Joshua D. Kertzer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Joshua D. Kertzer has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
4 shared publicationsJonathan Renshon
Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison
2 shared publications- Tyler Jost
Department of Political Science, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA
2 shared publications - Allison Carnegie
Columbia University
1 shared publication - Brad L. LeVeck
University of California, Merced
1 shared publication Brian C. Rathbun
Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 June 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
Shooting From the Hip: The Counterintuitively Intuitive Nature of Deterrence
Much if not most of human judgment is intuitive rather than reflective, but what types of behaviors result from non-deliberative as opposed to deliberative choice? We argue that for evolutionary reasons, intuition favors retaliatory aggression and a reliance on the deterrence model, the set of hunches that stress the importance of standing firm and demonstrating resolve to avoid challenges. By contrast, careful and analytical thought tends towards diplomacy and cooperation. By thinking from the gut and shooting from the hip, humans solved deterrence challenges in our evolutionary past. Across four studies—a time pressure experiment, an observational survey of thinking styles, a large-scale text analysis of Cold War US foreign policy elites, and a case study of US President Ronald Reagan—we find support for these expectations. These results are surprising, given that deterrence is often associated with rational deliberation. Instead, the intuitive nature of retaliatory aggression and the embrace of the deterrence model seem to be ecologically rational.
- 22 June 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
Open AccessShooting From the Hip: The Counterintuitively Intuitive Nature of Deterrence
Much if not most of human judgment is intuitive rather than reflective, but what types of behaviors result from non-deliberative as opposed to deliberative choice? We argue that for evolutionary reasons, intuition favors retaliatory aggression and a reliance on the deterrence model, the set of hunches that stress the importance of standing firm and demonstrating resolve to avoid challenges. By contrast, careful and analytical thought tends towards diplomacy and cooperation. By thinking from the gut and shooting from the hip, humans solved deterrence challenges in our evolutionary past. Across four studies—a time pressure experiment, an observational survey of thinking styles, a large-scale text analysis of Cold War US foreign policy elites, and a case study of US President Ronald Reagan—we find support for these expectations. These results are surprising, given that deterrence is often associated with rational deliberation. Instead, the intuitive nature of retaliatory aggression and the embrace of the deterrence model seem to be ecologically rational.
- 18 May 2026
- Published by The R Foundation
leadeR: Profiling Leaders at a Distance
Profiles political leaders at a distance from text data such as speeches, interviews, press conferences, and other public statements. Computes Leadership Trait Analysis scores for seven personality traits – including need for power, conceptual complexity, and self-confidence – and classifies leaders into one of eight leadership styles. Also computes Operational Code Analysis scores summarising a leader's beliefs about politics and the use of power.
- 18 May 2026
- Published by The R Foundation
leadeR: Profiling Leaders at a Distance
Profiles political leaders at a distance from text data such as speeches, interviews, press conferences, and other public statements. Computes Leadership Trait Analysis scores for seven personality traits – including need for power, conceptual complexity, and self-confidence – and classifies leaders into one of eight leadership styles. Also computes Operational Code Analysis scores summarising a leader's beliefs about politics and the use of power.
- Open Access
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 56
Elite Misperceptions in Foreign Policy
Many models of domestic politics in international relations presume that political elites correctly perceive public preferences, even as a growing body of research in political behavior calls this assumption into question. Leveraging seven paired surveys of 4,852 foreign policy elites and 13,687 members of the American public from 2004–24 on twenty-four different questions, we show elites systematically misperceive public opinion in foreign policy, misperceiving the public as more isolationist and inward-looking than it actually is. We replicate this finding with a paired experiment showing that elites effectively underestimate the public’s responsiveness to cues from international organizations, and that elites with isolationist stereotypes underestimate public approval the most. These dynamics – which operate predominantly through stereotyping, rather than projection – have important implications for the study of political elites, public opinion about foreign policy, and efforts to test theoretical models of domestic politics in international relations using public opinion data alone.
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 56
Open AccessElite Misperceptions in Foreign Policy
Many models of domestic politics in international relations presume that political elites correctly perceive public preferences, even as a growing body of research in political behavior calls this assumption into question. Leveraging seven paired surveys of 4,852 foreign policy elites and 13,687 members of the American public from 2004–24 on twenty-four different questions, we show elites systematically misperceive public opinion in foreign policy, misperceiving the public as more isolationist and inward-looking than it actually is. We replicate this finding with a paired experiment showing that elites effectively underestimate the public’s responsiveness to cues from international organizations, and that elites with isolationist stereotypes underestimate public approval the most. These dynamics – which operate predominantly through stereotyping, rather than projection – have important implications for the study of political elites, public opinion about foreign policy, and efforts to test theoretical models of domestic politics in international relations using public opinion data alone.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 8 February 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 78 (1) , 1-37
Advisers and Aggregation in Foreign Policy Decision Making
Do advisers affect foreign policy and, if so, how? Recent scholarship on elite decision making prioritizes leaders and the institutions that surround them, rather than the dispositions of advisers themselves. We argue that despite the hierarchical nature of foreign policy decision making, advisers’ predispositions regarding the use of force shape state behavior through the counsel advisers provide in deliberations. To test our argument, we introduce an original data set of 2,685 foreign policy deliberations between US presidents and their advisers from 1947 to 1988. Applying a novel machine learning approach to estimate the hawkishness of 1,134 Cold War–era foreign policy decision makers, we show that adviser-level hawkishness affects both the counsel that advisers provide in deliberations and the decisions leaders make: conflictual policy choices grow more likely as hawks increasingly dominate the debate, even when accounting for leader dispositions. The theory and findings enrich our understanding of international conflict by demonstrating how advisers’ dispositions, which aggregate through the counsel advisers provide, systematically shape foreign policy behavior.
