Jonathan P. Lang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jonathan P. Lang has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Giulio Tononi
Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI
3 shared publications - Larissa Albantakis
Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, USA
3 shared publications Jeremiah Hendren
Affiliations Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America, Graduate School Language & Literature, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Munich, Germany
2 shared publications- Matteo Grasso
Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, USA
2 shared publications Melanie Boly
Affiliations Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America, Department of Neurology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
2 shared publicationsAlireza Zaeemzadeh
Affiliation Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 17 October 2023
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Computational Biology
- Vol. 19 (10) , e1011465
Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms
This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0. IIT aims to account for the properties of experience in physical (operational) terms. It identifies the essential properties of experience (axioms), infers the necessary and sufficient properties that its substrate must satisfy (postulates), and expresses them in mathematical terms. In principle, the postulates can be applied to any system of units in a state to determine whether it is conscious, to what degree, and in what way. IIT offers a parsimonious explanation of empirical evidence, makes testable predictions concerning both the presence and the quality of experience, and permits inferences and extrapolations. IIT 4.0 incorporates several developments of the past ten years, including a more accurate formulation of the axioms as postulates and mathematical expressions, the introduction of a unique measure of intrinsic information that is consistent with the postulates, and an explicit assessment of causal relations. By fully unfolding a system’s irreducible cause–effect power, the distinctions and relations specified by a substrate can account for the quality of experience.
- 17 October 2023
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Computational Biology
- Vol. 19 (10) , e1011465
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessIntegrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms
This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0. IIT aims to account for the properties of experience in physical (operational) terms. It identifies the essential properties of experience (axioms), infers the necessary and sufficient properties that its substrate must satisfy (postulates), and expresses them in mathematical terms. In principle, the postulates can be applied to any system of units in a state to determine whether it is conscious, to what degree, and in what way. IIT offers a parsimonious explanation of empirical evidence, makes testable predictions concerning both the presence and the quality of experience, and permits inferences and extrapolations. IIT 4.0 incorporates several developments of the past ten years, including a more accurate formulation of the axioms as postulates and mathematical expressions, the introduction of a unique measure of intrinsic information that is consistent with the postulates, and an explicit assessment of causal relations. By fully unfolding a system’s irreducible cause–effect power, the distinctions and relations specified by a substrate can account for the quality of experience.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 15 October 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Vol. 2021 (2) , niab032
Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity
Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically—its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.
- 15 October 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Vol. 2021 (2) , niab032
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessConsciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity
Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically—its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.
- 23 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Neuroscience
- Vol. 24 (10) , 1348-1355
Causal reductionism and causal structures
Causal reductionism is the widespread assumption that there is no room for additional causes once we have accounted for all elementary mechanisms within a system. Due to its intuitive appeal, causal reductionism is prevalent in neuroscience: once all neurons have been caused to fire or not to fire, it seems that causally there is nothing left to be accounted for. Here, we argue that these reductionist intuitions are based on an implicit, unexamined notion of causation that conflates causation with prediction. By means of a simple model organism, we demonstrate that causal reductionism cannot provide a complete and coherent account of ‘what caused what’. To that end, we outline an explicit, operational approach to analyzing causal structures.
- 23 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Neuroscience
- Vol. 24 (10) , 1348-1355
Causal reductionism and causal structures
Causal reductionism is the widespread assumption that there is no room for additional causes once we have accounted for all elementary mechanisms within a system. Due to its intuitive appeal, causal reductionism is prevalent in neuroscience: once all neurons have been caused to fire or not to fire, it seems that causally there is nothing left to be accounted for. Here, we argue that these reductionist intuitions are based on an implicit, unexamined notion of causation that conflates causation with prediction. By means of a simple model organism, we demonstrate that causal reductionism cannot provide a complete and coherent account of ‘what caused what’. To that end, we outline an explicit, operational approach to analyzing causal structures.