Csaba Kozma
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Csaba Kozma has a total of 71 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Giulio Tononi
Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI
4 shared publications - Melanie Boly
Department of Neurology, University of Wisconsin-Madison
4 shared publications - Urszula Górska
Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, USA
4 shared publications - Hal Blumenfeld
Department of Neurology, Yale University School of Medicine, 333 Cedar Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06520, USA
3 shared publications - Abdelrahman Sharafeldin
School of Mathematics, Georgia Institute of Technology
2 shared publications - Alex Lepauvre
Neural Circuits, Consciousness and Cognition Research Group, Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 30 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 642 (8066) , 133-142
Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness
Different theories explain how subjective experience arises from brain activity 1,2 . These theories have independently accrued evidence, but have not been directly compared 3 . Here we present an open science adversarial collaboration directly juxtaposing integrated information theory (IIT) 4,5 and global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) 6–10 via a theory-neutral consortium 11–13 . The theory proponents and the consortium developed and preregistered the experimental design, divergent predictions, expected outcomes and interpretation thereof 12 . Human participants ( n = 256) viewed suprathreshold stimuli for variable durations while neural activity was measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging, magnetoencephalography and intracranial electroencephalography. We found information about conscious content in visual, ventrotemporal and inferior frontal cortex, with sustained responses in occipital and lateral temporal cortex reflecting stimulus duration, and content-specific synchronization between frontal and early visual areas. These results align with some predictions of IIT and GNWT, while substantially challenging key tenets of both theories. For IIT, a lack of sustained synchronization within the posterior cortex contradicts the claim that network connectivity specifies consciousness. GNWT is challenged by the general lack of ignition at stimulus offset and limited representation of certain conscious dimensions in the prefrontal cortex. These challenges extend to other theories of consciousness that share some of the predictions tested here 14–17 . Beyond challenging the theories, we present an alternative approach to advance cognitive neuroscience through principled, theory-driven, collaborative research and highlight the need for a quantitative framework for systematic theory testing and building.
- 30 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 642 (8066) , 133-142
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessAdversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness
Different theories explain how subjective experience arises from brain activity 1,2 . These theories have independently accrued evidence, but have not been directly compared 3 . Here we present an open science adversarial collaboration directly juxtaposing integrated information theory (IIT) 4,5 and global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) 6–10 via a theory-neutral consortium 11–13 . The theory proponents and the consortium developed and preregistered the experimental design, divergent predictions, expected outcomes and interpretation thereof 12 . Human participants ( n = 256) viewed suprathreshold stimuli for variable durations while neural activity was measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging, magnetoencephalography and intracranial electroencephalography. We found information about conscious content in visual, ventrotemporal and inferior frontal cortex, with sustained responses in occipital and lateral temporal cortex reflecting stimulus duration, and content-specific synchronization between frontal and early visual areas. These results align with some predictions of IIT and GNWT, while substantially challenging key tenets of both theories. For IIT, a lack of sustained synchronization within the posterior cortex contradicts the claim that network connectivity specifies consciousness. GNWT is challenged by the general lack of ignition at stimulus offset and limited representation of certain conscious dimensions in the prefrontal cortex. These challenges extend to other theories of consciousness that share some of the predictions tested here 14–17 . Beyond challenging the theories, we present an alternative approach to advance cognitive neuroscience through principled, theory-driven, collaborative research and highlight the need for a quantitative framework for systematic theory testing and building.
- Open Access
An adversarial collaboration to critically evaluate theories of consciousness
Summary: Different theories explain how subjective experience arises from brain activity 1,2 . These theories have independently accrued evidence, yet, confirmation bias and dependence on design choices hamper progress in the field 3 . Here, we present an open science adversarial collaboration which directly juxtaposes Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4,5 and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT) 6–10 , employing a theory-neutral consortium approach 11,12 . We investigate neural correlates of the content and duration of visual experience. The theory proponents and the consortium developed and preregistered the experimental design, divergent predictions, expected outcomes, and their interpretation 12 . 256 human subjects viewed suprathreshold stimuli for variable durations while neural activity was measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging, magnetoencephalography, and electrocorticography. We find information about conscious content in visual, ventro-temporal and inferior frontal cortex, with sustained responses in occipital and lateral temporal cortex reflecting stimulus duration, and content-specific synchronization between frontal and early visual areas. These results confirm some predictions of IIT and GNWT, while substantially challenging both theories: for IIT, a lack of sustained synchronization within posterior cortex contradicts the claim that network connectivity specifies consciousness. GNWT is challenged by the general lack of ignition at stimulus offset and limited representation of certain conscious dimensions in prefrontal cortex. Beyond challenging the theories themselves, we present an alternative approach to advance cognitive neuroscience through a principled, theory-driven, collaborative effort. We highlight the challenges to change people’s mind 13 and the need for a quantitative framework integrating evidence for systematic theory testing and building.