- 8 February 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 78 (1) , 1-37
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessAdvisers and Aggregation in Foreign Policy Decision Making
Do advisers affect foreign policy and, if so, how? Recent scholarship on elite decision making prioritizes leaders and the institutions that surround them, rather than the dispositions of advisers themselves. We argue that despite the hierarchical nature of foreign policy decision making, advisers’ predispositions regarding the use of force shape state behavior through the counsel advisers provide in deliberations. To test our argument, we introduce an original data set of 2,685 foreign policy deliberations between US presidents and their advisers from 1947 to 1988. Applying a novel machine learning approach to estimate the hawkishness of 1,134 Cold War–era foreign policy decision makers, we show that adviser-level hawkishness affects both the counsel that advisers provide in deliberations and the decisions leaders make: conflictual policy choices grow more likely as hawks increasingly dominate the debate, even when accounting for leader dispositions. The theory and findings enrich our understanding of international conflict by demonstrating how advisers’ dispositions, which aggregate through the counsel advisers provide, systematically shape foreign policy behavior.
- 28 September 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 68 (9) , 1769-1797
Armies and Influence: Elite Experience and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy
When is the public more likely to defer to elites on foreign policy? Existing research suggests the public takes its cues from co-partisans, but what happens when co-partisans disagree? We argue that the public defers to elites whose prior experiences signal expertise and favorable intentions. Elites with backgrounds in socially esteemed institutions are thus especially powerful cue-givers, even when the core competencies of those institutions are not directly related to the issue at hand. Using two conjoint experiments, we find that the American public defers to more experienced elites generally, but is especially deferential toward elites with experience in trusted institutions: the public defers more to elites with military backgrounds, even when considering non-military issues. The theory and findings suggest that where elites sat in the past shapes how much power they wield once standing in office.
- 28 September 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 68 (9) , 1769-1797
Armies and Influence: Elite Experience and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy
When is the public more likely to defer to elites on foreign policy? Existing research suggests the public takes its cues from co-partisans, but what happens when co-partisans disagree? We argue that the public defers to elites whose prior experiences signal expertise and favorable intentions. Elites with backgrounds in socially esteemed institutions are thus especially powerful cue-givers, even when the core competencies of those institutions are not directly related to the issue at hand. Using two conjoint experiments, we find that the American public defers to more experienced elites generally, but is especially deferential toward elites with experience in trusted institutions: the public defers more to elites with military backgrounds, even when considering non-military issues. The theory and findings suggest that where elites sat in the past shapes how much power they wield once standing in office.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 85 (1) , 1-18
Democratic Reputations in Crises and War
- 1 January 2023
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 85 (1) , 1-18
Democratic Reputations in Crises and War
- 6 August 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 67 (2-3) , 235-265
Democratic Peace and Covert Military Force: An Experimental Test
How should we reconcile covert war with normative theories of the democratic peace? Proponents argue that these interventions are consistent with democratic peace theory, as leaders intervene covertly to escape backlash by a public that has internalized liberal norms. Yet we know little about public opinion regarding the covert use of force. Using a survey experiment, we find that respondents are more favorable towards covert interventions against democratic targets than our theories assume, and that even citizens who value transparency the most still wrestle with a trade-off between their normative commitments and the instrumental benefits they perceive covert actions to hold. Our results thus help to explain why American leaders have repeatedly chosen to conduct covert military operations against fellow democracies, and raise important questions about the scope conditions of normative theories of the democratic peace.
- 6 August 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 67 (2-3) , 235-265
Democratic Peace and Covert Military Force: An Experimental Test
How should we reconcile covert war with normative theories of the democratic peace? Proponents argue that these interventions are consistent with democratic peace theory, as leaders intervene covertly to escape backlash by a public that has internalized liberal norms. Yet we know little about public opinion regarding the covert use of force. Using a survey experiment, we find that respondents are more favorable towards covert interventions against democratic targets than our theories assume, and that even citizens who value transparency the most still wrestle with a trade-off between their normative commitments and the instrumental benefits they perceive covert actions to hold. Our results thus help to explain why American leaders have repeatedly chosen to conduct covert military operations against fellow democracies, and raise important questions about the scope conditions of normative theories of the democratic peace.
