Kritika Maheshwari
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Kritika Maheshwari has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Christoph Jedan
Ethics and Comparative Philosophy of Religion, Department of Christianity and the History of Ideas, Faculty of Religion, Culture and Society, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
1 shared publicationEls Maeckelberghe
Bioethics and Research Ethics, Faculty of Medical Sciences, University Medical Center Groningen, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
1 shared publication- Giada Pistilli
Sorbonne Université, Paris, France
1 shared publication Imke Christiaans
Department of Genetics, University Medical Center Groningen, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
1 shared publicationMariëlle van Gijn
Department of Genetics, University Medical Center Groningen, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
1 shared publicationMirjam Plantinga
Department of Genetics and Data Science Center in Health, University Medical Center Groningen, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 38 (4) , 349
Theron Pummer, The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism (Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. 264 – CORRIGENDUM
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 38 (4) , 349
Open AccessTheron Pummer, The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism (Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. 264 – CORRIGENDUM
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 38 (4) , 345-348
Theron Pummer, The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism (Oxford University Press, 2025), pp. 264
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 38 (4) , 345-348
Theron Pummer, The Rules of Rescue: Cost, Distance, and Effective Altruism (Oxford University Press, 2025), pp. 264
- Open Access
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
- Vol. 7, 1243-1254
Introducing ELLIPS: An Ethics-Centered Approach to Research on LLM-Based Inference of Psychiatric Conditions
As mental health care systems worldwide struggle to meet demand, there is increasing focus on using language models (LM) to infer neuropsychiatric conditions or psychopathological traits from language production. Yet, so far, this research has only delivered solutions with limited clinical applicability, due to insufficient consideration of ethical questions crucial to ensuring the synergy between possible applications and model design. To accelerate progress towards clinically applicable models, our paper charts the ethical landscape of research on language-based inference of psychopathology and provides a practical tool for researchers to navigate it. We identify seven core ethical principles that should guide model development and deployment in this domain, translate them into ELLIPS, an ethical toolkit operationalizing these principles into questions that can guide researchers' choices with respect to data selection, architectures, evaluation, and model deployment, and provide a case study exemplifying its use. With this, we aim to facilitate the emergence of model technology with concrete potential for real-world applicability.
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
- Vol. 7, 1243-1254
Open AccessIntroducing ELLIPS: An Ethics-Centered Approach to Research on LLM-Based Inference of Psychiatric Conditions
As mental health care systems worldwide struggle to meet demand, there is increasing focus on using language models (LM) to infer neuropsychiatric conditions or psychopathological traits from language production. Yet, so far, this research has only delivered solutions with limited clinical applicability, due to insufficient consideration of ethical questions crucial to ensuring the synergy between possible applications and model design. To accelerate progress towards clinically applicable models, our paper charts the ethical landscape of research on language-based inference of psychopathology and provides a practical tool for researchers to navigate it. We identify seven core ethical principles that should guide model development and deployment in this domain, translate them into ELLIPS, an ethical toolkit operationalizing these principles into questions that can guide researchers' choices with respect to data selection, architectures, evaluation, and model deployment, and provide a case study exemplifying its use. With this, we aim to facilitate the emergence of model technology with concrete potential for real-world applicability.
- Open Access
- 29 April 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
- Vol. 34 (1) , 121-135
AI-Inclusivity in Healthcare: Motivating an Institutional Epistemic Trust Perspective
This paper motivates institutional epistemic trust as an important ethical consideration informing the responsible development and implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies (or AI-inclusivity) in healthcare. Drawing on recent literature on epistemic trust and public trust in science, we start by examining the conditions under which we can have institutional epistemic trust in AI-inclusive healthcare systems and their members as providers of medical information and advice. In particular, we discuss that institutional epistemic trust in AI-inclusive healthcare depends, in part, on the reliability of AI-inclusive medical practices and programs, its knowledge and understanding among different stakeholders involved, its effect on epistemic and communicative duties and burdens on medical professionals and, finally, its interaction and alignment with the public’s ethical values and interests as well as background sociopolitical conditions against which AI-inclusive healthcare systems are embedded. To assess the applicability of these conditions, we explore a recent proposal for AI-inclusivity within the Dutch Newborn Screening Program. In doing so, we illustrate the importance, scope, and potential challenges of fostering and maintaining institutional epistemic trust in a context where generating, assessing, and providing reliable and timely screening results for genetic risk is of high priority. Finally, to motivate the general relevance of our discussion and case study, we end with suggestions for strategies, interventions, and measures for AI-inclusivity in healthcare more widely.
