Mohammadreza Satouri
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mohammadreza Satouri has a total of 30 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kateřina Staňková
Institute for Health Systems Science, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands
3 shared publications - Alexander Stein
Centre for Cancer Evolution, Barts Cancer Institute, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK
2 shared publications - Christo Morison
School of Mathematical Sciences, Queen Mary University of London
2 shared publications - Diogo L. Pires
Copenhagen Center for Social Data Science (SODAS), University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
2 shared publications - Frank Bastian
School of Mathematical Sciences, University College Cork, Western Road, Cork T12 XF62, Ireland
2 shared publications - Frederik Jasper Thomsen
Institute of Applied Mathematics, Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Persister cells and their effects on cancer stabilization therapy
Some cancers have the ability to persist under treatment. Persister cancer cells can be a small subpopulation of cancer cells that enter a dormant or quiescent state, thereby evading the effects of chemotherapy, targeted therapy, or immunotherapy. Motivated by these observations, we develop and investigate an evolutionary game theory model that captures the interactions between three types of cancer cells: treatment-sensitive, drug-tolerant persister, and treatment-resistant cells. In our model, persister cells transition into resistant cells at a rate that can depend on the treatment intensity. We analyze the model’s equilibria and derive conditions for their existence and stability. In particular, we show that an equilibrium in which sensitive and resistant cells coexist is stable when intra-type competition is stronger than inter-type competition. We also show that equilibria in which only one cell type persists require the transition rate to exceed an explicit threshold determined by the treatment dose and competition parameters. Our findings reveal that persister cells can both stabilize and destabilize tumor dynamics, depending on treatment and cell type-transition rates, highlighting the importance of accounting for persister behavior in designing effective evolutionary therapies.
Open AccessPersister cells and their effects on cancer stabilization therapy
Some cancers have the ability to persist under treatment. Persister cancer cells can be a small subpopulation of cancer cells that enter a dormant or quiescent state, thereby evading the effects of chemotherapy, targeted therapy, or immunotherapy. Motivated by these observations, we develop and investigate an evolutionary game theory model that captures the interactions between three types of cancer cells: treatment-sensitive, drug-tolerant persister, and treatment-resistant cells. In our model, persister cells transition into resistant cells at a rate that can depend on the treatment intensity. We analyze the model’s equilibria and derive conditions for their existence and stability. In particular, we show that an equilibrium in which sensitive and resistant cells coexist is stable when intra-type competition is stronger than inter-type competition. We also show that equilibria in which only one cell type persists require the transition rate to exceed an explicit threshold determined by the treatment dose and competition parameters. Our findings reveal that persister cells can both stabilize and destabilize tumor dynamics, depending on treatment and cell type-transition rates, highlighting the importance of accounting for persister behavior in designing effective evolutionary therapies.
- Open Access
Initial tumor composition shapes resistance evolution and treatment outcomes in non-small cell lung cancer
Drug resistance is a leading cause of treatment failure in non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC), yet how resistance evolves during treatment and whether its fitness consequences depend on tumor composition remains poorly understood. Using a game-theoretic mathematical model fitted to longitudinal in-vitro data from alectinib-sensitive and alectinib-resistant H3122 NSCLC cells grown under different treatment and microenvironmental conditions, we found that the fitness effect of evolving resistance depended critically on the initial proportion of resistant cells in the tumor. When resistant cells were initially rare, resistance evolved faster and increasing resistance was associated with a growth advantage. When resistant cells were initially frequent, increasing resistance was associated with a fitness cost. In both cases, increasing resistance eroded treatment efficacy. In the gain-of-resistance regime, stabilization therapy could maintain a stable tumor equilibrium only if resistant cells were excluded. Maximum tolerated dosing was not always optimal for maximizing time to progression; intermediate doses performed better when they kept the initial tumor growth rate close to zero. These results suggest that evolutionary therapy for NSCLC should account not only for the abundance of resistant cells, but also for how resistance is evolving and what fitness consequences it currently carries in individual patients.
