MSMohammadreza Satouri

Mohammadreza Satouri

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Mohammadreza Satouri has a total of 30 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Persister cells and their effects on cancer stabilization therapy

    by Mohammadreza Satouri, Philipp M. Altrock, Jafar Rezaei, KateřIna Staňková

    Some cancers have the ability to persist under treatment. Persister cancer cells can be a small subpopulation of cancer cells that enter a dormant or quiescent state, thereby evading the effects of chemotherapy, targeted therapy, or immunotherapy. Motivated by these observations, we develop and investigate an evolutionary game theory model that captures the interactions between three types of cancer cells: treatment-sensitive, drug-tolerant persister, and treatment-resistant cells. In our model, persister cells transition into resistant cells at a rate that can depend on the treatment intensity. We analyze the model’s equilibria and derive conditions for their existence and stability. In particular, we show that an equilibrium in which sensitive and resistant cells coexist is stable when intra-type competition is stronger than inter-type competition. We also show that equilibria in which only one cell type persists require the transition rate to exceed an explicit threshold determined by the treatment dose and competition parameters. Our findings reveal that persister cells can both stabilize and destabilize tumor dynamics, depending on treatment and cell type-transition rates, highlighting the importance of accounting for persister behavior in designing effective evolutionary therapies.

  • Open Access

    Initial tumor composition shapes resistance evolution and treatment outcomes in non-small cell lung cancer

    by Mohammadreza Satouri, Joel S. Brown, Jafar Rezaei, Katerina Stankova, Rachel Cavill

    Drug resistance is a leading cause of treatment failure in non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC), yet how resistance evolves during treatment and whether its fitness consequences depend on tumor composition remains poorly understood. Using a game-theoretic mathematical model fitted to longitudinal in-vitro data from alectinib-sensitive and alectinib-resistant H3122 NSCLC cells grown under different treatment and microenvironmental conditions, we found that the fitness effect of evolving resistance depended critically on the initial proportion of resistant cells in the tumor. When resistant cells were initially rare, resistance evolved faster and increasing resistance was associated with a growth advantage. When resistant cells were initially frequent, increasing resistance was associated with a fitness cost. In both cases, increasing resistance eroded treatment efficacy. In the gain-of-resistance regime, stabilization therapy could maintain a stable tumor equilibrium only if resistant cells were excluded. Maximum tolerated dosing was not always optimal for maximizing time to progression; intermediate doses performed better when they kept the initial tumor growth rate close to zero. These results suggest that evolutionary therapy for NSCLC should account not only for the abundance of resistant cells, but also for how resistance is evolving and what fitness consequences it currently carries in individual patients.

  • Open Access

    Stability of the Darwinian Dynamics: Effect of Intraspecific Competition and Human Intervention

    by Mohammadreza Satouri, Jafar Rezaei, Kateřina Staňková

    We analyze the stability of a game-theoretic model of a polymorphic eco-evolutionary system in the presence of human intervention. The goal is to understand how the intensity of this human intervention and competition within the system impact its stability, with cancer treatment as a case study. In this case study, the physician applies anti-cancer treatment, while cancer, consisting of treatment-sensitive and treatment-resistant cancer cells, responds by evolving more or less treatment-induced resistance, according to Darwinian evolution. We analyze how the existence and stability of the cancer eco-evolutionary equilibria depend on the treatment dose and rate of competition between cancer cells of the two different types. We also identify initial conditions for which the resistance grows unbounded. In addition, we adopt the level-set method to find viscosity solutions of the corresponding Hamilton–Jacobi equation to estimate the basins of attraction of the found eco-evolutionary equilibria and simulate typical eco-evolutionary dynamics of cancer within and outside these estimated basins. While we illustrate our results on the cancer treatment case study, they can be generalized to any situation where a human aims at containing, eradicating, or saving Darwinian systems, such as in managing antimicrobial resistance, fisheries management, and pest management. The obtained results help our understanding of the impact of human interventions and intraspecific competition on the possibility of containing, eradicating, or saving evolving species. This will help us with our ability to control such systems.


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Public Goods Games in Disease Evolution and Spread

    by Christo Morison, Małgorzata Fic, Thomas Marcou, Javad Mohamadichamgavi, Javier Redondo Antón, Golsa Sayyar, Alexander Stein, Frank Bastian, Hana Krakovská, Nandakishor Krishnan, et al.