Open AccessAn adversarial collaboration to critically evaluate theories of consciousness
Summary: Different theories explain how subjective experience arises from brain activity 1,2 . These theories have independently accrued evidence, yet, confirmation bias and dependence on design choices hamper progress in the field 3 . Here, we present an open science adversarial collaboration which directly juxtaposes Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4,5 and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT) 6–10 , employing a theory-neutral consortium approach 11,12 . We investigate neural correlates of the content and duration of visual experience. The theory proponents and the consortium developed and preregistered the experimental design, divergent predictions, expected outcomes, and their interpretation 12 . 256 human subjects viewed suprathreshold stimuli for variable durations while neural activity was measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging, magnetoencephalography, and electrocorticography. We find information about conscious content in visual, ventro-temporal and inferior frontal cortex, with sustained responses in occipital and lateral temporal cortex reflecting stimulus duration, and content-specific synchronization between frontal and early visual areas. These results confirm some predictions of IIT and GNWT, while substantially challenging both theories: for IIT, a lack of sustained synchronization within posterior cortex contradicts the claim that network connectivity specifies consciousness. GNWT is challenged by the general lack of ignition at stimulus offset and limited representation of certain conscious dimensions in prefrontal cortex. Beyond challenging the theories themselves, we present an alternative approach to advance cognitive neuroscience through a principled, theory-driven, collaborative effort. We highlight the challenges to change people’s mind 13 and the need for a quantitative framework integrating evidence for systematic theory testing and building.
- 16 November 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Brain
- Vol. 146 (1) , 109-123
Distinct signatures of loss of consciousness in focal impaired awareness versus tonic-clonic seizures
Loss of consciousness is a hallmark of many epileptic seizures and carries risks of serious injury and sudden death. While cortical sleep-like activities accompany loss of consciousness during focal impaired awareness seizures, the mechanisms of loss of consciousness during focal to bilateral tonic-clonic seizures remain unclear. Quantifying differences in markers of cortical activation and ictal recruitment between focal impaired awareness and focal to bilateral tonic-clonic seizures may also help us to understand their different consequences for clinical outcomes and to optimize neuromodulation therapies.We quantified clinical signs of loss of consciousness and intracranial EEG activity during 129 focal impaired awareness and 50 focal to bilateral tonic-clonic from 41 patients. We characterized intracranial EEG changes both in the seizure onset zone and in areas remote from the seizure onset zone with a total of 3386 electrodes distributed across brain areas. First, we compared the dynamics of intracranial EEG sleep-like activities: slow-wave activity (1–4 Hz) and beta/delta ratio (a validated marker of cortical activation) during focal impaired awareness versus focal to bilateral tonic-clonic. Second, we quantified differences between focal to bilateral tonic-clonic and focal impaired awareness for a marker validated to detect ictal cross-frequency coupling: phase-locked high gamma (high-gamma phased-locked to low frequencies) and a marker of ictal recruitment: the epileptogenicity index. Third, we assessed changes in intracranial EEG activity preceding and accompanying behavioural generalization onset and their correlation with electromyogram channels. In addition, we analysed human cortical multi-unit activity recorded with Utah arrays during three focal to bilateral tonic-clonic seizures.Compared to focal impaired awareness, focal to bilateral tonic-clonic seizures were characterized by deeper loss of consciousness, even before generalization occurred. Unlike during focal impaired awareness, early loss of consciousness before generalization was accompanied by paradoxical decreases in slow-wave activity and by increases in high-gamma activity in parieto-occipital and temporal cortex. After generalization, when all patients displayed loss of consciousness, stronger increases in slow-wave activity were observed in parieto-occipital cortex, while more widespread increases in cortical activation (beta/delta ratio), ictal cross-frequency coupling (phase-locked high gamma) and ictal recruitment (epileptogenicity index). Behavioural generalization coincided with a whole-brain increase in high-gamma activity, which was especially synchronous in deep sources and could not be explained by EMG. Similarly, multi-unit activity analysis of focal to bilateral tonic-clonic revealed sustained increases in cortical firing rates during and after generalization onset in areas remote from the seizure onset zone.Overall, these results indicate that unlike during focal impaired awareness, the neural signatures of loss of consciousness during focal to bilateral tonic-clonic consist of paradoxical increases in cortical activation and neuronal firing found most consistently in posterior brain regions. These findings suggest differences in the mechanisms of ictal loss of consciousness between focal impaired awareness and focal to bilateral tonic-clonic and may account for the more negative prognostic consequences of focal to bilateral tonic-clonic.
