Ronald Sverdlove
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Ronald Sverdlove has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- S. Abraham Ravid
Yeshiva University
2 shared publications - Arturo Bris
IMD World Competitiveness Center, Institute for Management Development—IMD, Lausanne, Switzerland
1 shared publication - Gabriela Coiculescu
Yeshiva University, Sy Syms School of Business, New York, NY 10033, and New York University
1 shared publication - William N. Goetzmann
Is the Edwin J. Beinecke Professor of finance and management studies and faculty director of the International Center for Finance at the Yale School of Management
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 April 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 50 (6) , 1353-1388
Conflicts in Bankruptcy and the Sequence of Debt Issues
This paper investigates the optimal sequencing of debt issues. Our theoretical model suggests that once firms issue debt with one level of seniority, they may have an incentive to alternate seniorities, because of violations of the priced absolute priority rule (APR). When we introduce explicit costs of class conflict, the model yields cases of alternating seniorities and other cases in which firms issue only one class of debt. The implications of the model are consistent with the observed regularities in a large database of debt issues. We test several other implications of our model as well.
- 1 April 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 50 (6) , 1353-1388
Conflicts in Bankruptcy and the Sequence of Debt Issues
This paper investigates the optimal sequencing of debt issues. Our theoretical model suggests that once firms issue debt with one level of seniority, they may have an incentive to alternate seniorities, because of violations of the priced absolute priority rule (APR). When we introduce explicit costs of class conflict, the model yields cases of alternating seniorities and other cases in which firms issue only one class of debt. The implications of the model are consistent with the observed regularities in a large database of debt issues. We test several other implications of our model as well.
- 12 September 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cultural Economics
- Vol. 37 (2) , 271-307
The pricing of soft and hard information: economic lessons from screenplay sales
- 12 September 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cultural Economics
- Vol. 37 (2) , 271-307
The pricing of soft and hard information: economic lessons from screenplay sales