Open AccessInitial tumor composition shapes resistance evolution and treatment outcomes in non-small cell lung cancer
Drug resistance is a leading cause of treatment failure in non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC), yet how resistance evolves during treatment and whether its fitness consequences depend on tumor composition remains poorly understood. Using a game-theoretic mathematical model fitted to longitudinal in-vitro data from alectinib-sensitive and alectinib-resistant H3122 NSCLC cells grown under different treatment and microenvironmental conditions, we found that the fitness effect of evolving resistance depended critically on the initial proportion of resistant cells in the tumor. When resistant cells were initially rare, resistance evolved faster and increasing resistance was associated with a growth advantage. When resistant cells were initially frequent, increasing resistance was associated with a fitness cost. In both cases, increasing resistance eroded treatment efficacy. In the gain-of-resistance regime, stabilization therapy could maintain a stable tumor equilibrium only if resistant cells were excluded. Maximum tolerated dosing was not always optimal for maximizing time to progression; intermediate doses performed better when they kept the initial tumor growth rate close to zero. These results suggest that evolutionary therapy for NSCLC should account not only for the abundance of resistant cells, but also for how resistance is evolving and what fitness consequences it currently carries in individual patients.
- Open Access
- 20 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 15 (4) , 1467-1493
Stability of the Darwinian Dynamics: Effect of Intraspecific Competition and Human Intervention
We analyze the stability of a game-theoretic model of a polymorphic eco-evolutionary system in the presence of human intervention. The goal is to understand how the intensity of this human intervention and competition within the system impact its stability, with cancer treatment as a case study. In this case study, the physician applies anti-cancer treatment, while cancer, consisting of treatment-sensitive and treatment-resistant cancer cells, responds by evolving more or less treatment-induced resistance, according to Darwinian evolution. We analyze how the existence and stability of the cancer eco-evolutionary equilibria depend on the treatment dose and rate of competition between cancer cells of the two different types. We also identify initial conditions for which the resistance grows unbounded. In addition, we adopt the level-set method to find viscosity solutions of the corresponding Hamilton–Jacobi equation to estimate the basins of attraction of the found eco-evolutionary equilibria and simulate typical eco-evolutionary dynamics of cancer within and outside these estimated basins. While we illustrate our results on the cancer treatment case study, they can be generalized to any situation where a human aims at containing, eradicating, or saving Darwinian systems, such as in managing antimicrobial resistance, fisheries management, and pest management. The obtained results help our understanding of the impact of human interventions and intraspecific competition on the possibility of containing, eradicating, or saving evolving species. This will help us with our ability to control such systems.
- 20 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 15 (4) , 1467-1493
Open AccessStability of the Darwinian Dynamics: Effect of Intraspecific Competition and Human Intervention
We analyze the stability of a game-theoretic model of a polymorphic eco-evolutionary system in the presence of human intervention. The goal is to understand how the intensity of this human intervention and competition within the system impact its stability, with cancer treatment as a case study. In this case study, the physician applies anti-cancer treatment, while cancer, consisting of treatment-sensitive and treatment-resistant cancer cells, responds by evolving more or less treatment-induced resistance, according to Darwinian evolution. We analyze how the existence and stability of the cancer eco-evolutionary equilibria depend on the treatment dose and rate of competition between cancer cells of the two different types. We also identify initial conditions for which the resistance grows unbounded. In addition, we adopt the level-set method to find viscosity solutions of the corresponding Hamilton–Jacobi equation to estimate the basins of attraction of the found eco-evolutionary equilibria and simulate typical eco-evolutionary dynamics of cancer within and outside these estimated basins. While we illustrate our results on the cancer treatment case study, they can be generalized to any situation where a human aims at containing, eradicating, or saving Darwinian systems, such as in managing antimicrobial resistance, fisheries management, and pest management. The obtained results help our understanding of the impact of human interventions and intraspecific competition on the possibility of containing, eradicating, or saving evolving species. This will help us with our ability to control such systems.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 19 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 15 (5) , 1733-1749
Public Goods Games in Disease Evolution and Spread
Cooperation arises in nature at every scale, from within cells to entire ecosystems. Public goods games (PGGs) are used to represent scenarios characterised by the conflict/dilemma between choosing cooperation as a socially optimal strategy and defection as an individually optimal strategy. Evolutionary game theory is often used to analyse the dynamics of behaviour emergence in this context. Here, we focus on PGGs arising in the disease modelling of cancer evolution and the spread of infectious diseases. We use these two systems as case studies for the development of the theory and applications of PGGs, which we succinctly review. We also posit that applications of evolutionary game theory to decision-making in cancer, such as interactions between a clinician and a tumour, can learn from the PGGs studied in epidemiology, where cooperative behaviours such as quarantine and vaccination compliance have been more thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, instances of cellular-level cooperation observed in cancers point to a corresponding area of potential interest for modellers of other diseases, be they viral, bacterial or otherwise. We aim to demonstrate the breadth of applicability of PGGs in disease modelling while providing a starting point for those interested in quantifying cooperation arising in healthcare.