- 29 April 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
- Vol. 34 (1) , 121-135
Open AccessAI-Inclusivity in Healthcare: Motivating an Institutional Epistemic Trust Perspective
This paper motivates institutional epistemic trust as an important ethical consideration informing the responsible development and implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies (or AI-inclusivity) in healthcare. Drawing on recent literature on epistemic trust and public trust in science, we start by examining the conditions under which we can have institutional epistemic trust in AI-inclusive healthcare systems and their members as providers of medical information and advice. In particular, we discuss that institutional epistemic trust in AI-inclusive healthcare depends, in part, on the reliability of AI-inclusive medical practices and programs, its knowledge and understanding among different stakeholders involved, its effect on epistemic and communicative duties and burdens on medical professionals and, finally, its interaction and alignment with the public’s ethical values and interests as well as background sociopolitical conditions against which AI-inclusive healthcare systems are embedded. To assess the applicability of these conditions, we explore a recent proposal for AI-inclusivity within the Dutch Newborn Screening Program. In doing so, we illustrate the importance, scope, and potential challenges of fostering and maintaining institutional epistemic trust in a context where generating, assessing, and providing reliable and timely screening results for genetic risk is of high priority. Finally, to motivate the general relevance of our discussion and case study, we end with suggestions for strategies, interventions, and measures for AI-inclusivity in healthcare more widely.
- Open Access
- 24 January 2023
- Published by University of Groningen Press
Essays on the Morality of Risk Impositions
Maheshwari, K. (2023). Essays on the Morality of Risk Impositions. [Thesis fully internal (DIV),
- 24 January 2023
- Published by University of Groningen Press
Open AccessEssays on the Morality of Risk Impositions
Maheshwari, K. (2023). Essays on the Morality of Risk Impositions. [Thesis fully internal (DIV),
- Open Access
- 14 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 147-162
Offsetting Present Risks, Preempting Future Harms, and the Ethics of a ‘New Normal’
The ongoing pandemic has led some people to speak about a ‘new normal’, since we have temporarily had to radically change how we live our lives to protect ourselves and others from the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. That expression – ‘a new normal’ – has been also be used in other contexts, such as in relation to societal disruptions brought about by things like new technologies or climate change. What this general idea of a ‘new normal’ means is unclear and hard to characterise, and there are diverging views about how to respond to a new normal, but one feature of a desirable new normal that most people would agree on is that it should be ‘safer’: safer technologies, safer institutions, and so on. But it is also important to consider what other ethical considerations and principles should be part of an ethics of a new normal. And it is also interesting to explore similarities and differences among different types of cases that can be classified as situations where we face a new normal. In this chapter, we will discuss the general idea of an ethics of a new normal, and consider what ethical distinctions, values, and principles are likely to be relevant in most instances where we face a new normal, including ethical considerations related to risk mitigation and ways of offsetting potential harms.
- 14 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 147-162
Open AccessOffsetting Present Risks, Preempting Future Harms, and the Ethics of a ‘New Normal’
The ongoing pandemic has led some people to speak about a ‘new normal’, since we have temporarily had to radically change how we live our lives to protect ourselves and others from the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. That expression – ‘a new normal’ – has been also be used in other contexts, such as in relation to societal disruptions brought about by things like new technologies or climate change. What this general idea of a ‘new normal’ means is unclear and hard to characterise, and there are diverging views about how to respond to a new normal, but one feature of a desirable new normal that most people would agree on is that it should be ‘safer’: safer technologies, safer institutions, and so on. But it is also important to consider what other ethical considerations and principles should be part of an ethics of a new normal. And it is also interesting to explore similarities and differences among different types of cases that can be classified as situations where we face a new normal. In this chapter, we will discuss the general idea of an ethics of a new normal, and consider what ethical distinctions, values, and principles are likely to be relevant in most instances where we face a new normal, including ethical considerations related to risk mitigation and ways of offsetting potential harms.