- 16 November 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Brain
- Vol. 146 (1) , 109-123
Distinct signatures of loss of consciousness in focal impaired awareness versus tonic-clonic seizures
Loss of consciousness is a hallmark of many epileptic seizures and carries risks of serious injury and sudden death. While cortical sleep-like activities accompany loss of consciousness during focal impaired awareness seizures, the mechanisms of loss of consciousness during focal to bilateral tonic-clonic seizures remain unclear. Quantifying differences in markers of cortical activation and ictal recruitment between focal impaired awareness and focal to bilateral tonic-clonic seizures may also help us to understand their different consequences for clinical outcomes and to optimize neuromodulation therapies.We quantified clinical signs of loss of consciousness and intracranial EEG activity during 129 focal impaired awareness and 50 focal to bilateral tonic-clonic from 41 patients. We characterized intracranial EEG changes both in the seizure onset zone and in areas remote from the seizure onset zone with a total of 3386 electrodes distributed across brain areas. First, we compared the dynamics of intracranial EEG sleep-like activities: slow-wave activity (1–4 Hz) and beta/delta ratio (a validated marker of cortical activation) during focal impaired awareness versus focal to bilateral tonic-clonic. Second, we quantified differences between focal to bilateral tonic-clonic and focal impaired awareness for a marker validated to detect ictal cross-frequency coupling: phase-locked high gamma (high-gamma phased-locked to low frequencies) and a marker of ictal recruitment: the epileptogenicity index. Third, we assessed changes in intracranial EEG activity preceding and accompanying behavioural generalization onset and their correlation with electromyogram channels. In addition, we analysed human cortical multi-unit activity recorded with Utah arrays during three focal to bilateral tonic-clonic seizures.Compared to focal impaired awareness, focal to bilateral tonic-clonic seizures were characterized by deeper loss of consciousness, even before generalization occurred. Unlike during focal impaired awareness, early loss of consciousness before generalization was accompanied by paradoxical decreases in slow-wave activity and by increases in high-gamma activity in parieto-occipital and temporal cortex. After generalization, when all patients displayed loss of consciousness, stronger increases in slow-wave activity were observed in parieto-occipital cortex, while more widespread increases in cortical activation (beta/delta ratio), ictal cross-frequency coupling (phase-locked high gamma) and ictal recruitment (epileptogenicity index). Behavioural generalization coincided with a whole-brain increase in high-gamma activity, which was especially synchronous in deep sources and could not be explained by EMG. Similarly, multi-unit activity analysis of focal to bilateral tonic-clonic revealed sustained increases in cortical firing rates during and after generalization onset in areas remote from the seizure onset zone.Overall, these results indicate that unlike during focal impaired awareness, the neural signatures of loss of consciousness during focal to bilateral tonic-clonic consist of paradoxical increases in cortical activation and neuronal firing found most consistently in posterior brain regions. These findings suggest differences in the mechanisms of ictal loss of consciousness between focal impaired awareness and focal to bilateral tonic-clonic and may account for the more negative prognostic consequences of focal to bilateral tonic-clonic.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 15 October 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Vol. 2021 (2) , niab032
Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity
Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically—its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.
- 15 October 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Vol. 2021 (2) , niab032
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessConsciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity
Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically—its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do.
