Ran Ran
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 October 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 260, 1107-1109
Wuhan: How the COVID-19 Outbreak in China Spiraled Out of Control Dali L. Yang. New York: Oxford University Press, 2024. 392 pp. $35.00 (pbk). ISBN 9780197756263
- 2 October 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 260, 1107-1109
Open AccessWuhan: How the COVID-19 Outbreak in China Spiraled Out of Control Dali L. Yang. New York: Oxford University Press, 2024. 392 pp. $35.00 (pbk). ISBN 9780197756263
- 30 March 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning
- Vol. 26 (3) , 311-324
Performance without legitimacy? Examining the performance-legitimacy dilemma of China’s authoritarian environmentalism model through Hebei’s ‘ban on coal furnace’ project
1. Introduction One of the widely observed puzzles in environmental politics is how to understand policy failure across local, national, and global levels. Conventional wisdom attributes environmen...
- 30 March 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning
- Vol. 26 (3) , 311-324
Performance without legitimacy? Examining the performance-legitimacy dilemma of China’s authoritarian environmentalism model through Hebei’s ‘ban on coal furnace’ project
1. Introduction One of the widely observed puzzles in environmental politics is how to understand policy failure across local, national, and global levels. Conventional wisdom attributes environmen...
- Top Cited Papers
- 18 August 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 231, 634-661
Understanding Blame Politics in China's Decentralized System of Environmental Governance: Actors, Strategies and Context
Decentralized environmental governance theory suggests that decentralization can produce better environmental performance mainly because lower-level governments are closer to the people and environmental issues and are considered more legitimate than the national government. However, China's decentralized system of environmental governance has been often regarded as a key factor in creating pollution problems rather than in solving them. To explain this puzzle, this article, using Blame Avoidance Behaviour in government theory as a theoretical framework, examines how blame avoidance behaviour shapes China's decentralized system of environmental governance from three perspectives: first, actors and the chain of blame shaped by the hierarchical power structure among environmental policymakers and implementers; second, the strategies of discursive domination and decentralization for blaming environmental problems on local officials; and lastly, the contextual factor of “hierarchical governmental trust.” Drawing on documentary discursive analysis and extensive fieldwork, this article suggests that the dysfunction of China's decentralized environmental governance structure may in fact be an outcome of a blame-shifting game between central and local governments.
- 18 August 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 231, 634-661
Top Cited PapersUnderstanding Blame Politics in China's Decentralized System of Environmental Governance: Actors, Strategies and Context
Decentralized environmental governance theory suggests that decentralization can produce better environmental performance mainly because lower-level governments are closer to the people and environmental issues and are considered more legitimate than the national government. However, China's decentralized system of environmental governance has been often regarded as a key factor in creating pollution problems rather than in solving them. To explain this puzzle, this article, using Blame Avoidance Behaviour in government theory as a theoretical framework, examines how blame avoidance behaviour shapes China's decentralized system of environmental governance from three perspectives: first, actors and the chain of blame shaped by the hierarchical power structure among environmental policymakers and implementers; second, the strategies of discursive domination and decentralization for blaming environmental problems on local officials; and lastly, the contextual factor of “hierarchical governmental trust.” Drawing on documentary discursive analysis and extensive fieldwork, this article suggests that the dysfunction of China's decentralized environmental governance structure may in fact be an outcome of a blame-shifting game between central and local governments.