- 2 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ethics, Policy & Environment
- Vol. 25 (3) , 249-252
Why I Should Still Offset Rather Than Do More Good
Stefansson (forthcoming) argues that by emitting and offsetting, we fail to fulfil our justice-based duty to avoid harm owed to specific individuals. In this paper, I explore a case where offsetting fails to prevent some but not all risks of harms that our emissions impose on them. By drawing on a distinction between general and specific duties not to (risk) harm, I argue that if by emitting and offsetting, we satisfy some (if not all) of our specific duties we owe others, then this gives us stronger moral reasons to offset than give to charities that do good more effectively.
- 2 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ethics, Policy & Environment
- Vol. 25 (3) , 249-252
Why I Should Still Offset Rather Than Do More Good
Stefansson (forthcoming) argues that by emitting and offsetting, we fail to fulfil our justice-based duty to avoid harm owed to specific individuals. In this paper, I explore a case where offsetting fails to prevent some but not all risks of harms that our emissions impose on them. By drawing on a distinction between general and specific duties not to (risk) harm, I argue that if by emitting and offsetting, we satisfy some (if not all) of our specific duties we owe others, then this gives us stronger moral reasons to offset than give to charities that do good more effectively.
- 26 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 29-51
Responding to Covid-19 in India: Reducing Risk or Increasing Domination?
- 26 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 29-51
Responding to Covid-19 in India: Reducing Risk or Increasing Domination?
- Open Access
- 24 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 24 (4) , 965-980
On the Harm of Imposing Risk of Harm
What is wrong with imposing pure risks, that is, risks that don’t materialize into harm? According to a popular response, imposing pure risks is pro tanto wrong, when and because risk itself is harmful. Call this the Harm View. Defenders of this view make one of the following two claims. On the Constitutive Claim, pure risk imposition is pro tanto wrong when and because risk constitutes diminishing one’s well-being viz. preference-frustration or setting-back their legitimate interest in autonomy. On the Contingent Claim, pure risk imposition is pro tanto wrong when and because risk has harmful consequences for the risk-bearers, such as psychological distress. This paper argues that the Harm View is plausible only on the Contingent Claim, but fails on the Constitutive Claim. In discussing the latter, I argue that both the preference and autonomy account fail to show that risk itself is constitutively harmful and thereby wrong. In discussing the former, I argue that risk itself is contingently harmful and thereby wrong but only in a narrow range of cases. I conclude that while the Harm View can sometimes explain the wrong of imposing risk when (and because) risk itself is contingently harmful, it is unsuccessful as a general, exhaustive account of what makes pure imposition wrong.
- 24 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 24 (4) , 965-980
Open AccessOn the Harm of Imposing Risk of Harm
What is wrong with imposing pure risks, that is, risks that don’t materialize into harm? According to a popular response, imposing pure risks is pro tanto wrong, when and because risk itself is harmful. Call this the Harm View. Defenders of this view make one of the following two claims. On the Constitutive Claim, pure risk imposition is pro tanto wrong when and because risk constitutes diminishing one’s well-being viz. preference-frustration or setting-back their legitimate interest in autonomy. On the Contingent Claim, pure risk imposition is pro tanto wrong when and because risk has harmful consequences for the risk-bearers, such as psychological distress. This paper argues that the Harm View is plausible only on the Contingent Claim, but fails on the Constitutive Claim. In discussing the latter, I argue that both the preference and autonomy account fail to show that risk itself is constitutively harmful and thereby wrong. In discussing the former, I argue that risk itself is contingently harmful and thereby wrong but only in a narrow range of cases. I conclude that while the Harm View can sometimes explain the wrong of imposing risk when (and because) risk itself is contingently harmful, it is unsuccessful as a general, exhaustive account of what makes pure imposition wrong.