability to reconstruct events offer a promising avenue forward.
- 28 May 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessWhodunnit? Inferring what happened from multimodal evidence
Humans are remarkably adept at inferring the causes of events in their environment; doing so often requires incorporating information from multiple sensory modalities. For instance, if a car slows down in front of us, inferences about why they did so are rapidly revised if we also hear sirens in the distance. Here, we investigate the ability to reconstruct others' actions and events from the past by integrating multimodal information. Participants were asked to infer which of two agents performed an action in a household setting given either visual evidence, auditory evidence, or both. We develop a computational model that makes inferences by generating multimodal simulations, and also evaluate our task on a large language model (GPT-4) and a large multimodal model (GPT-4V). We find that humans are relatively accurate overall and perform best when given multimodal evidence. GPT-4 and GPT-4V performance comes close overall, but is very weakly correlated with participants across individual trials. Meanwhile, the simulation model captures the pattern of human responses well. Multimodal event reconstruction represents a challenge for current AI systems, and frameworks that draw on the cognitive processes underlying people's ability to reconstruct events offer a promising avenue forward.
- 23 April 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 151
Repeated rock, paper, scissors play reveals limits in adaptive sequential behavior
- 23 April 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 151
Repeated rock, paper, scissors play reveals limits in adaptive sequential behavior
- 1 September 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 151 (9) , 2092-2114
Ongoing dynamic calibration produces unstable number estimates.
Whether estimating the size of a crowd or rating a restaurant on a five-star scale, humans frequently navigate between subjective sensory experiences and shared formal systems. Here we ask how people manage this in the case of estimating number. We present participants with arrays of dots and ask them to report how many dots there are. Our results produce two novel findings. First, people's estimates are best fit by a bilinear function in log space, rather than the traditional power law described in previous literature. Second, we find that people's estimates do not have a stable coefficient of variation at higher magnitudes, and that the likely cause of this is a "drift" in people's estimate calibration over many trials which has not previously been identified. Building on these results, we present a model of the mapping function from subjective numerosity to symbolic number that relies primarily on a constrained set of previous estimates and familiar numerosities, rather than the robust internal scale used in existing models. Our model is able to generate an accurate mapping with limited data and reproduce notable aspects of estimation seen in our experimental results. This suggests that human number estimation, and perhaps other domains in which we must navigate between subjective representations and formal systems, is governed by a relatively simple decision process that primarily seeks to maintain consistency with previous estimates. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 September 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 151 (9) , 2092-2114
Ongoing dynamic calibration produces unstable number estimates.
Whether estimating the size of a crowd or rating a restaurant on a five-star scale, humans frequently navigate between subjective sensory experiences and shared formal systems. Here we ask how people manage this in the case of estimating number. We present participants with arrays of dots and ask them to report how many dots there are. Our results produce two novel findings. First, people's estimates are best fit by a bilinear function in log space, rather than the traditional power law described in previous literature. Second, we find that people's estimates do not have a stable coefficient of variation at higher magnitudes, and that the likely cause of this is a "drift" in people's estimate calibration over many trials which has not previously been identified. Building on these results, we present a model of the mapping function from subjective numerosity to symbolic number that relies primarily on a constrained set of previous estimates and familiar numerosities, rather than the robust internal scale used in existing models. Our model is able to generate an accurate mapping with limited data and reproduce notable aspects of estimation seen in our experimental results. This suggests that human number estimation, and perhaps other domains in which we must navigate between subjective representations and formal systems, is governed by a relatively simple decision process that primarily seeks to maintain consistency with previous estimates. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 25 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Developmental Science
- Vol. 26 (1) , e13274
Ask me why, don't tell me why: Asking children for explanations facilitates relational thinking
Identifying abstract relations is essential for commonsense reasoning. Research suggests that even young children can infer relations such as “same” and “different,” but often fail to apply these concepts. Might the process of explaining facilitate the recognition and application of relational concepts? Based on prior work suggesting that explanation can be a powerful tool to promote abstract reasoning, we predicted that children would be more likely to discover and use an abstract relational rule when they were prompted to explain observations instantiating that rule, compared to when they received demonstration alone. Five‐ and 6‐year‐olds were given a modified Relational Match to Sample (RMTS) task, with repeated demonstrations of relational (same) matches by an adult. Half of the children were prompted to explain these matches; the other half reported the match they observed. Children who were prompted to explain showed immediate, stable success, while those only asked to report the outcome of the pedagogical demonstration did not. Findings provide evidence that explanation facilitates early abstraction over and above demonstration alone.
- 25 May 2022
- Published by Wiley in Developmental Science
- Vol. 26 (1) , e13274
Ask me why, don't tell me why: Asking children for explanations facilitates relational thinking
Identifying abstract relations is essential for commonsense reasoning. Research suggests that even young children can infer relations such as “same” and “different,” but often fail to apply these concepts. Might the process of explaining facilitate the recognition and application of relational concepts? Based on prior work suggesting that explanation can be a powerful tool to promote abstract reasoning, we predicted that children would be more likely to discover and use an abstract relational rule when they were prompted to explain observations instantiating that rule, compared to when they received demonstration alone. Five‐ and 6‐year‐olds were given a modified Relational Match to Sample (RMTS) task, with repeated demonstrations of relational (same) matches by an adult. Half of the children were prompted to explain these matches; the other half reported the match they observed. Children who were prompted to explain showed immediate, stable success, while those only asked to report the outcome of the pedagogical demonstration did not. Findings provide evidence that explanation facilitates early abstraction over and above demonstration alone.