- Open Access
Distinct signatures of loss of consciousness during Focal Impaired Awareness versus Focal to Bilateral Tonic Clonic seizures
Loss of consciousness (LOC) is a hallmark of many epileptic seizures and carries risks of serious injury and sudden death. While cortical sleep-like activities accompany LOC during focal impaired awareness (FIA) seizures, the mechanisms of LOC during focal to bilateral tonic-clonic (FBTC) seizures remain unclear. Quantifying differences in markers of cortical activation and ictal recruitment between FIA and FBTC seizures may also help to understand their different consequences for clinical outcomes and to optimize neuromodulation therapies. We quantified clinical signs of LOC and intracranial EEG (iEEG) activity during 129 FIA and 50 FBTC from 41 patients. We characterized iEEG changes both in the seizure onset zone (SOZ) and in areas remote from SOZ with a total of 3386 electrodes distributed across brain areas. First, we compared the dynamics of iEEG sleep-like activities: slow-wave activity (SWA; 1-4 Hz) and beta/delta ratio (B/D; a validated marker of cortical activation) during FIA vs. FBTC. Second, we quantified differences between FBTC and FIA for a marker validated to detect ictal cross-frequency coupling: phase-locked high-gamma (PLHG; high gamma phased locked to low frequencies) and a marker of ictal recruitment: the epileptogenicity index (i.e. the number of channels crossing an energy ratio threshold for high vs. low frequency power). Third, we assessed changes in iEEG activity preceding and accompanying behavioral generalization onset and their correlation with electromyogram (EMG) channels. In addition, we analyzed human cortical multi-unit activity recorded with Utah arrays during three FBTC. Compared to FIA, FBTC seizures were characterized by deeper LOC and by stronger increases in SWA in parieto-occipital cortex. FBTC also displayed more widespread increases in cortical activation (B/D), ictal cross-frequency coupling (PLHG) and ictal recruitment (epileptogenicity index). Even before generalization, FBTC displayed deeper LOC; this early LOC was accompanied by a paradoxical increase in B/D in fronto-parietal cortex. Behavioral generalization coincided with complete loss of responsiveness and a subsequent increase in high-gamma in the whole brain, which was especially synchronous in deep sources and could not be explained by EMG. Similarly, multi-unit activity analysis of FBTC revealed sustained increases in cortical firing rates during and after generalization onset in areas remote from the SOZ. Unlike during FIA, LOC during FBTC is characterized by a paradoxical increase in cortical activation and neuronal firing. These findings suggest differences in the mechanisms of ictal LOC between FIA and FBTC and may account for the more negative prognostic consequences of FBTC.
Open AccessDistinct signatures of loss of consciousness during Focal Impaired Awareness versus Focal to Bilateral Tonic Clonic seizures
Loss of consciousness (LOC) is a hallmark of many epileptic seizures and carries risks of serious injury and sudden death. While cortical sleep-like activities accompany LOC during focal impaired awareness (FIA) seizures, the mechanisms of LOC during focal to bilateral tonic-clonic (FBTC) seizures remain unclear. Quantifying differences in markers of cortical activation and ictal recruitment between FIA and FBTC seizures may also help to understand their different consequences for clinical outcomes and to optimize neuromodulation therapies. We quantified clinical signs of LOC and intracranial EEG (iEEG) activity during 129 FIA and 50 FBTC from 41 patients. We characterized iEEG changes both in the seizure onset zone (SOZ) and in areas remote from SOZ with a total of 3386 electrodes distributed across brain areas. First, we compared the dynamics of iEEG sleep-like activities: slow-wave activity (SWA; 1-4 Hz) and beta/delta ratio (B/D; a validated marker of cortical activation) during FIA vs. FBTC. Second, we quantified differences between FBTC and FIA for a marker validated to detect ictal cross-frequency coupling: phase-locked high-gamma (PLHG; high gamma phased locked to low frequencies) and a marker of ictal recruitment: the epileptogenicity index (i.e. the number of channels crossing an energy ratio threshold for high vs. low frequency power). Third, we assessed changes in iEEG activity preceding and accompanying behavioral generalization onset and their correlation with electromyogram (EMG) channels. In addition, we analyzed human cortical multi-unit activity recorded with Utah arrays during three FBTC. Compared to FIA, FBTC seizures were characterized by deeper LOC and by stronger increases in SWA in parieto-occipital cortex. FBTC also displayed more widespread increases in cortical activation (B/D), ictal cross-frequency coupling (PLHG) and ictal recruitment (epileptogenicity index). Even before generalization, FBTC displayed deeper LOC; this early LOC was accompanied by a paradoxical increase in B/D in fronto-parietal cortex. Behavioral generalization coincided with complete loss of responsiveness and a subsequent increase in high-gamma in the whole brain, which was especially synchronous in deep sources and could not be explained by EMG. Similarly, multi-unit activity analysis of FBTC revealed sustained increases in cortical firing rates during and after generalization onset in areas remote from the SOZ. Unlike during FIA, LOC during FBTC is characterized by a paradoxical increase in cortical activation and neuronal firing. These findings suggest differences in the mechanisms of ictal LOC between FIA and FBTC and may account for the more negative prognostic consequences of FBTC.