- 11 March 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 76 (3) , 513-548
Hawkish Biases and Group Decision Making
How do cognitive biases relevant to foreign policy decision making aggregate in groups? Many tendencies identified in the behavioral decision-making literature—such as reactive devaluation, the intentionality bias, and risk seeking in the domain of losses—have been linked to hawkishness in foreign policy choices, potentially increasing the risk of conflict, but how these “hawkish biases” operate in the small-group contexts in which foreign policy decisions are often made is unknown. We field three large-scale group experiments to test how these biases aggregate in groups. We find that groups are just as susceptible as individuals to these canonical biases, with neither hierarchical nor horizontal group decision-making structures significantly attenuating the magnitude of bias. Moreover, diverse groups perform similarly to more homogeneous ones, exhibiting similar degrees of bias and marginally increased risk of dissension. These results suggest that at least with these types of biases, the “aggregation problem” may be less problematic for psychological theories in international relations than some critics have argued. This has important implications for understanding foreign policy decision making, the role of group processes, and the behavioral revolution in international relations.
- 11 March 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 76 (3) , 513-548
Hawkish Biases and Group Decision Making
How do cognitive biases relevant to foreign policy decision making aggregate in groups? Many tendencies identified in the behavioral decision-making literature—such as reactive devaluation, the intentionality bias, and risk seeking in the domain of losses—have been linked to hawkishness in foreign policy choices, potentially increasing the risk of conflict, but how these “hawkish biases” operate in the small-group contexts in which foreign policy decisions are often made is unknown. We field three large-scale group experiments to test how these biases aggregate in groups. We find that groups are just as susceptible as individuals to these canonical biases, with neither hierarchical nor horizontal group decision-making structures significantly attenuating the magnitude of bias. Moreover, diverse groups perform similarly to more homogeneous ones, exhibiting similar degrees of bias and marginally increased risk of dissension. These results suggest that at least with these types of biases, the “aggregation problem” may be less problematic for psychological theories in international relations than some critics have argued. This has important implications for understanding foreign policy decision making, the role of group processes, and the behavioral revolution in international relations.
- 29 September 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 66 (2) , 217-245
What’s Fair in International Politics? Equity, Equality, and Foreign Policy Attitudes
How do concerns about fairness shape foreign policy preferences? In this article, we show that fairness has two faces—one concerning equity, the other concerning equality—and that taking both into account can shed light on the structure of important foreign policy debates. Fielding an original survey on a national sample of Americans, we show that different types of Americans think about fairness in different ways, and that these fairness concerns shape foreign policy preferences: individuals who emphasize equity are far more sensitive to concerns about burden sharing, are far less likely to support US involvement abroad when other countries aren’t paying their fair share, and often support systematically different foreign policies than individuals who emphasize equality. As long as IR scholars focus only on the equality dimension of fairness, we miss much about how fairness concerns matter in world politics.
- 29 September 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 66 (2) , 217-245
What’s Fair in International Politics? Equity, Equality, and Foreign Policy Attitudes
How do concerns about fairness shape foreign policy preferences? In this article, we show that fairness has two faces—one concerning equity, the other concerning equality—and that taking both into account can shed light on the structure of important foreign policy debates. Fielding an original survey on a national sample of Americans, we show that different types of Americans think about fairness in different ways, and that these fairness concerns shape foreign policy preferences: individuals who emphasize equity are far more sensitive to concerns about burden sharing, are far less likely to support US involvement abroad when other countries aren’t paying their fair share, and often support systematically different foreign policies than individuals who emphasize equality. As long as IR scholars focus only on the equality dimension of fairness, we miss much about how fairness concerns matter in world politics.
- Top Cited Papers
- 2 December 2020
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 66 (3) , 539-553
Re‐Assessing Elite‐Public Gaps in Political Behavior
Political scientists often criticize psychological approaches to the study of politics on the grounds that many psychological theories were developed on convenience samples of college students or members of the mass public, whereas many of the most important decisions in politics are made by elites, who are presumed to differ systematically from ordinary citizens. This paper proposes an overarching framework for thinking about differences between elites and masses, presenting the results of a meta‐analysis of 162 paired treatments from paired experiments on political elites and mass publics, as well as an analysis of 12 waves of historical elite and mass public opinion data on foreign policy issues over a 43 year period. It finds political scientists both overstate the magnitude of elite‐public gaps in decision‐making, and misunderstand the determinants of elite‐public gaps in political attitudes, many of which are due to basic compositional differences rather than to elites' domain‐specific expertise.
- 2 December 2020
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 66 (3) , 539-553
Top Cited PapersRe‐Assessing Elite‐Public Gaps in Political Behavior
Political scientists often criticize psychological approaches to the study of politics on the grounds that many psychological theories were developed on convenience samples of college students or members of the mass public, whereas many of the most important decisions in politics are made by elites, who are presumed to differ systematically from ordinary citizens. This paper proposes an overarching framework for thinking about differences between elites and masses, presenting the results of a meta‐analysis of 162 paired treatments from paired experiments on political elites and mass publics, as well as an analysis of 12 waves of historical elite and mass public opinion data on foreign policy issues over a 43 year period. It finds political scientists both overstate the magnitude of elite‐public gaps in decision‐making, and misunderstand the determinants of elite‐public gaps in political attitudes, many of which are due to basic compositional differences rather than to elites' domain‐specific expertise.