- 19 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 15 (5) , 1733-1749
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessPublic Goods Games in Disease Evolution and Spread
Cooperation arises in nature at every scale, from within cells to entire ecosystems. Public goods games (PGGs) are used to represent scenarios characterised by the conflict/dilemma between choosing cooperation as a socially optimal strategy and defection as an individually optimal strategy. Evolutionary game theory is often used to analyse the dynamics of behaviour emergence in this context. Here, we focus on PGGs arising in the disease modelling of cancer evolution and the spread of infectious diseases. We use these two systems as case studies for the development of the theory and applications of PGGs, which we succinctly review. We also posit that applications of evolutionary game theory to decision-making in cancer, such as interactions between a clinician and a tumour, can learn from the PGGs studied in epidemiology, where cooperative behaviours such as quarantine and vaccination compliance have been more thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, instances of cellular-level cooperation observed in cancers point to a corresponding area of potential interest for modellers of other diseases, be they viral, bacterial or otherwise. We aim to demonstrate the breadth of applicability of PGGs in disease modelling while providing a starting point for those interested in quantifying cooperation arising in healthcare.
- Open Access
- 14 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 15 (5) , 1750-1769
Stackelberg Evolutionary Games of Cancer Treatment: What Treatment Strategy to Choose if Cancer Can be Stabilized?
We present a game-theoretic model of a polymorphic cancer cell population where the treatment-induced resistance is a quantitative evolving trait. When stabilization of the tumor burden is possible, we expand the model into a Stackelberg evolutionary game, where the physician is the leader and the cancer cells are followers. The physician chooses a treatment dose to maximize an objective function that is a proxy of the patient’s quality of life. In response, the cancer cells evolve a resistance level that maximizes their proliferation and survival. Assuming that cancer is in its ecological equilibrium, we compare the outcomes of three different treatment strategies: giving the maximum tolerable dose throughout, corresponding to the standard of care for most metastatic cancers, an ecologically enlightened therapy, where the physician anticipates the short-run, ecological response of cancer cells to their treatment, but not the evolution of resistance to treatment, and an evolutionarily enlightened therapy, where the physician anticipates both ecological and evolutionary consequences of the treatment. Of the three therapeutic strategies, the evolutionarily enlightened therapy leads to the highest values of the objective function, the lowest treatment dose, and the lowest treatment-induced resistance. Conversely, in our model, the maximum tolerable dose leads to the worst values of the objective function, the highest treatment dose, and the highest treatment-induced resistance.
- 14 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 15 (5) , 1750-1769
Open AccessStackelberg Evolutionary Games of Cancer Treatment: What Treatment Strategy to Choose if Cancer Can be Stabilized?