    Cooperation arises in nature at every scale, from within cells to entire ecosystems. Public goods games (PGGs) are used to represent scenarios characterised by the conflict/dilemma between choosing cooperation as a socially optimal strategy and defection as an individually optimal strategy. Evolutionary game theory is often used to analyse the dynamics of behaviour emergence in this context. Here, we focus on PGGs arising in the disease modelling of cancer evolution and the spread of infectious diseases. We use these two systems as case studies for the development of the theory and applications of PGGs, which we succinctly review. We also posit that applications of evolutionary game theory to decision-making in cancer, such as interactions between a clinician and a tumour, can learn from the PGGs studied in epidemiology, where cooperative behaviours such as quarantine and vaccination compliance have been more thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, instances of cellular-level cooperation observed in cancers point to a corresponding area of potential interest for modellers of other diseases, be they viral, bacterial or otherwise. We aim to demonstrate the breadth of applicability of PGGs in disease modelling while providing a starting point for those interested in quantifying cooperation arising in healthcare.


  • Open Access

    Stackelberg Evolutionary Games of Cancer Treatment: What Treatment Strategy to Choose if Cancer Can be Stabilized?

    by Monica Salvioli, Hasti Garjani, Mohammadreza Satouri, Mark Broom, Yannick Viossat, Joel S. Brown, Johan Dubbeldam, Kateřina Staňková

    We present a game-theoretic model of a polymorphic cancer cell population where the treatment-induced resistance is a quantitative evolving trait. When stabilization of the tumor burden is possible, we expand the model into a Stackelberg evolutionary game, where the physician is the leader and the cancer cells are followers. The physician chooses a treatment dose to maximize an objective function that is a proxy of the patient’s quality of life. In response, the cancer cells evolve a resistance level that maximizes their proliferation and survival. Assuming that cancer is in its ecological equilibrium, we compare the outcomes of three different treatment strategies: giving the maximum tolerable dose throughout, corresponding to the standard of care for most metastatic cancers, an ecologically enlightened therapy, where the physician anticipates the short-run, ecological response of cancer cells to their treatment, but not the evolution of resistance to treatment, and an evolutionarily enlightened therapy, where the physician anticipates both ecological and evolutionary consequences of the treatment. Of the three therapeutic strategies, the evolutionarily enlightened therapy leads to the highest values of the objective function, the lowest treatment dose, and the lowest treatment-induced resistance. Conversely, in our model, the maximum tolerable dose leads to the worst values of the objective function, the highest treatment dose, and the highest treatment-induced resistance.


  • Open Access

    Public Goods Games in Disease Evolution and Spread

    by Christo Morison, Małgorzata Fic, Thomas Marcou, Javad Mohamadichamgavi, Javier Redondo Antón, Golsa Sayyar, Alexander Stein, Frank Bastian, Hana Krakovská, Nandakishor Krishnan, et al.

    Cooperation arises in nature at every scale, from within cells to entire ecosystems. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, public goods games (PGGs) are used to analyse scenarios where individuals can cooperate or defect, and can predict when and how these behaviours emerge. However, too few examples motivate the transferal of knowledge from one application of PGGs to another. Here, we focus on PGGs arising in disease modelling of cancer evolution and the spread of infectious diseases. We use these two systems as case studies for the development of the theory and applications of PGGs, which we succinctly review and compare. We also posit that applications of evolutionary game theory to decision-making in cancer, such as interactions between a clinician and a tumour, can learn from the PGGs studied in epidemiology, where cooperative behaviours such as quarantine and vaccination compliance have been more thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, instances of cellular-level cooperation observed in cancers point to a corresponding area of potential interest for modellers of other diseases, be they viral, bacterial or otherwise. We aim to demonstrate the breadth of applicability of PGGs in disease modelling while providing a starting point for those interested in quantifying cooperation arising in healthcare.

  • Trajectory tracking of an autonomous vehicle using immersion and invariance control

    by Mohammad Reza Satouri, Arash Marashian, Abolhassan Razminia


  • Open Access

    On stability of the Darwinian dynamics

    by Mohammadreza Satouri, Jafar Rezaei, Kateřina Staňková

    Here we analyze Darwinian dynamics of cancer introduced in [1], extended by including a competition matrix, and evaluate (i) when the eco-evolutionary equilibrium is positive and (ii) when the eco-evolutionary equilibrium is asymptotically stable.