We present a game-theoretic model of a polymorphic cancer cell population where the treatment-induced resistance is a quantitative evolving trait. When stabilization of the tumor burden is possible, we expand the model into a Stackelberg evolutionary game, where the physician is the leader and the cancer cells are followers. The physician chooses a treatment dose to maximize an objective function that is a proxy of the patient’s quality of life. In response, the cancer cells evolve a resistance level that maximizes their proliferation and survival. Assuming that cancer is in its ecological equilibrium, we compare the outcomes of three different treatment strategies: giving the maximum tolerable dose throughout, corresponding to the standard of care for most metastatic cancers, an ecologically enlightened therapy, where the physician anticipates the short-run, ecological response of cancer cells to their treatment, but not the evolution of resistance to treatment, and an evolutionarily enlightened therapy, where the physician anticipates both ecological and evolutionary consequences of the treatment. Of the three therapeutic strategies, the evolutionarily enlightened therapy leads to the highest values of the objective function, the lowest treatment dose, and the lowest treatment-induced resistance. Conversely, in our model, the maximum tolerable dose leads to the worst values of the objective function, the highest treatment dose, and the highest treatment-induced resistance.
- Open Access
Public Goods Games in Disease Evolution and Spread
Cooperation arises in nature at every scale, from within cells to entire ecosystems. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, public goods games (PGGs) are used to analyse scenarios where individuals can cooperate or defect, and can predict when and how these behaviours emerge. However, too few examples motivate the transferal of knowledge from one application of PGGs to another. Here, we focus on PGGs arising in disease modelling of cancer evolution and the spread of infectious diseases. We use these two systems as case studies for the development of the theory and applications of PGGs, which we succinctly review and compare. We also posit that applications of evolutionary game theory to decision-making in cancer, such as interactions between a clinician and a tumour, can learn from the PGGs studied in epidemiology, where cooperative behaviours such as quarantine and vaccination compliance have been more thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, instances of cellular-level cooperation observed in cancers point to a corresponding area of potential interest for modellers of other diseases, be they viral, bacterial or otherwise. We aim to demonstrate the breadth of applicability of PGGs in disease modelling while providing a starting point for those interested in quantifying cooperation arising in healthcare.
Open AccessPublic Goods Games in Disease Evolution and Spread
Cooperation arises in nature at every scale, from within cells to entire ecosystems. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, public goods games (PGGs) are used to analyse scenarios where individuals can cooperate or defect, and can predict when and how these behaviours emerge. However, too few examples motivate the transferal of knowledge from one application of PGGs to another. Here, we focus on PGGs arising in disease modelling of cancer evolution and the spread of infectious diseases. We use these two systems as case studies for the development of the theory and applications of PGGs, which we succinctly review and compare. We also posit that applications of evolutionary game theory to decision-making in cancer, such as interactions between a clinician and a tumour, can learn from the PGGs studied in epidemiology, where cooperative behaviours such as quarantine and vaccination compliance have been more thoroughly investigated. Furthermore, instances of cellular-level cooperation observed in cancers point to a corresponding area of potential interest for modellers of other diseases, be they viral, bacterial or otherwise. We aim to demonstrate the breadth of applicability of PGGs in disease modelling while providing a starting point for those interested in quantifying cooperation arising in healthcare.
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Franklin Institute
- Vol. 358 (17) , 8969-8992
Trajectory tracking of an autonomous vehicle using immersion and invariance control
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Franklin Institute
- Vol. 358 (17) , 8969-8992
Trajectory tracking of an autonomous vehicle using immersion and invariance control
- Open Access
On stability of the Darwinian dynamics
Here we analyze Darwinian dynamics of cancer introduced in [1], extended by including a competition matrix, and evaluate (i) when the eco-evolutionary equilibrium is positive and (ii) when the eco-evolutionary equilibrium is asymptotically stable.
Open AccessOn stability of the Darwinian dynamics
Here we analyze Darwinian dynamics of cancer introduced in [1], extended by including a competition matrix, and evaluate (i) when the eco-evolutionary equilibrium is positive and (ii) when the eco-evolutionary equilibrium is asymptotically stable.